Thought into being: finitude and creation by Haworth, Michael
1 
 
 
Thought into Being 
Finitude and Creation 
 
 
Michael Haworth 
 
 
 
 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
2013 
 
 
2 
 
 
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is a response to the increasingly widespread belief in the potential for 
technology and modern science to enable finite subjects to overcome the essential 
limitations constitutive of finitude and, hence, subjectivity. It investigates the truth 
and extent of such claims, taking as its focus quasi-miraculous technological 
developments in neuroscience, in particular Brain-Computer Interfacing systems 
and cognitive imaging technologies. The work poses the question of whether such 
emergent neurotechnologies signal a profound shift beyond receptivity and finitude 
by effectively bridging the gap between interiority and exteriority. Organised 
around a quadripartite division, the thesis pursues this idea firstly with regard to the 
act of artistic creation; secondly through an exegesis of Kant’s account of the 
original or infinite creativity of the Supreme Being; thirdly through readings of 
Freud and Jung and their respective models of the psyche; and finally through an 
interrogation into the possibility of telepathy and the various ways in which it can 
be conceived. Each chapter thus takes place as an extended thought experiment, 
exploring the consequences of a seemingly unprecedented proposition that 
promises to eradicate the finite gap between internal and external. This is followed 
to the limits of conceivability before asking in each case whether we may in fact 
need to rethink the very premises around which each proposition has framed the 
problem. 
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Introduction 
 
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. 
– Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents1 
 
We often hear predictions about the alarmingly transformational future in store for 
subjectivity, given the unprecedented leaps made over the last two and a half 
decades in genetics, neuroscience and computing, as well as anticipated advances in 
nanotechnology and robotics. The rate at which previously insurmountable 
deficiencies and frailties are routinely overcome, and new powers or capabilities are 
granted, suggests to some observers that there is no inherent biological limitation 
that cannot in principle be transcended.
2
 However, rather than corporeal 
appendages which increase strength, enable greater motility, or supplement the 
functioning of our perceptual organs, or advances in biomedicine that promise to 
eradicate disease and slow down the ageing process, our interest in the present 
study is in technological advances which promise to augment the faculty of thought 
itself. Our aim is to interrogate the seemingly unbreachable limits of finitude, and 
the irreducible gap or interval between the subjective interiority of thought and the 
positive exteriority of reality, and to consider whether any technological 
intermediary could conceivably enable us to traverse or even close altogether this 
gap. It is primarily a question of whether a supplementary prosthesis could allow 
thought or consciousness to exceed itself, and what the implications might be were 
the abyssal gulf between mind and world, and between one mind and another, to be 
annulled. 
                                                 
1
 Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, 1930 (Standard Ed. 21) p. 21. 
2
 See for example, Joel Garreau, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing our Minds, 
our Bodies – And What it Means to be Human (New York: Doubleday, 2005.) 
7 
 
 
The devices that are the occasion for these reflections are well-documented, rapidly 
advancing neurotechnological systems that, through opening a direct 
communication pathway into the brain, seek to facilitate an immediate psychical 
intervention into reality, thus bypassing physical actions and potentially removing 
all mediation between intention and act, possibility and actuality, thought and 
being. We will ask whether the faculty presented by such devices, which will be 
outlined in our first chapter, amounts to a form of spontaneous creative activity that 
as such would surmount the receptivity central to human finitude. Furthermore, if 
this is so, what would be the consequences of such an ‘overcoming’ of finitude and 
how is it to be conceived? Could any instrumental agent enable us to attain this true 
immediacy, where the ‘in here’ would coincide with the ‘out there’ without any 
delay or mediation? Or alternatively, can the relationship between thought and 
being be reconsidered such that there would be no gap to overcome? These 
introductory remarks will simply sketch a broad overview of the work as a whole, 
providing a chapter-by-chapter summary of what is to be addressed. Since each 
division is largely autonomous, while all constellating around the same set of 
questions, it may prove helpful at this stage to get a sense of how the central 
narrative unfolds. 
 
Chapter One: As our point of departure we will situate these questions in relation 
to artistic practice, where this ‘gap’ will be considered with regard to the relation 
between the artist’s idea or inspiration and the resulting object. The process of 
realising a ‘mere idea’ as a physical object or event can often be a troubling one, 
where compromises must be made and problems negotiated. The possibility 
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promised by the technologies we will be considering, in potentially allowing for a 
piece of work to be willed into existence and for the idea or intention to emerge 
fully realised as an object, thus seems to fulfil the familiar dream of many 
practitioners by effectively circumventing the practicalities, limitations and 
disappointments that intervene between conception and execution. So would such a 
bypassing of physicality, of the necessary struggle to translate an idea into reality, 
facilitate a more ‘direct’, true or faithful realisation of this idea? However, as John 
Dewey writes, ‘[the] act of expression that constitutes a work of art is a 
construction in time, not an instantaneous emission’,3 so bearing this in mind how 
would such a development impact upon the act of artistic creation? What kind of 
creation would we be dealing with? In addition to this, would the liberation from 
the requisite physical expertise enable just anyone to access previously untapped 
reserves of creativity that had been unable to find expression? 
 
Besides, how stable and clear-cut is this distinction between the idea and the 
physical expression? After a brief examination of certain pertinent aspects of 
Kant’s philosophy of art, and Hegel’s critique of Kant, we will then turn for the 
bulk of the chapter to the aesthetic philosophy of Bendetto Croce, which, while no 
longer commanding any of the influence or prestige it once enjoyed, still has a 
claim to our interest and, so I will suggest, presents us with a uniquely productive 
paradigm for envisaging what we are potentially faced with. This reading of Croce 
is pivotal to the argument of the opening chapter and will implicitly underlie much 
of what follows in subsequent chapters. 
 
                                                 
3
 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Pedigree, 2005) p. 67. 
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Chapter Two: This is followed by a more ‘fundamental’, ontological discussion in 
the second chapter, where the central problematic of the entire thesis is brought into 
clear focus. Here is where the question of finitude is explicitly posed for the first 
time, by systematically pursuing the consequences of an extraordinary, but 
thoroughly undeveloped, remark by Slavoj Žižek. As will be seen, Žižek boldly 
declares that the capability granted to us by these same neurotechnologies we are 
interested in amounts to what Kant calls intellectual intuition, a faculty hitherto 
considered to belong only to the divine mind of the Creator. While finite cognition 
is a derivative faculty, for which the object must be given in a receptive intuition, 
the divine intuition is said to be an original one whose objects spring forth from the 
cognition itself. The infinite mind of God, since it cannot be dependent upon an 
external object to which it must conform, is therefore creative rather than receptive. 
However, with the apparent prospect of closing the finite gap between inner and 
outer, and the possibility of giving body to the merely subjective contents of the 
mind, are we, as Žižek suggests, on the threshold of attaining to this divine, 
productive faculty? 
 
Our approach here, then, is one of methodically picking up the pieces after this 
somewhat cavalier pronouncement, and attempting to come to terms with the 
fallout from this astonishing prospect.
4
 In doing so much of the chapter is devoted 
to providing a detailed exegesis of the concept of intellectual intuition itself, and 
endeavouring to conceive of what it might mean were such a capability to be made 
available to finite beings. After all, the surpassing of finitude is by no means seen 
by Kant as something desirous; on one or two occasions he gives highly evocative 
                                                 
4
 In actual fact this sentence describes not merely the methodological approach of one chapter but 
accurately sums up the entire thesis, for it was this passage of Žižek’s that provided the germ for all 
of the present research. 
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accounts of the disastrous consequences that would follow were we to transgress 
the limits of the finite. For since our spontaneity, freedom and creativity are 
conditioned by, and inextricable from, finitude, perhaps such a transgression, rather 
than conferring superior creative powers, would actually put this spontaneity at 
risk. We will appeal also to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, and his privileging 
of the transcendental imagination, whose power of productivity or creativity must, 
however, be strictly distinguished from the mode of creation pertaining to an 
infinite intellect. After thus setting out the scope of the problem and the difficulties 
to be surmounted the argument will turn finally to Quentin Mellassoux’s far-
reaching critique of philosophies of finitude and consider what implications his 
intriguing employment of the term intellectual intuition could have for our 
enquiries. 
 
Chapter Three: The third chapter then poses the question of what happens when 
we introduce the unconscious into the equation. Freud places great importance on a 
number of strict oppositional distinctions, such as the real as opposed to the unreal, 
subjective as opposed to objective, and internal as opposed to external; so would 
the technologies in question, by problematising such distinctions, lead to a 
reconsideration of some of the key concepts of psychoanalysis? We will consider 
initially the gap between a need or desire and its fulfilment, and speculate upon 
whether these devices, brought to their inevitable conclusion, would lead to a state 
of auto-satisfaction. Once again, however, despite how it might appear at first sight, 
the outcome may turn out to be far from advantageous. For just as Kant warns of 
the catastrophic cost of exceeding finitude, so here it may be the case that the 
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condition of instant gratification and total enslavement to the pleasure principle 
would paradoxically spell the end of pleasure. 
 
Moreover, there may be profound implications for Freud’s theory of memory, for it 
seems as if we are potentially on the cusp of supplementing our finite mnemic 
systems with technological memory-aids that would facilitate absolute retention, or 
total recall. However, we will have cause to question the implicit assumptions 
behind such a prediction, through calling on Derrida’s readings of Freud and the 
famed ‘Mystic Writing-Pad.’ Following this we will return to the question of 
automatic wish-fulfilment and the opposition of fantasy and reality, probing 
Freud’s theory of repressed desire, according to which the materialisation of that 
which we most desire, rather than bringing pleasure, would make us recoil in 
disgust. This will be related to the capability of brain scans to reveal latent 
dispositions and a discussion will ensue on the essential difference between what 
we think we want (or think, feel, experience) and what we really want. 
 
For the second half we will return to the concerns of the preceding chapter and ask 
whether psychoanalysis may provide us with the means to rethink finitude and the 
inescapability of receptivity. Is this to be sought in the alleged ‘timelessness’ of the 
unconscious? Indeed, how is this latter to be conceived and does it amount to an 
exception to Kant’s transcendental conditions of experience as Freud suggests? 
From here we will turn to the work of Carl Gustav Jung, in particular the short 
treatise entitled Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle, where the monist 
or ‘psychoid’ ontology underpinning all of Jung’s psychological work on the 
archetypes of the collective unconscious is given its most extensive treatment. 
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Through appealing to the holistic absolute that Jung terms unus mundus, we hope to 
undermine the interval separating thought from positive being and in doing so 
reconsider the relationship between subject and object set out thus far. 
 
Chapter Four: Our final considerations will probe the concept of telepathy, 
prompted by experiments into the possibility of a technologically enabled form of 
brain-to-brain communication. Here we are ostensibly faced with the prospect of 
traversing perhaps the final unbridgeable gap of finitude: that separating one mind 
from another and confining us to individual egoity. We will ask whether a 
telepathic insight into the mind of the other could enable us to penetrate his or her 
innermost thoughts, thus bypassing the intermediary of language and profoundly 
transforming intersubjectivity. For language produces as much as it overcomes the 
distance between subjects, both enabling and disabling communication; however, 
can we truly speak of thought or subjectivity prior to language? Is there a stratum 
of selfhood that is indubitably mine and mine alone, undiluted by the universality 
and generality of language, and which the latter necessarily conceals? Through 
tracing an outline of Wittgenstein’s famous ‘private language argument’ from the 
Philosophical Investigations, and a related passage from Nietzsche’s Gay Science, 
we will explore this question as to whether there is an irreducible, singular kernel of 
mineness that withdraws from the universal, and follow the paradoxes to which it 
seems inevitably to lead. 
 
In considering the possibility of a truly ‘direct’ form of communication that 
outstrips the universal, we will then ask whether, via technological means, we could 
conceive of telepathically communicating what philosophers of mind term qualia, 
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or the immediate ‘what-it-is-like-ness’ of an experience. Given the 
interconnectedness of all of our thoughts and experiences, can we envisage the 
possibility of extracting a moment from this horizon of associations and 
transmitting it to the other, such that he or she would immediately feel what we 
feel, short-circuiting the need for description? Furthermore, would this be an 
immediate presence of mind to mind without the recourse to a signifying utterance? 
 
Going further still, could we speculatively conceive of a first hand experience of the 
other’s subjective interior that is not thereby wrested back into my own experience? 
That is to say, rather than gaining an empathetic understanding into what it would 
be like for me to experience that which he is experiencing, could I ever probe the 
other’s mind to such a degree that I could know – or feel – what it is like for him? 
But how can this externality, this otherness, be maintained as externality and 
otherness, without its being assumed and taken over by my consciousness? We will 
follow the intricate thread of these questions through readings of Husserl, Levinas 
and Derrida, and try to arrive at a form of telepathy that is not reducible to the 
simple communication of a message between an active and a passive agent, but 
which simultaneously maintains the distance between the subjects involved. We 
will conclude by returning to the question of ownness, attempting once again to 
locate the irreducible, singular core of subjectivity that would abstain from 
universality. 
 
So in each case something extraordinary is promised and this possibility is followed 
to the limits of conceivability to consider whether such a promise can be fulfilled, 
or whether in fact we may need to rethink the premises from which we set out. As 
14 
 
such, each chapter resembles an extended thought experiment, pursuing the 
consequences of a seemingly unprecedented proposition. In order to help conceive 
of such outlandish possibilities we will often have recourse to certain apposite 
examples from literature and science-fiction cinema. Such examples, more than 
mere illustrative signposting, will provide us with models for how to think the 
possibilities we are faced with. 
 
As a disclaimer, it should be made clear at the outset that while these considerations 
are motivated by particular technoscientific developments, and specific cases are 
addressed, what is at issue for us here is in no respects the capacity or capabilities 
of any given technological procedure. Thus it is not our aim to predict scientific 
developments, nor describe the mechanics and judge the efficacy of the processes 
that we will be considering. The technologies addressed in these pages are engaged 
with on an analogous level to the examples from fictional sources, that is, on a 
purely speculative conceptual basis. As such this work in no way attempts a 
‘scientific’ approach to philosophical problems, nor does it contribute to the 
growing literature probing the philosophical consequences of developments in 
neuroscience. Furthermore, although admittedly there is a certain superficial 
kinship, this is resolutely not a work of ‘transhumanist’ futurology. Transhumanism 
is a form of speculative eschatological thought predicting and welcoming the 
potential of technology to profoundly transform and improve the human condition 
by overcoming suffering and reversing ageing, as well as boundlessly increasing 
intellectual capabilities through technological brain enhancements.
5
 The goal of 
transhumanism is to usher in the ‘post-human’ age, where biological constraints 
                                                 
5
 Cf. Nick Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, Journal of Evolution and Technology 
14, no. 1 (April 2005): pp. 1-25. 
15 
 
will be transcended and finitude definitively surpassed. However, while we will at 
times be speculating upon future developments and probing the consequences, 
unlike transhumanist discourses our enquiries here do not rest on scientific 
evidences or outcomes, for the question is whether any technological instrument 
could enable us to freely transgress hitherto insurmountable limits. Thus it is not 
strictly a question of technology as such, of its essence or its potential for 
transformation of the human species, but of these very limits themselves. Are there 
limitations pertaining to finitude that no technological instrument however 
advanced could surpass, regardless of what the advocates of transhumanism may 
predict; limits, the only surpassing of which would be the dissolution or dispersal of 
the subject, namely death itself? 
 
After all, does not Adorno state that gaps are an essential precondition to thought? 
A thought that does not perform a break with what is, where there is no space 
between itself and the already there, would be mere repetition. For Adorno, a 
thought or an insight is born through ‘the dense, firmly founded but by no means 
uniformly transparent medium of experience’,6 in other words the irreducible 
mediation and separation between the interiority of the subject and the exteriority of 
the actual. A pure adequation of thought to object, a divine insight into things, 
would thus simply reaffirm what is, and as such would fail to rise above the 
commonplace. Thought or knowledge, says Adorno, is ‘mediated by the whole flow 
of conscious life in the knowing subject’,7 and this mediation is not something we 
must seek to overcome in the aim of ever greater objectivity, for this would 
effectively amount to thought’s dissolution. So the inescapability of one’s own 
                                                 
6
 Theodor Adorno, ‘Gaps’, Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005) p. 80. 
7
 Ibid., p. 81. 
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individual point of entry onto the world (which is finitude itself), including 
‘prejudices, opinions, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and 
exaggerations’,8 that perennially keep us at a distance at one remove from an 
immediate grasp of ‘reality’, is in fact the enabling source of insight rather than its 
obscuring fog. This gap, or opacity, however, is essentially unjustifiable and thus 
always incurs ‘a certain guilt’9 or unpayable debt. However, the settlement of the 
debt, or the closure of the gap and the overcoming of finitude, would perhaps spell 
the end of thought itself rather than its elevation to ever-greater heights. In other 
words, the coincidence of interior and exterior could seemingly only come at the 
cost of losing one of the terms of the opposition. 
 
What we hope to have achieved by the end of this work is a rigorous and 
painstaking investigation into the structure and subjective status of such gaps, 
interruptions, delays and intervals as we have briefly outlined in this introduction, 
and to consider whether a form of ecstatic venturing beyond the ego, or an original 
(non-receptive) creativity could be at all conceivable. We will endeavour to 
understand whether the promise of these technologies to attain to a form of 
immediacy can be fulfilled and if so what consequences this must necessarily 
entail. For, surely, if a hitherto impassable limit can be broached this cannot be due 
to some seismic technological event, but because it has been revealed to be 
something other than that which we originally thought it to be. Likewise, if certain 
problems prove incapable of being negotiated this will not be due to a flaw, 
weakness or shortcoming on the side of the technologies themselves, but will be for 
essential reasons pertaining to the nature of the problem. 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 80. 
9
 Ibid., p. 81. 
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Chapter One: ‘The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.’ 1 
 
He understood that the task of moulding the incoherent and dizzying stuff that 
dreams are made of is the most difficult work a man can undertake. 
– Jorge Luis Borges, The Circular Ruins2 
 
Since the gradual repudiation or rejection of physical skill as a necessary 
constituent of artistic practice it has been difficult to define with any degree of 
finality what it is exactly that an artist does, and what it is that makes one an artist. 
Undoubtedly the most persistent answer, prevalent at least since the late 1960s 
heyday of conceptual art, is that the talent of the artist consists in generating ideas. 
But does this mean that the essence of the creative work takes place in advance of 
its construction? Does the work of art (or novel, film, or piece of music for that 
matter) necessarily proceed from a conscious plan or does it only take shape as it is 
being enacted? Concomitantly, if an artist has a ‘good idea’ is its implementation a 
mere formality, or conversely can a ‘bad idea’, executed well, result in a successful 
piece of work? Number 33 of Sol Lewitt’s Sentences on Conceptual Art states 
flatly: ‘It is difficult to bungle a good idea.’3 For LeWitt, the form is merely a 
vehicle and the artist must go about constructing it so as to maximise the clarity and 
impact of this animating principle. When considering, for instance, the dimensions 
of a work LeWitt writes, ‘the piece must be large enough to give the viewer 
whatever information he needs to understand the work and placed in such a way 
                                                 
1
 Sol LeWitt, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’, first published in Artforum 5, no. 10 (1967), reprinted 
in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p. 834. 
2
 Jorge Luis Borges, Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin, 2000) p. 46. 
3
 LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’, first published in Art-Language 1, no. 1 (1969), reprinted 
in Art in Theory 1900-1990, p. 839. 
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that will facilitate this understanding.’4 The enactment is a wholly pragmatic affair; 
so long as the ideational content has been transmitted effectively then it has been a 
success. However, is it possible to deny this radical pragmatism without 
overemphasising or fetishising the corporeal, sensual or ‘performative’ aspect of 
artistic creation? Carl Andre, often associated with conceptual art but vocally 
critical of its rhetoric, rejects the notion of the idea as sovereign. For Andre, ‘all 
ideas are the same except in execution. They lie in the head. In terms of the artist, 
the only difference between one idea and another is how it is executed.’5 And 
elsewhere he states, ‘if abstract art is art as its own content, then conceptual art is 
pure content without art. Following Reinhardt, I desire art-as-art, not art-as-idea.’6 
This dialectic of idea and expression, referring here for expediency to debates 
surrounding conceptual art but by no means limited to such a context, will one way 
or another form the crux of this first chapter. 
 
Too Much, Too Little: Beckett and Joyce, Cage and Boulez 
 
For any artist working to a pre-formulated idea, or a precise conception of what it is 
he or she intends to do, the process of its physical realisation can often be 
experienced as a frustrating struggle, fraught with obstacles and impasses. As Kant 
puts it in his Anthropology, ‘actuality is always more limited than the idea that 
serves as a pattern for realisation.’7 This imposing of limitations on what appears 
boundless, and the conferral of clunky materiality onto what seems perfect in the 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. 836. 
5
 Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialisation of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997) p. 40. 
6
 Ibid., p. 157. 
7
 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell, 
revised and updated by Hans H. Rudnick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996) 
§30, AA 173. [My italics.] 
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mind is the reason why the physical art-object can often disappoint its creator and 
fail to live up the promise of its gestation. It can seem that this leap from psychical 
event to physical object is an impossible one, where the very first gesture or 
incision feels like a compromise and a corruption: an irretrievable turning away 
from the idea. All further work undertaken as the artist attempts to bring it closer to 
the original conception is a form of regression – a return to an impossible origin – 
that is simultaneously a progressive dislocation from the origin, as the more she 
works it over the further it strays from its starting point. Like a palimpsest, it retains 
the traces of all that has been added and removed, such that even if the artist undoes 
what has been done and attempts to start afresh it is at risk of becoming laboured, 
and referring more and more to itself and the previous failures than to the virginal 
idea as it started out. This, of course, is in many respects how a work of art takes 
shape and becomes both more and less than that which it started out as. Great things 
can come from accidents or even from failing to accomplish what was initially 
intended; but it can also have the opposite effect, and repeated frustration can 
stymie the creative process. 
 
This tension that is in some respects the condition and predicament of the artist is 
expressed in tragicomic fashion by the narrator in Samuel Beckett’s 1947 novel 
Molloy: 
 
This is one of the reasons why I avoid speaking as much as possible. For I 
always say either too much or too little, which is a terrible thing for a man 
with a passion for truth like mine. And I shall not abandon this subject, to 
which I shall probably never have occasion to return, with such a storm 
20 
 
blowing up, without making this curious observation, that it often happened 
to me, before I gave up speaking for good, to think I had said too little when 
in fact I had said too much and in fact to have said too little when I thought I 
had said too much. I mean that on reflection, in the long run rather, my 
verbal profusion turned out to be penury, and inversely. So time sometimes 
turns the tables. In other words, or perhaps another thing, whatever I said it 
was never enough and always too much.
8
 
 
The work of the artist is ‘never enough’ in that more could always be done to a 
piece; perhaps she has not successfully articulated what she wished to express. It is 
not quite there, and the threat of misinterpretation or misconstrual is ever-present. 
There are innumerable accounts of artists being repeatedly reluctant to declare a 
work finished and hand it over to be exhibited where it would circulate beyond their 
control; and as Alberto Giacometti once remarked, ‘that’s the terrible thing: the 
more one works on a picture, the more impossible it becomes to finish it.’9 
                                                 
8
 Samuel Beckett, Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnameable (New York: Grove Press, 
2009) pp. 29-30. Interestingly, this paragraph from Molloy and the interpretation here given is 
anticipated in a strikingly similar passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: 
 
Speech and work are outer expressions in which the individual no longer keeps and 
possesses himself within himself, but lets the inner get completely outside of him, leaving it 
to the mercy of something other than himself. For that reason we can say with equal truth 
that these expressions express the inner too much, as that they do so too little: too much, 
because the inner itself breaks out in them and there remains no antithesis between them 
and it; they give not merely an expression of the inner, but directly the inner itself; too 
little, because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else, thus putting 
itself at the mercy of the element of change, which twists the spoken word and the 
accomplished act into meaning something else than they are in and for themselves, as 
actions of this particular individual. (§312. Tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p. 187.) 
 
In the words I speak or the work I produce I estrange myself from myself. The object is not an 
external sign pointing back to something inner that remains mine, but is my inner intention 
externalised – I do not keep anything back in reserve. But at the same time, since I am powerless to 
determine its reception, what is intended may become lost or altered in transmission. For Hegel it 
seems I am thus fully present and wholly absent from my product or utterance. 
9
 ‘The Painter’s Keys’, http://quote.robertgenn.com/auth_search.php?authid=1492, [Accessed 
02.03.10.] 
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However, it is simultaneously ‘always too much’, in that the very first act – 
breaking the silence, sullying the clean white canvas or making the first mark on an 
empty page – is itself an excess; it commits, while corrupting the purity of the idea 
or intention. Every decision after that first breach takes the artist further away from 
where she started, and following the path along the way she came never leads back 
to where she began; wiping away traces always makes more traces of its own.
10
 
 
Another way the too much/too little axis can be approached is from the perspective 
of the viewer. What we are presented with is in itself not enough; it is too enigmatic 
and opaque. We may often find we want to read some explanation or historical 
detail of what has been done and what it means, a tendency which has culminated 
in the increasingly widespread availability of explanatory audio guides at major art 
galleries, conveniently summarising and deciphering these strange objects for our 
easy digestion. But it is equally too much in that it places limits on our imagination 
and binds it to this particular object we are considering, limiting the possibilities to 
this particular work and nothing else. In other words, like the horror movie maxim 
that an unseen menace is always more terrifying than anything that could be 
directly shown, the more we are presented with the less work there is for our 
imagination. If one finally gets to experience a rare or hard to come by film or piece 
of music that one has long anticipated it can very often fail to live up to our 
expectations. So the same thing that elevates our imagination to new heights 
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simultaneously limits it, leaving us unsatisfied and impatient to move on to 
something else that will perhaps satiate us more. So if the artist inhabits the role of 
Beckett’s Molloy, the position of the viewer as I have characterised it could, pushed 
to its limit, be identified with another character in 20
th
 Century comic literature, the 
inscrutable master of disguise Henry Burlingame in John Barth’s satirical novel The 
Sot-Weed Factor. He loves and loathes the world for this very reason – that while it 
inspires his imagination and ‘’twas splendid here and there […] he could not but 
loathe it for having been the case.’11 That it is the case is both the cause and the 
limit of our enjoyment, grounding it and rendering it commonplace. 
 
The artist caught in the double bind of ‘never enough and always too much’ can 
often find herself tempted to, like Molloy, ‘give up speaking for good’. She is 
thwarted by the seeming impossibility of creating a work of art and finds that the 
only available action is inaction, recalling Foucault’s formulation of madness as 
l’absence d’oeuvre;12 everything is compromised so why do anything. One strategy 
of coping with this impasse would be to do almost nothing, what the composer 
George Brecht called ‘Borderline Art’: sights barely seen, sounds barely heard and 
easily missed. Many of the practices, disruptions and interventions of conceptual 
art, Fluxus, and the latter period of great American and European abstract painting 
were so minimal as to be barely there. More recently, it is not uncommon in free 
improvisatory music for performances to hover just above the threshold of total 
silence; one strains to discern the body of a guitar squeaking as it is rubbed, or the 
slight rattling sound of a saxophonist’s fingers on the keys. It is as if any breaking 
of the silence must be fully justified, and the longer it goes on the more loaded and 
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problematic would any sound become. It casts the act of making music as a 
heroically brave gesture. The ‘borderline’ on which such gestures operate is, in the 
words of Foucault, ‘the exterior edge, the line of dissolution, the contour against the 
void’;13 that is, the limit separating the work from the nothingness out of which it 
emerged. Every work of art is, for Foucault, ‘the sheer cliff over the abyss of [its 
own] absence.’14 In veering as close as possible to this precipice, minimal gestures 
dramatise this fact and strive to enact the moment of their own coming into 
existence – the first tentative crossing of the line. 
 
What these considerations could not fail to call to mind is of course John Cage’s 
famous ‘silent’ piece 4’33”, the score for which read simply thus: 
 
I 
TACET 
II 
TACET 
III 
TACET 
 
The piece is in three movements and, as ‘TACET’ is the word used in western 
notation to tell a player to remain silent during a movement, the entire piece is 
silent. As is well known, the title 4’33” is the total length in minutes and seconds of 
its notorious first performance in 1952 by the pianist David Tudor, who marked the 
beginning and ending of each movement by closing and opening his piano lid 
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respectively; but Cage makes clear that the piece could last any length of time and 
be ‘performed’ on any musical instrument or combination of instruments. Thus he 
imposes a wholly arbitrary and variable time frame during which what takes place 
is the ‘piece’ but what occurs immediately before or after this duration is not. As 
Michael Nyman describes, 
 
At the first performance Tudor, seated in the normal fashion on a stool in 
front of the piano, did nothing more nor less than silently close the keyboard 
lid at the beginning of, and raise it at the end of each time period. The score 
had not of course explicitly asked him to make these – or any – actions, but 
they were implied because some means or other had to be devised to 
observe the three time lengths without causing to be heard any sounds not 
specified by the composer.
15
 
 
This is a piece of music reduced to the minimal difference between something and 
nothing; a limit in time that inevitably bleeds and undermines its boundaries. In 
stripping virtually everything away all that is left is the frame, and that is a wholly 
arbitrary and unstable one. Whenever a piece of music is performed the ‘start’ and 
‘end’, what is within and without of the work, is difficult to define but in Cage’s 
piece this forms the very object of the work, some token signal from the performer 
acting as the only indication that the piece is under way, and even this is inferred 
rather than specified in the score. The clearly defined duration of the piece both 
excludes and includes the other side of that limit: time in its infinite expanse. In 
Derridean terms it delimits a definite space while de-limiting and contaminating 
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that space in the very act of establishing it.
16
 It excludes this boundless excess by 
drawing up the frame in the first place, delineating this period of time and 
identifying it as the duration of a piece of music. However, as Kant puts it, any 
‘determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations [put] on a 
single underlying time. Hence, the original presentation, time, must be given as 
unlimited.’17 So in the very act of enclosing a section of time it evokes time itself, a 
sublime gesture that in Kant’s terms negatively presents the absolute. The piece is 
almost nothing, threatening to collapse entirely but as such, as Derrida would have 
it, it merely draws attention to the instability of all limits and all acts of framing. 
 
Beckett once famously said of James Joyce: 
 
I realised that [he] had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing 
more, [being] in control of one’s material. He was always adding to it; you 
only have to look at his proofs to see that. I realised that my own way was in 
impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting 
rather than adding.
18
 
 
In this is an implicit acknowledgement that one can never have complete control 
over one’s work and attempting to do so will be an endless, Sisyphean task, for no 
matter how tightly sealed the frame may appear to be it will always allow for 
escape and infiltration. So Beckett may be said to approach this knot of too 
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much/too little from the side of too little and Joyce that of the too much. An 
argument could be made that these competing tendencies constituted the two 
essential horns of modernism, and that the foundering of the modernist project 
could be ascribed to each direction reaching its limit – in the one case of there being 
nothing left to strip away and in the other complete saturation. Perhaps an even 
more exemplary illustration is the deeply ideological rift between the Experimental 
Music of Cage, Morton Feldman, Cornelius Cardew, etc., and the classical avant-
garde of Schoenberg and Webern through to Boulez, Stockhausen and others. 
While the former were concerned with processes and chance procedures and treated 
notation as instructions for actions to be carried out, the results of which varied 
hugely from performance to performance, the latter attempted to rigidly define and 
contain what took place in their work. Again, in the words of Michael Nyman, 
 
[This] is the effect that processes have in experimental music: they are the 
most direct and straightforward means of simply setting sounds in motion; 
they are impersonal and external and so they do not have the effect of 
organising sounds and integrating them, of creating relationships of 
harmony as the controlling faculty of the human mind does.
19
 
 
And at the other end of the spectrum, 
 
[One] finds Boulez, seemingly disconcerted by the impermanence of his 
sounds, constantly trying to fix them with ever greater precision by 
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obsessive revising, refining and reworking, in the hope of sculpting his 
sounds into more permanent finality.
20
 
 
The music of Boulez and the rest of the European avant-garde, in the estimation of 
Nyman and those he includes under the ‘Experimental Music’ banner, is rigid and 
lifeless, demanding a far less autocratic authorial approach. Boulez himself on the 
other hand would no doubt have considered the work of the Cagean school to be 
lacking in complexity and compositional rigour and needing more from the guiding 
hand of the composer. 
 
Whereas traditionally musical notation was seen as an, albeit not ideal, method of 
transcribing a ‘musical thought’ in the words of Edgar Varése,21 the experimental 
composers, as noted above, all but abandoned conventional notation in favour of 
ambiguous worded instructions and pictographic diagrams that could be interpreted 
any number of ways. This transformation of the score from a graphic 
representation of an arrangement of sounds into a set of instructions retroactively 
allows us to, as Nyman again notes, see ‘the note C in a Mozart piano sonata [to 
mean] “hit that piece of ivory there, with that force and for that long.”’22 This 
echoes Willem de Kooning’s famous declaration, ‘the past does not influence me, I 
influence the past’,23 and similar sentiments expressed by Borges and Cage 
himself.
24
 For the European avant-garde however, unconvinced by such radical 
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moves, the conventional system of notation was still something to be struggled 
with, as an inadequate but nonetheless essential vehicle for transcribing one’s 
‘musical thoughts’. This inadequacy became ever more pronounced when greater 
emphasis began to be placed on timbre than on pitch, and ‘non-musical’ elements 
began to be incorporated such as electronic devices and tape collages. 
 
Stockhausen, who himself experimented with novel forms of notation, but perhaps 
for rather different reasons than those of the Anglo-American composers, once said,  
 
My intuition, my fantasy, is so much more developed than what I can do. I 
am constantly hitting my head against a wall because everything is so slow. 
I have so many ideas, and really brilliant ones, that I can never realise […] I 
will try to get a mission to a place which is more advanced, where music is 
far more developed. A place where I can work directly with the vibrations, 
where the atmosphere is adapted to the kind of vibrations that exist, where 
the people are so sensitive that I can make music right out of my 
consciousness, and where the translation is not so primitive. I have to go 
beyond writing, and using erasers that don’t work, bad paper and all this. 
You see, it’s all very primitive here.25 
 
While Stockhausen has a well-deserved reputation for eccentricity and mysticism 
and comments like these should be taken in such a context, it nevertheless gives 
                                                                                                                                        
what other people do in a different light than we do without our having done anything. What I mean 
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voice to a common frustration. Indeed this notion of creating work directly ‘out of 
one’s consciousness’ must be a familiar dream of the composer or artist. Raymond 
Scott, the composer and electronic music pioneer, expressed similar sentiments 
when he said in 1949, 
 
Perhaps within the next hundred years, science will perfect a process of 
thought transference from composer to listener. The composer will sit alone 
on the concert stage and merely think his idealised conception of his music. 
Instead of recordings of actual music sound, recordings will carry the 
brainwaves of the composer directly to the mind of the listener.’26 
 
This, in effect, is a yearning for the artistic idea to appear fully formed as an object, 
bypassing the crude practicalities and limitations involved in the process of its 
assembly and eliminating all obstacles between conception and execution. 
 
The earliest notable example of music created straight out of the brainwaves of the 
performer is Alvin Lucier’s 1965 piece Music for Solo Performer. Electrodes are 
attached to the performer’s scalp and the vibrations from the amplified alpha 
rhythms are used to resonate a number of percussion instruments. But while this 
could be said to be music created by thought, it is evidently not music that has been 
thought into being. It could just as easily be the performer’s heartbeat triggering the 
sounds, although this obviously would have been less compelling. The actual 
contents of that cognitive activity are strictly irrelevant and, in any case, 
inaccessible. The wish being expressed by the composers above is rather different; 
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namely, they desire for their actual subjective states to be harnessed and for the 
music ‘in their head’ to be brought into reality. As fanciful as this sounds, 
extraordinary technological advances in the brain sciences are fast making it a very 
real and urgent concern. 
 
Scientists have over the last few decades developed very reliable means of 
measuring and harnessing human brain activity and utilising this information in 
ever more refined and efficient technologies. A Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) 
involves the transmitting of neural impulses directly to a computer, enabling the 
user to bypass physical actions and manipulate mechanical tools or computer 
systems using only their brainwaves. It allows for the control of a device by 
explicitly thinking of the task in question, for example controlling a prosthetic limb 
by merely thinking about the intended movement.
27
 There has been remarkable, 
well publicised research conducted on monkeys, who learned to feed themselves 
using a robotic arm controlled by the brain, managing to manoeuvre the arm 
effortlessly as if it were a part of their own body.
28
 Early steps are also being taken 
toward developing an interface that will enable a form of ‘brain-to-brain 
communication’, but we will address this particular prospect in a later chapter. 
 
The most common type of BCI system uses EEG (electroencephalogram) signals 
from electrodes attached to the user’s scalp, but this is limited in scope and in 
accuracy, mainly due to the distance between the surface of the scalp and the brain 
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itself, which results in weak signals. The only way to counter this limitation is 
through invasive or partially invasive procedures which either insert electrodes 
directly into the brain tissue or on the inside of the skull but outside of the 
membrane protecting the brain. Daniel Moran, a significant pioneer of the latter 
procedure (called epidural electrocorticography or EECoG) predicts, with casual 
brevity, that as the technology is perfected, ‘we’ll drill a small hole in the skull, pop 
the bone out, drop the device in, replace the bone, sew up the scalp and you’ll have 
what amounts to Bluetooth in your head that translates your thoughts into 
actions.’29 
 
What is of especial interest for the moment is the work being done by researchers at 
a number of academic institutions in adapting this technology for musical 
composition and performance, the aim being to enable the subject to ‘think’ or, 
perhaps better, ‘intend’, a note that is recognised by a computer and executed.30 Its 
primary stated purpose, as with most BCI technology, is to enable those with 
disabilities to accomplish tasks which they are unable to carry out physically, but 
the implications extend far beyond this. So if one were to conceive of a piece of 
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music but were hampered by a lack of musical ability this need not necessarily be 
an obstacle; one need only think of the piece and potentially there may be the 
capability to take the information directly from one’s brain and bring it into reality. 
But this of course would remove the aspect of physical expression from music-
making, of the struggle with the instrument and the need to translate one’s ideas 
into a manifest form. The question of what implications such a development would 
carry for artistic creation in general will be of paramount importance for us here. 
 
It should be stressed that the term ‘physical expression’ is being employed rather 
loosely and not in a romantic or ideological sense, such as the musician or gestural 
painter supposedly giving of his or her body and soul in the work. There obviously 
exist countless forms of artistic expression that do not carry this association. 
Computer music, for instance, has often been described by hostile critics as cold 
and mechanical and the artists themselves accused of doing nothing other than 
clicking mouse buttons. However, as with most mechanical arts, while the level of 
strictly physical activity may be minimal this absence of physicality in no way 
equates to an absence of authorial involvement or compositional expression. 
Furthermore, in visual art post-Warhol it is a commonplace for works to show no 
sign of the artist’s hand and in many cases for the actual physical construction to 
have been carried out by assistants. So, for ‘expression’ we might just as easily 
have substituted ‘execution’, for it is being used to refer to the actions undertaken, 
whatever they may be, to bring about the physical work itself and to realise what 
one intends to do. Certain technical and practical considerations need to be 
negotiated and the resultant object will surely always differ in some essential 
respect from the ‘idea’, however fully realised or provisional this latter may be. 
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What we are concerned to address here is this minimal gap between the idea or 
intention of the artist and the outcome, and whether the prospect of thinking an art 
object into being will destroy or bridge that gap, facilitating a more ‘direct’ 
realisation of an idea, and with what potential consequences. 
 
Perhaps even more startling than the BCI technologies just outlined is the extensive 
research into brain analysis using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
combined with computational models, whose aim is to digitally reconstruct live, 
dynamic visual experiences from the brain. In an ongoing series of trials at the 
University of California, Berkeley,
31
 neurologists have developed a procedure 
which involves scanning the brains of test subjects as they watched video clips, 
while computer software searches for correlations between the configuration of 
shapes, colours and movements in the films, and patterns of activity in the subjects’ 
visual cortex. Subsequently the computer was fed 18 million seconds of random 
video clips and programmed to predict which areas of the brain these clips would 
stimulate in subjects who were watching them. In the final stage the software was 
used to monitor the subjects’ brains as they watched a new set of films and, using 
the database of video clips as building blocks, the system was able to reconstruct 
the ‘contents’ of their cognitive activity and display on screen highly distorted, low 
resolution, but continuous footage of what they were seeing. So the information 
was taken only from the neural activity, without reference to the video footage they 
were watching, and the results coincided remarkably closely with the visual 
stimulus. Scientists are talking up the possibility in the future of this technology 
advancing to a stage where even abstract thoughts and intentions can be deciphered 
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(a subsequent chapter will address similar neuroimaging trials which have been 
able to distinguish subjects’ memories, and the possibility of recording electronic 
visualisations of dreams.) Without wishing to resort to the hyperbole inevitably 
contained in press reports of such research, we are effectively facing the prospect of 
a technology that can ‘read’ a subject’s thoughts or memories and produce a digital 
rendering of something like a ‘mental picture’. The ethical and political concerns 
thrown up here are obvious, and much sport could be had predicting the uses 
advertisers could make of such a facility in some bleak dystopian future where 
capitalism has gained access to our intimate thoughts, or prophesying Philip K. 
Dick-esque state-sponsored neuro-monitoring. However, what concerns us for the 
moment is the possible creative utilisation of these systems and whether this could 
radically transform artistic activity. For if we were to coordinate such cognitive 
imaging technologies with rapidly improving three-dimensional printing 
techniques, which can ‘print’ solid objects from digital files, there is the very real 
possibility that an imagined object could be immediately physically materialised. 
 
Jack Gallant, one of the neurologists at Berkeley, said in a press release, 
 
[At] the moment, when you see something and want to describe it to 
someone you have to use words or draw it and it doesn’t work very well. 
You could use this technology to transmit the image to someone. It might be 
useful for artists or to allow you to recover an eyewitness’s memory of a 
crime.
32
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Evidently he regards this procedure as simply a more efficient means of 
externalising one’s thoughts; that drawing or ‘using words’ are clumsy and 
inadequate for such purposes and are destined to be superseded. This explicitly 
addresses what we have outlined regarding the difficulty in translating an idea into 
reality, but it will be important to consider to what extent this is a necessary 
difficulty. A work of art is not simply an outward manifestation of a prior concept, 
so again this question of what takes place in between – the gap between thought and 
actuality, and that between what the artist intends to do and what he or she actually 
does – arises, and whether this is at least as crucial and fundamental to the work as 
the idea itself. 
 
Excursus: Three Stories by Borges 
 
It may prove fruitful at this stage to take a slight digression through some of the 
early stories of Jorge Luis Borges in order to provide a helpful illustration of what 
is at stake here, and in the process move our discussion onto a more profound space 
of questioning. 
 
This theme of creating a new element of reality through mere thought alone that can 
coexist and interact with already existing reality recurs again and again in Borges. 
In Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, the narrator describes an imaginary world named 
Tlön, revealed to him through elliptical and fragmentary encyclopaedic references, 
that exists according to the laws of Berkeleyan Idealism. In Tlön, objects have no 
material existence, they merely coincide with the way they are seen. One of the 
most extraordinary phenomena in this world is the appearance of duplicated lost 
36 
 
objects, hrönir, which are multiple versions of the same thing found by different 
people independently. Thus objects can be created or conjured into reality through 
the very act of looking for them. The occurrence of these outlandish phenomena 
resonates with common experience when, as occasionally happens, one has been 
searching for something in particular for such a long time that upon its eventual 
discovery one experiences a strange mix of déjà vu and hallucination. One has 
pictured it in one’s mind for so long that its actual physical presence feels both 
totally familiar and strangely foreign at the same time, like a kind of uncanny 
phantasm that one has produced oneself. 
 
And then, ‘[s]ometimes stranger and purer than any hrön is the ur – the thing 
produced by suggestion, the object brought forth by hope.’33 These ur are not mere 
replicas of previously perceived objects but entirely new entities that appear as 
objects in the world every bit as real (or unreal) as any other thing. The products of 
these interfaces could rather illuminatingly be likened to hrönir, or ur, objects that 
appear through the will of the user, whether it is a reduplicated clone of something 
one is trying to recall or a wholly new object conjured into being. In a ‘Postscript’ 
to the main body of the story the narrator describes how the world of Tlön began to 
intrude upon the ‘real’ world, with foreign objects from this fictitious place 
appearing in reality. It is told how people rushed to embrace the logic of Tlön 
because it tells of an ontology that places our human perception as the ground of 
reality and not some divine law to which we do not have access. Reality thus 
‘“caved in” at more than one point’34 and the logic and history of Tlön took over, 
making this fictional world itself an ur – an imaginary creation that obtained 
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substantial existence outside of the minds of its creators. Our following chapter will 
explore the implications this capacity of spontaneous thought-creation will carry 
regarding the distinction between human and divine cognition. Perhaps the 
appearance of these objects will likewise lead to the world of science fiction 
encroaching upon our reality. 
 
In Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, Borges provides another model of an act 
of spontaneous creation through thought and determination. Pierre Menard is a 
fictional French author, described in a mock-biographical portrait, whose life’s 
work was the seemingly impossible task of writing a word for word reconstruction 
of Don Quixote, from scratch and without reference to Cervantes’ original. 
However, Menard did not ‘merely’ undertake to channel Cervantes and write a 
copy of the same work, rather he was to write it ‘through the experiences of Pierre 
Menard’.35 In other words, he was to make the work his own but without changing 
a word, thus as D.L. Shaw insightfully points out, ‘Menard’s Don Quixote is in fact 
a kind of hrön.’36 From the fragments that he achieved, the writer of the memoir is 
moved to declare that Menard’s version, though strictly identical, is in fact a more 
subtle, greater work than the original, because of the richer historical tradition that 
Menard has inherited in the three centuries since the book’s first publication; the 
same words written by a 17
th
 Century Spaniard and a 20
th
 Century Frenchman 
cannot possibly have the same meaning or resonance. At one stage the writer 
compares the ‘same’ section written by both authors but regards them as two 
radically different passages: 
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…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness 
of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present, and the future’s counsellor. 
 
This catalogue of attributes, written in the seventeenth century, and written 
by the ‘ingenious layman’ Miguel de Cervantes, is mere rhetorical praise of 
history. Menard, on the other hand, writes: 
 
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness 
of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present, and the future’s counsellor. 
 
History, the mother of truth! – the idea is staggering. Menard, a 
contemporary of William James, defines history not as a delving into reality 
but as the very fount of reality. Historical truth, for Menard is not ‘what 
happened’; it is what we believe happened.37 
 
Though the work remained incomplete, the narrator describes reading Cervantes’ 
Quixote ‘as if’ it were Menard’s. He then imagines attributing other canonical 
works to different authors and thus realising these new works and transforming the 
old ones. If one were to read Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones ‘as if’ it were written by a 
contemporary author, such as Thomas Pynchon, it is to actually create this hybrid, 
bastard novel. But such radical re-imaginings are of course not necessary, for every 
reading creates a work anew to some extent. Just as writing Don Quixote now, in 
the early 21
st
 Century, would be to write something entirely different to the book 
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Cervantes wrote, so to read it now is to read a completely different work to that 
read by its original readers. 
 
This act of transubstantiation is outwardly similar to such conceptual strategies as 
Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree from 1973. It consists, famously, of a glass of 
water on a shelf attached to the gallery wall 9ft from the floor, accompanied by this 
(rather self-satisfied) text: 
 
Q: To begin with could you describe this work? 
A: Yes, of course. What I’ve done is change a glass of water into a full-
grown oak tree without altering the accidents of the glass of water. 
Q: The accidents? 
A: Yes. The colour, feel, weight, size. 
Q: Haven’t you simply called this glass of water an oak tree? 
A: Absolutely not. It is not a glass of water anymore. I have changed its 
actual substance. It would no longer be accurate to call it a glass of water. 
One could call it anything one wished but that would not alter the fact that it 
is an oak tree. […]38 
 
And so on. Or obviously there are Duchamp’s earlier gestures, transforming 
quotidian items into art objects through the caprice of the artist. Such acts, as is 
now a commonplace, enabled us to see an art object no longer as something that 
must have been physically created by the artist’s hand, but rather as something 
brought about through thought and will. Is there really such a radical disparity 
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between an art practice that directly brings into being an object of thought from one 
which alters the properties of an already existing object simply by investing it with 
an ‘idea’? 
 
To return to Borges, the most apposite of his works for this discussion is surely The 
Circular Ruins, from the same early collection of stories as those already discussed. 
In it, an enigmatic stranger arrives by boat in a village somewhere in ‘the East’. It 
transpires that the man is a magician who has set himself the task of dreaming a 
man into existence; that is, of conjuring up a son through a concentrated act of 
thought and then imposing him on reality. We are told of the various stages his 
dreams go through, at first chaotic, then dialectical, ‘he was seeking a soul worthy 
of taking its place in the universe.’39 He imagines a lecture theatre filled with 
countless faces waiting to learn from him; the ones with promise are those who 
answer back and venture a reasonable objection to his teachings. After progressing 
so far with this approach the sorcerer loses his grasp on his creation, realising that 
he must abandon it and start from scratch with a new procedure. He now begins 
with a single heart and sets it beating. Then, slowly and painstakingly, he worked 
outwards until he had the complete man. The God of Fire now appears to him in his 
dream and says that he will grant his creation life. After this the wizard imparts all 
his wisdom to his creation, and gives him simple tasks to accomplish in order to 
accustom him to reality. Finally, when he is deemed ready the father sends his son 
on his way but clears his memory of his origins and his years of education. Some 
time later the magician is told by local villagers of a man in another circular 
enclosure a few miles away who has found fame because he can walk on fire 
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without being burned, and the magician immediately understands that this man is 
his son. Since the God of fire gave him life and knows of his unnatural birth the 
flames cannot harm him, thus betraying the fact that he is not a real human being 
but a facsimile. The story ends with the wizard’s awful realisation that he too is a 
facsimile, dreamed up in precisely the same way, the possibility of which has been 
haunting him throughout the story. 
 
Borges’ stories are often tempting to interpret as allegories, a temptation that should 
of course not lead us into attempting to find a definitive ‘explanation’. However, 
for the purposes at hand we could see the wizard as the counterpart of the writer or 
artist, and his impossible task of composing a new element of reality as that of 
artistic creation, where the artist generates through an act of thought something that 
bears his patronage but which is independent of and will outlive him – something 
for which he is ultimately responsible but which nevertheless extends far beyond 
him and his intentions. At various points in the story we find support for this 
reading; for example, the only students in the vast lecture hall who are deserving of 
their teacher’s time are those who in some regard venture an objection to him. Thus 
there is little use in giving body to an idea which is already fully realised, it must in 
some sense confront its creator and surprise him or her. 
 
When this way of working predictably fails to bear fruit the wizard tries an entirely 
different, excruciatingly methodical approach. Again in the helpful words of D.L. 
Shaw: ‘inverting his procedure, the wizard abandons the general, the external and 
the abstract. He turns to the internal and the concrete: the heart of the individual.’40 
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We may not want to be so bluntly literal as to call this beating heart the ‘idea’ from 
which all else derives but it is firmer footing upon which to proceed. The 
magician’s reluctance to let his son go when he is ready, impatient even, to be born 
echoes the reticence described above of artists unwilling to declare a work finished; 
and the stage when he finally relinquishes him, erasing from his memory the details 
of how he came to exist, is the point at which the artist releases her work and sends 
it on its ‘essential drifting’ in the words of Derrida.41 The progeny must be 
autonomous and stand apart from his creator’s hand and make his own way in the 
world. 
 
The fact that the magician is in a sense removed from reality, enclosed within the 
circular ruins of the title, is a further parallel with the writer or artist, who according 
to cliché shuts herself away to carry out her work. The local peasant folk who bring 
food and water to the man and who eventually inform him of his son’s fate are 
‘part’ of reality in a way that the magician is not, who must take up a certain 
distance from it in order to perform his task. It could be said that the artist/writer 
‘observes’ life from a vantage point somewhat outside of it, indeed the late 
American writer David Foster Wallace described novelists as voyeurs, desperately 
studying how ‘real’ human beings act and talk.42 The object he introduces into 
reality from this outside place thus doesn’t quite ‘fit’; his son is not a human being 
like other human beings just as the work of art is not simply a thing among other 
things – it sticks out and refuses to cohere. What is more, in the case of this manner 
of creation that we are considering, thought manifested immediately into being, it 
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could be said that the result will always be a hollow simulacrum. Where the truth 
about the wizard’s son is betrayed by his immunity to fire, in the case of the art 
object that stems from mere thought (whatever form this may take) perhaps its 
secret would be revealed by its seeming empty and false and encouraging nothing 
but indifference; for since nothing has been won or lost in its execution nothing has 
really been accomplished. Furthermore, more gravely, if these objects conjured into 
existence could successfully take their place in the world of things would it render 
the reality of all things uncertain, like at the story’s ending when the wizard comes 
to doubt his own existence? This sounds rather grandiloquent, but essentially would 
the very presence of these thought-objects in the real world, along with the capacity 
to intervene directly into reality via the mind, pose profound ontological questions? 
Again, this will be returned to in the following chapter. 
 
Knowing and Doing: Kant and the Creative Act 
 
So what about the outcome of such a creative procedure, the art created merely 
through thinking about it? We have two rather different cases before us that must be 
distinguished. In the first instance, the BCI, we have a form of telekinetic ‘mind 
control’, whereby rather than physically executing a particular task we accomplish 
it through thought. This has the consequence of obscuring the distinction between 
what one can do, and what one merely wants to do but lacks the ability or expertise 
to carry it out. Again, to return to the example of BCI-generated music, a user 
without any instrumental ability could compose and perform music simply by 
thinking about what she wants to do. Of course it has always been the case that a 
composer could write a piece for others to perform that she need not be able to 
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physically perform herself, but she will need a firm training in classical 
composition in order to internally hear how the marks on paper will sound when 
performed. The possibility raised by the BCI however, is for someone without any 
conventional training being granted the ability to compose music, and further on we 
will need to ask whether without some degree of competence, whether 
compositional or instrumental, one could have the necessary articulation to 
conceive of a piece at all. Could any amount of attentive listening stand in for this 
or does it only come through actual doing? Essentially the fundamental question is 
this: is the mode of expression something that could be learned subsequently in 
order to transcribe an idea that otherwise would find no outlet, or is it a necessary 
constituent of those ideas? Can one truly have anything to say before knowing how 
to say it? 
 
In the second case however, with the cognitive imaging techniques, things are 
somewhat more radical, for the very contents of the thought itself, whatever they 
may be, are made manifest: a ‘mental picture’ can be harnessed and displayed 
electronically (and subsequently printed as an object.) The experiments cited above 
were designed to reproduce specific visual stimuli, thus one can at this stage only 
speculate about the possibility of a purely fantasied image being so exported, but 
this possibility itself is enough to open the field of inquiry. We spoke a great deal at 
the beginning about the difficulties the artist encounters in making the physical 
object equal to the thought behind it, the idea that she is striving to express. Would 
these procedures finally accomplish this ideal and nullify the gap? 
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However, so far we have been working rather loosely and naïvely with a 
characterisation of the artistic process as the physical realisation of a prior, self-
sufficient ‘idea’. This has served a purpose but it only holds so far and is ultimately 
unsatisfactory as an account of artistic creation. Turning now to Kant’s third 
Critique may provide assistance in our attempts to develop a more nuanced 
description of what takes place in the creative act. 
 
Firstly, in the section ‘Art in general’ (§43), works of art are distinguished from 
nature ‘as making (facere) is from acting or operating in general (agere), and the 
product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work 
(opus) from effect (effectus).’43 The act of making, or doing, implies a decisiveness 
and deliberateness that is not found in the processes of nature. Furthermore, ‘we 
recognise an art in everything formed in such a way that its actuality must have 
been preceded by a representation of the thing in its cause […] although the effect 
could not have been thought by the cause.’44 Put simply, the work of art must be the 
result of an intentional consciousness that has decided upon its action in advance. 
Prior to the object’s existence or actuality there was the will to act, it did not 
happen by serendipity or blind instinct. But with the second clause to the statement, 
that ‘the effect could not have been thought by the cause’, Kant seems to be 
asserting that the outcome of the artistic process cannot have been predetermined: if 
the resulting product were already fully worked out in advance and simply awaited 
its expression as a physical form then we would not be dealing with a work of art 
but rather some other intentional act.  
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This is confirmed with the second point of Kant’s definition:  
 
Art, as human skill, is distinguished also from science (as ability from 
knowledge), as a practical from a theoretical faculty […] For this reason, 
also, what one can do the moment one only knows what is to be done, hence 
without anything more than sufficient knowledge of the desired result, is not 
called art. To art that alone belongs for which the possession of the most 
complete knowledge does not involve one’s having then and there the skill 
to do it. Camper describes very exactly how the best shoe must be made, but 
he, doubtless, was not able to turn one out himself.
45
  
 
So it is only in the doing that a work of art comes to be. A critic or philosopher may 
claim to know what constitutes a great work of art, but only the artist can carry it 
out. However, with the cognitive technologies under discussion the distinction 
between knowing and doing collapses – to know it is to do it. Following what was 
said earlier about the technology in question being merely a more efficient means 
of externalising one’s thoughts, we can see now that this is not simply a convenient 
shortcut that otherwise leaves the concept of art untouched, it cuts to the very 
notion of creativity itself. Following Kant’s definition of artists being those who are 
able to carry out that which others may only be able to describe, do these systems 
negate or counteract the specificity of art and to a greater or lesser extent pave the 
way for anyone to be an artist? But the crucial aspect here may turn out to be the 
status of this ‘greater or lesser extent.’ 
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And let us not forget that the latter point we have dwelled on has been taken in 
isolation, its original purpose being only to differentiate art, as something that 
carries with it a practical skill, from science, which carries no such requirement. 
Furthermore, this is in relation to ‘art in general’, of which fine art is a species, 
evidenced by the example given being Camper’s lack of shoemaking ability rather 
than someone who lacks artistic genius. For otherwise there would be a 
contradiction between this notion of the non-artist ‘knowing what is to be done’ but 
simply lacking the technical know-how to realise it and the earlier assertion that a 
representation of the result cannot precede the actuality of the object. The very idea 
of knowing fully and comprehensively what is to be done before carrying it out is 
surely anathema to artistic creation, to the experimentation and improvisation that 
takes place in the creative act. Indeed the Kantian genius works blindly to a large 
degree, and so even she would be at a loss to recount the procedure or the steps by 
which a work of art is created. If she were to know in advance and thus be able to 
provide such an account it would imply that she worked to a rule or template. This 
has a bearing on the discussion above regarding the struggle involved in realising a 
work of art. Kant here describes it as the ‘slow and even painful process of 
improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without 
prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers.’46 Earlier it was portrayed as 
the difficulty in bringing the physical form to live up to the idea, while here it is a 
two-way tussle, or more precisely, a delicate balance, between the imagination and 
the understanding. What we have been calling quite loosely the ‘idea’, is here 
equivalent to what Kant refers to at certain times as imagination and at others as 
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genius. As Henry Allison notes, Kant’s definition of genius is somewhat 
inconsistent – sometimes identified as virtually synonymous with imagination 
(what Allison calls the ‘thin’ conception of genius) and at others as including the 
understanding and judgement along with the productive imagination (the ‘thick’ 
conception.)
47
 But it could also perhaps be termed inspiration, the imaginative 
driving force behind a work, and that which the artist attempts to convey.  
 
So not only must the object do justice to the idea, the idea must allow itself to be 
regulated by taste without sacrificing the play of its powers. The idea is not the 
unimpeachable sovereign, which everything else must try to satisfy and avoid doing 
violence to; it too must compromise otherwise the artist is at risk of producing 
‘nothing but nonsense’.48 Indeed, if there is a conflict between the two faculties and 
something must be sacrificed, ‘then it should rather be on the side of genius; and 
judgement, which in matters of fine art bases its decision on its own proper 
principles, will more readily endure an infringement of the freedom and wealth of 
the imagination than that the understanding should be compromised.’49 Working in 
harmony with the understanding, the imagination is brought back down to earth but 
it can convey the fruits of its wanderings via what Kant calls aesthetic ideas. These 
are a counterpart to rational ideas, as something that cannot be encountered in the 
world: 
 
Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. This is partly 
because they at least strain after something lying out beyond the confines of 
experience, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational 
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concepts (i.e. intellectual ideas), thus giving to these concepts the semblance 
of objective reality. But, on the other hand, there is this most important 
reason, that no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal 
intuitions. The poet essays the task of giving sensible form to the rational 
ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, 
and so forth. Or, again, as to things of which examples occur in experience, 
e.g. death, envy and all vices, as also love, fame and the like, transgressing 
the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination, which in 
reaching for a maximum emulates the precedent of reason, to present them 
for the senses with a completeness of which nature affords no parallel.
50
 
 
An aesthetic idea, then, is a presentation of the imagination which provokes much 
thought and speculation on the part of the viewer but for which no concept can be 
found to express it. Just as the idea of reason is a concept which cannot be 
presented by any form or intuition, the aesthetic idea is a form to which no concept 
can measure up: 
 
[Thus] genius properly consists in the happy relation [between the 
faculties], which science cannot teach nor diligence learn, enabling one to 
seek out ideas for a given concept, and, besides, to hit upon the expression 
for them – the expression by means of which the subjective condition of the 
mind aroused by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be 
communicated to others.
51
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So the talent of the artist consists jointly in discovering these ideas and in 
presenting them so that others can experience them. An aesthetic idea is not a 
mental event that must then somehow be presented or transcribed in a physical 
form, it is the form itself. Through presenting these aesthetic ideas the artist incites 
the same feeling in the viewer of the work, so there is a correlation between the free 
harmony of the faculties required for the creation of fine art and that which is 
required for its proper reception. That it can be communicated at all demonstrates a 
certain shared or common sensibility. Often we find that a great work of art gives 
voice to something within us that we already felt but only vaguely, while with other 
works it presents something that we had never thought or felt before but which still 
strikes a chord and causes us to see things slightly differently as a result. 
 
It is precisely this point – the emphasis on the subjective harmony of cognitive 
faculties – that forms Hegel’s principle quarrel with Kant’s aesthetics. For while he 
identified the beautiful as the point of harmonious union between universal and 
particular, the idea presented within the sensible on equal terms, this 
correspondence was located by Kant solely on the side of the judging subject. 
Hegel remains close to Kantian aesthetic ideas but takes the critical step further in 
characterising this union between idea and form as true and actual in itself and not 
as merely subjective. 
 
The task of art for Hegel is to reconcile the idea, which is outside of the finite 
dimension, with the sensuous material which is to present it and he identifies three 
stages through which this is accomplished. The first is the requirement that the 
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content should be suitable and ‘qualified for such representation’.52 Not everything 
is appropriate for artistic representation and that which is not would lead to a 
disjuncture between content and form. (This could be likened to Kant’s stipulation 
about that which elicits disgust being the one form of ugliness that cannot be 
presented in art, for here representation breaks down and our repulsion at the object 
presented overpowers its artistic rendering.) The second point is that this content 
should not be merely abstract, vague or general but must be concrete, although not 
in the way that a material object is concrete. A favourite illustration of this for 
Hegel is the contrast between the God of Judaism and Islam, which is a ‘dead 
abstraction’, and the Christian God, which is individualised in Christ and the Holy 
Spirit and therefore capable of presentation. This accounts for the greater 
sophistication of Christian iconography, because ‘[here] we have essentiality or 
universality, and particularisation, together with their reconciled unity, and only 
such unity is the concrete.’53 This movement from abstract to concrete echoes the 
methodological shift that the wizard finds he must make in The Circular Ruins. The 
overwhelming abstraction of the first approach leads to failure because it cannot 
advance to ‘particularisation and phenomenal manifestation and to unity with itself 
in these.’54 Only when the man is particularised and determined from within can he 
make the leap into reality. The final point Hegel specifies relates to the matter of 
the presentation, which must also be concrete, and so because this applies to both 
the material and the content it is this shared concreteness around which both sides 
coincide and correspond. Hence because of this essential correspondence the shape 
that is given to the content is not simply arbitrary or haphazard: ‘art does not seize 
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upon this form either because it just finds it there or because there is no other; on 
the contrary, the concrete content itself involves the factor of external, actual, and 
indeed sensuous manifestation.’55 
 
So the form is not external or secondary to the concrete idea, rather the latter 
involves in itself its sensuous presentation. This then is the fundamental point of 
difference between Hegel and Kant, because while for Kant the idea remains 
untouched by presentation and is merely evoked for the subject, for Hegel the idea 
must actually come forth to be presented and ‘carries within itself the principle of 
its mode of its appearance’.56 A purely general idea, abstract and undetermined 
could never be presented or even merely suggested, so ‘determinacy is, as it were, 
the bridge to appearance.’57 
 
This notion of a vague or general idea is similarly denied by Deleuze, for whom, 
 
[An] idea – like the one who has the idea – is already dedicated to a 
particular field […] Ideas have to be treated like potentials already engaged 
in one mode of expression or another and inseparable from the mode of 
expression, such that I cannot say that I have an idea in general.
58
 
 
To be sure, this is no longer the rational idea of which Kant and Hegel treat, but 
like the Hegelian concrete content it already contains its means of expression. 
Indeed it would be absurd to imagine an artist developing an idea and then needing 
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to decide whether to express this idea as an installation or a painting or a sound 
piece. 
 
Art, for Deleuze, has nothing at all to do with communication, if by this we 
understand the transmission of information, for ‘a work of art does not contain the 
least bit of information.’59 The idea then, in this case, is not something that is 
communicated through the work as if it were a message; rather it concerns the 
specific aesthetic of the discipline to which it applies, whether cinema, theatre, 
visual art, etc. Thus an idea is an exceptional event, occurring only rarely and then 
developed in and through all of that artist’s work and is not something that is 
conceived and exhausted in every new piece. On this view, the ‘idea’ of a 
filmmaker such as Bresson would be what makes all of his films uniquely 
‘Bressonian’, and not the particular premise, pitch or storyline of each individual 
film. So conceptual artists who speak of the ‘idea’ behind each of their works are 
not using the term in the Deleuzian sense, which would concern the very approach 
to art that they adopt and how their body of work re-conceives and enriches art as 
such. It may not even be his or her own idea, for an idea that is truly potent 
transcends its originator, such as Duchamp’s readymades. Indeed the richness of an 
idea can be attested to by the amount of proponents it has. From this point of view, 
the often-heralded ‘end of art’ could be identified as the end of ideas in this 
Deleuzian sense, all artists of today working within already established regimes. 
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Intuition and Expression: Croce’s Aesthetics 
 
This relation between idea and expression has now become the crucial factor in the 
discussion. It all turns around whether the execution is to be considered simply as 
an expedient, something that must be overcome, or whether the idea is already 
involved in expression and external manifestation from the outset. An interesting 
and productive approach to this question will be to appeal to the idealist aesthetics 
of Benedetto Croce and his notion of art as intuition. For Croce, intuition is not the 
passive, receptive faculty that is described in Kant’s philosophy, of which we will 
have more to say in the following chapter. Rather, Croce portrays it as an active 
faculty through which we give form to the world, imposing order upon the brute 
stimuli that affect us, so that we are no longer subject to the sensations that act upon 
us but are their master. This is a type of knowledge, independent of and prior to 
intellectual knowledge that is based upon our power to form mental representations. 
Intellectual knowledge is second-order knowledge, where we construct concepts 
and abstractions based on these mental representations, so intuitive knowledge is 
necessarily primary. And if logic is the science of intellectual knowledge, aesthetics 
for Croce is the science of intuitive knowledge, which is evidently a broader 
definition of aesthetics than we have become accustomed to, namely the philosophy 
of art and beauty. Croce’s brand of idealism holds that there is no reality prior to its 
construction by the spirit. All mental representations we form of the world function 
as a creative ordering, and in doing so we articulate this information and make it 
comprehensible to ourselves. From this active notion of intuition Croce asserts that 
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‘everything that is truly intuition or representation is also expression.’60 In order to 
make sense of the stimuli we receive we must give it form, and this is already 
expression. The notion that sometimes befalls us that we have a vague idea of 
something ineffable but which we cannot quite express is simply rebuffed by 
Croce: if we truly had such ideas then we would have already expressed them. An 
idea is not an idea until it is expressed in the mind, before that it is simply a 
confused, inadequate feeling. From this it is a small and insignificant step to 
express it verbally or in writing. This recalls Hegel’s rebuke to the Romantic notion 
that what is most supreme in the heart of the artist is inexpressible and hence there 
is an infinite depth to him beyond what his work discloses: ‘On the contrary, his 
works are the best part and the truth of the artist; what he is [in his works], that he 
is; but what remains buried in his heart, that is he not.’61 So since the idea is 
expression from its inception, the success of this idea consists entirely in how it has 
been expressed. 
 
Nevertheless, when the clumsy physicality of the work seems not to live up to the 
‘dizzying stuff that dreams are made of’, even if the artistic rendering stayed 
perfectly faithful to the idea, the artist may feel disappointed as if all that wondrous 
potential has been captured and grounded in this object. There may in fact be a 
perfectly simple, mundane explanation for this: it simply wasn’t as successful an 
idea as he or she believed it to be. It is only by testing one’s ideas through 
realisation that we discover their true nature and, in the words of Karl Popper, ‘let 
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our false theories die in our stead.’62 The maxim that to think badly is to speak (or 
write) badly is thus for Croce a tautology, because to have an idea is to express it. If 
we are confused then we have not fully grasped or developed our own thought. It 
follows that we could not say of a work of art that there is fundamentally, at its 
core, something greater than what or how it has been expressed, as if it were 
adorned in shabby clothes. There is no dichotomy between the idea and its 
expression. 
 
An immediate objection to this could be to refer to the numerous cases where a 
cover version of a song has been widely regarded to be superior to the original. A 
classic example is some of the early Bob Dylan compositions which were recorded 
in a somewhat rudimentary fashion and were arguably improved upon in later 
performances by artists such as The Byrds and Fairport Convention. But this would 
be to conflate two distinct meanings or even stages of ‘expression’: the song itself – 
the words, music, structure, etc – and its performance, which might better be 
termed communication. The Crocean response would be that the artistic intuition-
expression proper is the song itself, and the execution is a technical matter only:  
 
So clearly are the two forms of activity distinguishable from each other that 
one could be a great artist but a poor technician […] but what is impossible 
is to be a great poet who writes poor verses, a great painter who does not 
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know how to match colours […] in short, a great artist who does not know 
how to express himself.
63
 
 
Proust, for example, was a notoriously poor editor and proof-reader of his 
manuscripts, which led not just to grammatical mistakes but to awkward errors of 
continuity and verisimilitude, but these are technical failings that in no way detract 
from the greatness of the work. They could even be said to be necessary side-
effects of his manner of working, and so were he the kind of writer to pay more 
attention to such details he would not have written the Recherche, or at least it 
would have been a very different work. The notion of a great poet who lacks lyrical 
ability however, or a great painter with no eye for composition, is an oxymoron, for 
these are more than technical considerations, they are the very matter of the 
expression itself. 
 
However, in the case of music this presents a problem, for it seems to suggest that 
there is no artistry in, for example, John Coltrane’s masterful version of My 
Favourite Things. Is this mere technique, all the bona fide artistic work being that 
of Rodgers and Hammerstein? Clearly not, but this is a question specific to music 
and Croce (to my knowledge) does not address it. We can, however, appeal to his 
thoughts on translation for a possible answer. This is an activity Croce judges to be 
strictly speaking impossible, because one cannot extract the content of one 
expression and present it ‘in the guise of another.’64 So either the translation is 
slavishly faithful and hence a diminished version of the original, or: 
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It creates an entirely new expression by putting the original expression back 
in the crucible and mixing it with the personal impressions of the one who 
calls himself the translator. In the first case the expression stays the same as 
it was originally, the other version being more or less inadequate, that is to 
say, not properly expression: in the other case there will indeed be two 
expressions, but with two different contents.
65
  
 
Only an innovatively re-imagined interpretation of a song would be a separate 
expression and hence a work of art in its own right rather than a superfluous 
retread. However, this should not be taken to stand in contradiction to the assertion 
above which stated that the song itself is the expression proper and the performance 
a mere technical matter. A creative cover version would not be a better produced 
but otherwise unaltered version of the original, it would reinvent the song itself 
(this bearing obvious parallels with Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.) 
 
To return to Kant’s example of the layman who may know what goes into the 
making of a work of art but simply lack the skill to execute it, this notion is firmly 
rejected by Croce. The difference between this layman and a great artist like 
Raphael is not simply the latter’s skill in rendering the world in paint. Given 
Croce’s insistence that there is no reality prior to its construction by our intuitive 
activity, it follows that the artist quite simply inhabits a different world to the rest of 
us. ‘The painter is a painter because he sees what others only feel or glimpse but do 
not actually see.’66 His power of representation is greater than ours and hence his 
power of expression is greater than ours, since they are one and the same. Although 
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we may believe our visual activity directly acquaints us with things, whether it be a 
tree or a rose, etc., what we in truth see is an ‘index of a book […] the labels that 
we have attached to things and which take the place of them.’67 These indexes are 
perfectly sufficient for our everyday lives but are quite inadequate for the artist’s 
purposes. Incidentally, an argument could be made that this account is compatible 
with current optical science, according to which the human eye, rather than taking 
in the entire visual field all at once, makes quick interrupted leaps from point to 
point called saccades, reassembling the whole thing into a coherent picture. 
Because of the different systems guiding the reconstruction process, the resulting 
mental representation is not objectively faithful the way a camera is, but is a 
personal interpretation. The fact that we see a continuous whole with no gaps or 
blanks is a mental illusion; we do not really ‘see’ detail, we represent that there is 
detail and label it as having features that we know should be there. This impression 
is confirmed when we turn our attention to it, thus reinforcing the sense that we saw 
it all along. This is demonstrated by what happens when one closely studies 
someone’s face, even that of a close friend; it starts to change and become alien 
before one’s eyes and it is as if one were seeing it completely anew. So we might 
suggest that it is legitimate to claim that there are differing abilities or capacities for 
constructing the visible world and that a great painter’s visual assemblage could be 
more advanced than that of a non-artist. After all, the usual foundation and point of 
departure for life-drawing classes is to teach the students how to see. The amateur 
drawer’s ineptness comes not (or not only) from a lack of skill with the pencil or 
charcoal but because one has to learn to see the world differently in order to make a 
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two-dimensional rendering of it. It is a matter of ignoring or forgetting what one 
knows about the object and trying to merely see it. 
 
So to the question as to whether this technology would make artists out of all of us, 
the proper Crocean response would be to say: not any more than we already are all 
artists. The important point to be made is that the difference between the aesthetic 
activity of the artist and that of the rest of us is not one of kind but only of degree. 
No technology could miraculously open the door to a horde of latent artists, 
liberated by the removal of the necessity for physical or technical skill of any kind. 
The intuition-expression of the artist, poet, composer, etc., will always be greater 
than that of the non-artist, thus it is countersensical to imagine a mechanism that 
would find the ‘hidden talents’ of someone who was unaware they had them, 
because aesthetic ability is not something buried within us that awaits activation, it 
is already expressed. This also provides a response to the tedious and idiotic 
complaint about much modern and contemporary art that ‘anyone could do it’, and 
that would be a resolute ‘no they could not’. The complainant is obviously referring 
to the actual handiwork required to carry it out but this cannot be taken in isolation, 
as if mere virtuosity were the standard by which we judge art. As we have seen, no 
physical skill alone is enough to make one an artist. This would be akin to declaring 
that all it takes to become a great poet or novelist is a large vocabulary, when this 
only serves to make one at best a formidable Scrabble player. 
 
So what is the status of the actual art object itself in Croce’s model if all the work 
of the artist takes place ‘internally’ so to speak? If intuition is expression then the 
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work of art must be fully conceived or ‘imagined’ prior to its being put down on the 
canvas or score, etc.: 
 
The aesthetic stage is completely over and done with when impressions 
have been worked up into expressions. When we have captured the internal 
word, formed an apt and lively idea of a figure or a statue, found a musical 
motif, expression has begun and ended: there is no need for anything else. 
That we then open, or want to open, our mouths in order to speak, or our 
throats in order to sing, and, that is, to say aloud and full throat what we 
have already said and sung sotto voce within ourselves; and that we stretch 
out, or wish to stretch out, our hands to touch the keys of a piano, or take a 
brush or chisel, following, so to speak, on a larger scale those small and 
swift actions which we have already executed, translating these into a 
material where traces of them will remain more or less durably; – all this is 
something additional, and obeys quite different laws from those governing 
that earlier activity, laws which we are not for now concerned with: 
although from now on we recognise that the latter activity produces objects 
and is practical or voluntary. It is customary to distinguish between the work 
of art which exists inside us and that which exists in the outside world: this 
way of speaking seems infelicitous to us, since the work of art (the aesthetic 
work) is always internal; and what is called the external work is no longer 
the work of art.
68
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We have here a curious intersection between high formalism and radical 
conceptualism, for this strongly recalls such conceptual mantras as this from Sol 
LeWitt’s Paragraphs on Conceptual Art: ‘when an artist uses a conceptual form of 
art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the 
execution is a perfunctory affair.’69 The physical embodiment given to an intuition 
is nothing more than an aide-mémoire. It is a marker, or pointer, to a work of art 
that has ‘happened’ – a physical supplement or indicator to something that has 
already taken place, something that was alive in the mind of the artist. If this 
rendition is successful then the physical entity will incite or reproduce in oneself 
and in others an already experienced or produced intuition. Much like what Derrida 
has said about the impossible ideality of the archive, in Croce’s account the 
successful work of art ‘comes to efface itself, it becomes transparent and unessential 
so as to let the origin present itself in person. Live, without mediation and without 
delay.’70 (Indeed it would not be difficult to undertake a deconstructionist reading 
of Croce here, and in a subsequent chapter we will have cause to interrogate the 
relationship between this ‘secondary’ external support and the ‘primary’ internal 
process, but we will go no further with such a reading here.) 
 
So the work of art always refers to something that has passed and is nothing more 
than a reproduction. It is technically incorrect, according to Croce’s account, to call 
a work of art beautiful; rather, it is ‘simply an aid to the reproduction of internal 
beauty.’71 Aside from its parallels with conceptual art this also corresponds with, 
for example, accounts of The Beach Boys’ composer Brian Wilson’s creative 
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procedure. He has often described how he mentally conceived his ‘pocket 
symphonies’ in great detail and his exacting standards required of the musicians – 
demanding endless repeated takes – were in order to bring them to recreate what he 
could hear internally. Of course, what we can never be sure of is how far away from 
the original conception he may have travelled during this process. It may be that he 
believes himself to be remaining faithful to the mental image while imperceptibly 
modifying it with each performance. As LeWitt puts it, ‘the fewer decisions made 
in the course of completing the work the better. This eliminates the arbitrary, the 
capricious, and the subjective as much as possible.’72 The less an artist leaves 
himself to do in the execution the ‘purer’ the idea can be and the less interference 
there will be between it and the final result. 
 
It is clear that Croce’s model (and LeWitt’s for that matter) is the complete 
antithesis of any performative account of artistic creation. It is difficult to square 
Croce’s theory of art with free improvisation or aleatoric practices in which there is 
supposedly nothing prior to the act, no notion of an outcome – everything begins 
and ends with the doing. While the American abstract expressionist belief in ‘pure’, 
disengaged expression is clearly an impossible ideal, there is undoubtedly 
something automatic and intuitive about such work that does not seem to be the 
result of a prior, deliberate mental construction. In free improvisatory musical 
performance a great deal of the skill resides in the ability to react to one’s fellow 
players and follow the piece where it leads ‘organically’. But if we were to play 
devil’s advocate and try to stay with Croce we may want to problematise this notion 
of expression and insist on there always being a prior intuition, no matter how 
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minimal. The great improvisers, from John Coltrane and Ornette Coleman to Derek 
Bailey and Evan Parker, would practice for so long and so intensely precisely so 
that ‘in the moment’ they can instantly bend their instrument to their will and elicit 
any desired sound or motif. This, it could be argued, is simply in microcosm what 
the musician-composer always does: she has something in mind that she intends to 
play and then aims to make the instrument produce it. Improvisation is often 
referred to as ‘instant composition’ and in the light of this we could say that it is 
still the same model of composition but the stakes, as it were, are higher because it 
is being played out live in front of an audience. Whereas through trial and 
experimentation the composer in a studio refines her work until satisfied, the free 
improviser has no such luxury. As such, mistakes, happy accidents and inadvertent 
inspiration abound, which lends to it a sense of being more ‘alive’ than a similar 
piece that has been composed and rehearsed. So the interval between intention and 
act may shrink to an infinitesimal gap but it does not disappear altogether. The idea 
that an improvisatory pianist, such as John Tilbury, would blindly hammer away at 
the keys with no notion of what he is doing is obviously false and does a disservice 
to his art. 
 
Indeed Croce anticipates this potential objection to his depiction of the physical art 
object as a reproduction: 
 
To that theory we have outlined of physical beauty as simply an aid to the 
reproduction of internal beauty, that is, to expression, it could be objected: 
that the artist creates his expressions in the act of painting and sketching, 
writing and composing; and that, therefore, physical beauty, rather than 
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coming after, can sometimes come before aesthetic beauty. That would be a 
superficial way of understanding the procedure of artists, who, in fact, do 
not even make strokes of the brush without first having seen by means of 
the imagination; and, if they have not yet seen, make brushstrokes, not to 
externalise their expressions (which do not then exist), but as if to try out 
and to have a simple point of support for their internal meditations and 
contemplations.
73
 
 
It would be absurd to suggest that Jackson Pollock, to take an obvious example, 
‘intuited’ in advance his chaotic compositions and dribbled the paint on the canvas 
in order to recreate them. But it would be equally wrong, and again, do him a gross 
injustice, if we were to assume that it was an entirely random procedure with no 
aesthetic guidance. For he obviously had some idea of what he wanted to express 
and worked the paint over until it approached his vision, with some things being 
rejected and others accepted. It could be argued that they are rejected or admitted 
based on whether it pleases aesthetically and this only comes after the gesture has 
already been made, but if the standard by which he judges whether it pleases or not 
is taken from elsewhere, according to some preconceived model then it will be 
derivative and shallow, which is obviously not the case. So this standard plainly 
comes from within; he keeps working at it until it looks the way he wants it to look. 
 
Clearly it is very easy to summarily dismiss such systematic aesthetic philosophies 
as Croce’s as outdated bourgeois dogmatism without ever attempting to engage 
with it. The more interesting and fruitful approach would be to read it 
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sympathetically and, as we have attempted to do here, take cases which seem to 
undermine its model and endeavour to overcome them rather than rushing to use 
these instances as so many nails in the coffin. As a basic precondition to subjecting 
a philosophical text to criticism one must surely pursue its internal logic as far as 
one can, otherwise the dogmatism is on the side of the critique rather than the 
critiqued. This is not to say that Croce’s account is without fault, and such a 
comprehensive and totalising philosophy of artistic creation – treated as a 
consistent, homogeneous activity – is clearly no longer a tenable proposition, but its 
faults are often less interesting than its merits.
74
 However, it cannot be denied that 
the process of art making entails a great deal of investigation, both material and 
conceptual, and often the work travels far from whatever the artist initially set out 
to achieve. The idea develops with and through the execution and a great deal of the 
artist’s talent lies in the ability to follow it where it leads. Indeed, sometimes when 
the artist thinks she is doing one thing she may ‘actually’ be doing another and it is 
not until she can take a step back from it that she can see it for herself. The same 
point is made by John Dewey, who writes, 
 
[Between] conception and bringing to birth there lies a long period of 
gestation. During this period the inner material of emotion and idea is as 
much transformed through acting and being acted upon by objective 
material as the latter undergoes modification when it becomes a medium of 
expression.
75
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Furthermore, we must surely ask how the art-as-intuition model can be squared 
with the intrinsicality of the medium to all expression. If an idea is always already 
expressed then it follows that it must be expressed as something, of which the 
intuition would be the internal visualisation. In our very brief discussion of Deleuze 
we suggested that it would be senseless to imagine that an artist conceived of an 
idea and only subsequently chooses the medium with which to express it, and 
initially we regarded this to be compatible with Croce’s position. However, if the 
aesthetic intuition derives its content from the medium, which after all is contingent 
and historical, then this seems to undermine the ontological primacy of the idea 
over the physical object. For if the idea is merely a mental image of paint on 
canvas, or of sculpted marble, etc., then the material object itself can no longer be 
said to be something secondary, additional, or inessential. 
 
We will develop this line of thought further in Chapter Three, but returning to the 
previous point regarding the transformation of the idea during the process of 
materialisation, it seems that here is where certain fundamental difficulties must 
surely arise with regard to an artistic practice that would utilise neurotechnologies 
to realise its objects. For would we not be dealing with something purely intentional 
and hence, in some respects, stillborn? Anecdotal accounts suggest that very often it 
is an accidental, unplanned or unforeseen element that turns out to be an artist’s 
most cherished part of a work, something that could not have been predicted until it 
stands before them, and it is difficult to imagine how these happy by-products could 
result from such a mode of creation. It would be nothing more than an intention 
plucked straight from the mind with no physical negotiation, no aspect of working 
it through and overcoming problems. It seems totally to bypass or negate the 
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corporeality and the improvisation, not to mention the struggle, involved in making 
a work of art. Is it not thus all too easy? 
 
 
Improvisation and Intuitive Music: Stockhausen, Bailey, Dennett 
 
Slavoj Žižek likens the advancement of new media to the Hegelian negation of 
negation, which Žižek defines as a shifting of coordinates: Computers are first 
introduced as a means of more efficiently going about our activities, for example 
writing and printing newspapers. But before long the fatal question is raised: why 
continue to print and distribute newspapers at all, why not consider the virtual text 
on screen to be the finished product and make it accessible via the internet? Thus 
the old means are rendered obsolete by the very things brought in to make them 
more efficient and successful.
76
 So if brain computer interfaces and cognitive 
imaging technologies were to shape how we produce and consume art, the art 
object itself may soon become an unnecessary intermediary. The next step would 
surely be to do away with the object altogether and have a form of brain-to-brain 
communication, where the aesthetic intuition in Croce’s sense will be 
communicated directly from the mind of the artist to the mind of the receiver. The 
art object is thus literally effaced and fulfils Croce’s description, becoming simply a 
communicated intuition without the need for the physical ‘memory-aid’. This 
mirrors the trajectory of those conceptual art and experimental music practices we 
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touched upon above, where the object becomes less and less specific and more 
abstract to the point of dissolution. An emblematic example is La Monte Young’s 
early piece Poem for Chairs, Tables, and Benches, Etc., or Other Sound Sources 
(1960). The duration of the piece was wholly variable, and the distinction between 
performers and audience obliterated. Any sound source emitted by anybody at all, 
or indeed any actions made, inside or outside the performance space, could be 
incorporated into the work. As Cornelius Cardew describes,  
 
The work developed into a kind of ‘chamber opera’ in which any activity, 
not necessarily even of a sound variety, could constitute one strand in the 
complex weave of the composition, which could last minutes, or weeks, or 
aeons. In fact it was quickly realised that all being and happening from the 
very beginning of time had been nothing more than a single gigantic 
performance of Poem.
77
 
 
So going even further than John Cage’s strictly defined, albeit arbitrary, timeframe 
in 4’33”, with the Poem Young developed a piece whose borders were so 
permeable, its form so comprehensive, that it incorporated all of creation and at the 
same time dissolved into nothingness. 
 
But perhaps one of the problems is that we inevitably view new technology as an 
improvement on older forms, evidenced by the all but complete replacement of 
analogue technology with digital in film, photography and music. Digital 
technology, however, is not simply a quicker, more efficient or easier route to the 
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same destination, it has a character all of its own. This is obviously not to voice a 
feeble Luddite complaint, bemoaning the pace of new media, but it is undeniable 
that digital reproductions of analogue processes, no matter how advanced, cannot 
recreate the warmth of reel-to-reel tape or 16mm film and when it attempts to do so 
it usually feels like a soulless simulacrum with no character or depth. Pushed to its 
extreme it leads to absurdly complicated procedures which try desperately to 
recreate the ‘real thing’, such as artificial tape hiss, or digital books with a touch 
screen that require the user to ‘pretend’ to turn the page by touching the bottom 
right hand corner of the screen and dragging it across, or even computer keyboards 
which mimic the key resistance of an old-fashioned typewriter. There is surely no 
need for such pointless kitsch simulations, which are often frustratingly un-user 
friendly in any event. Having said this, digital technology possesses huge 
capabilities that extend far beyond the reach of analogue systems, but whose 
creative potential remains largely untapped. The problem is in nostalgically trying 
to retain the old forms but with newer means. The most creatively freeing approach 
would be to advocate a split that could signal a revival in analogue and free up the 
capabilities of digital technology from mere slick replication. With this in mind, 
perhaps we have been guilty thus far of viewing this technology as a threat to 
traditional art-making methods rather than as a wholly new means of expression 
that can exist concurrently. It is especially jarring to characterise it negatively when 
its primary purpose, as stated earlier, is to enable those with physical disabilities to 
compose and perform music. And after all, nobody is suggesting that musicians will 
all throw away their instruments and painters their brushes. So perhaps it would be 
beneficial to turn our attention to some of the things that could and could not be 
achieved via these means in an attempt to delineate how this could be regarded as 
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an entirely new form of creation rather than viewing it as some diminished travesty 
of existing art practices. 
 
Stockhausen described how during his early musical education music was treated 
and spoken about exclusively as a rational product, with its intuitive aspect 
completely suppressed. While much of his early work could be termed ‘rational 
music’, realised through intellectual energy, in his later compositions he 
endeavoured to create a space for a form of totally free improvisation, liberated 
from the conventions and idioms of jazz or any other tradition, that he named 
‘intuitive music’. His piece IT is one such case, consisting of a textual score which 
simply instructs the performer to ‘think NOTHING. Wait until it is absolutely still 
within you. When you have attained this begin to play. As soon as you start to 
think, stop and try to re-attain the state of NON-THINKING. Then continue 
playing.’78 While this should probably be considered an ideal to be approached by 
the performer rather than something that can be literally put into practice, it is 
certainly a requirement of any freely expressive performance for the player to, in a 
sense, disengage their conscious activity and play without thinking about what they 
are doing. This is true of any automatic motor activity, from table-tennis to touch-
typing; if one starts to think about what one is doing it is as if a spell had been 
broken and what before came naturally and with ease now becomes awkward and 
laboured. This is the difference between what cognitive scientists call the implicit 
and the explicit systems of learning. A receptionist may be an expert typist but be 
unable to recite from memory the order in which the letters appear on the keyboard. 
Similarly, many proficient musicians find that they are incapable of teaching others 
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how to play the instrument because this would require what has been learned 
implicitly to be re-learned explicitly, which demands considerable time and effort. 
The same is true of a person’s native language, and teaching English to foreign 
students requires a great deal more than merely knowing how to speak it. So 
implicit learning is learning-through-doing and takes place largely in the absence of 
explicit knowledge about what has been acquired and any amount of transfer of 
skill from implicit to explicit control during the act will be very detrimental to its 
performance.
79
 
 
What remains difficult to conceive is how such spontaneous instinctive activity 
could be possible with music created through the BCI, for it must surely always be 
an explicit, deliberate act of thought to induce the computer to play the intended 
note. If one were to ‘let go’ in the way a performer with an instrument would then 
there would be nothing that the computer could identify or recognise. Put more 
bluntly, if you are not thinking of anything, or at least anything specific, how could 
the computer play anything? Stockhausen says of intuitive music that, ‘acting, or 
listening, or doing something without thinking, is the state of pure intuitive activity, 
not requiring to use the brain as a control’.80 However, with this system by 
definition the brain is the only control, so would it be that of the two paradigms 
Stockhausen describes only the former, rational music, would be possible with the 
BCI system? 
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The renowned guitarist Derek Bailey identified two distinct improvisatory attitudes 
towards the instrument, which he called the pro- and anti-instrument camps. For the 
former, the instrument is the be-all and end-all of performance and the performer is 
merely there to tease out all of its capabilities and sonic potential. This leads to 
modifications, preparations and extensions of the instrument, all by way of doing 
full justice to its possibilities and respecting its limitations. For this position there 
can surely be no room for incorporation into the BCI model of creation as it is an 
inherently corporal activity.
81
 On the other hand, ‘the anti-instrument attitude might 
be presented as: “The instrument comes between the player and his music” […] 
Technically, the instrument has to be defeated. The aim is to do on the instrument 
what you could do if you could play without an instrument.’82 Here the instrument 
stands in the way between the performer and his expression and is fundamentally 
an inconvenience, or even an irrelevance, since it is the player and his inspiration 
alone that counts. So it should make little difference what the instrument is, since it 
is merely a conduit, which is why the instruments favoured by such performers 
usually have an extremely limited capacity – the idea being that a more direct 
expressiveness is possible when the opportunities for technical virtuosity are 
minimised. Perhaps the BCI would be embraced by such performers as the ultimate 
victory of expressiveness over the tyranny of the instrument. But this brings us back 
to the point reached above, namely how to conceive of a freely expressive form of 
music using a system that would require deliberate, concentrated thought. 
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However, it is perhaps based on a common misconception of the brain and an 
underestimation of this technology to suggest that it could only respond to explicit, 
deliberate thought. The activities carried out ‘implicitly’ are still controlled by the 
brain, despite the misleading term in popular usage ‘muscle memory’. In email 
correspondence, Dr. Mick Grierson of Goldsmiths, University of London, who has 
developed his own version of the BCI for real-time performance and composition 
has expressed his belief that as the technology progresses and becomes more 
sophisticated – and as the user becomes more familiar with the process – it could 
become intuitive in a similar way to using an instrument.
83
 To return to the 
monkeys who learned to feed themselves using a brain-controlled robotic arm (and 
similar experiments carried out on human volunteers), after the initial strangeness it 
was soon assimilated into unconscious activity and became integrated into its 
normal behavioural routine much more quickly than any of the scientists 
anticipated. Effectively this is the difference between explicitly thinking ‘now I am 
going to move the arm’ and doing it unconsciously as if it were a part of the user’s 
body. Already, in the relatively early stages of development of the BCI technology 
for musical performance, it is apparently becoming increasingly easy to ‘forget’ 
about the interface, in an analogous way to when one reaches a certain level of skill 
with an instrument and can play without having to think about what one is doing.
84
 
This potentially suggests an even truer fulfilment of Stockhausen’s ideal of intuitive 
music, something which truly comes ‘from within’, bypassing our conscious 
control. Speculatively, we could perhaps extend it to other art forms: for example if 
                                                 
83
 Quote: ‘I'd hazard that the more familiar one becomes with the process, physical or not, the more 
intuitive it will be - i.e. it will pass from working memory to long term memory. The body/brain will 
assimilate the activity into unconscious activity, assuming that it is happening enough. Like when 
you play the same scale enough times, eventually, you don't have to think about it.’ (Personal 
communication with the author, 22.02.10) 
84
 Ibid. 
75 
 
a painter or sculptor were to use a brain-controlled mechanical arm like the one 
described above would this approach the ideal of unmediated expression that Cy 
Twombly and others strove after? Or alternatively would it realise Duchamp’s 
intention regarding his early paintings: ‘I wanted to get away from the physical 
aspect of painting. I was much more interested in recreating ideas in painting […] I 
wanted to put painting once again at the service of the mind.’85 Or even both of 
these models simultaneously? But any conjecture with regards to what such art 
would actually sound or look like and whether radically new forms of expression 
would accompany the new means must remain open. The question here still 
concerns the nature of such a means of mind-creation itself, not the outcome. 
 
We can surely discount the literary arts from consideration here, because there is no 
conceivable way a computer could realise something from one’s brain in a language 
if it was not already expressed linguistically. Croce regards the divisions of the arts 
as arbitrary and artificial (and genres even more so), each intuition being singular 
and expressing itself in its own way, whether as a painting, a piece of music or a 
poem, etc.; but it would seem that for our present purposes literature presents a 
special case. If something were to spring out from within us as a word that we had 
not ourselves consciously expressed, what right would we have to call it a thought 
of ours? If a machine scans my brain and expresses some vague preverbal feeling in 
a word then it would be more like a description of a mental state than an 
unexpressed thought. If I am thinking of something that I cannot formulate into 
words, then in what precise sense am I ‘thinking’ at all? And coming back to the 
discussion above regarding how an artist may struggle to physically express her 
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ideas, could the same be said for a poet or novelist? Has she even had the idea until 
she has found the words to express them, and then is there really any difference or 
disjuncture between a thought and its verbal or written expression? Perhaps only in 
that we are not umbilically attached to it any more and cannot control its 
interpretation or how it is understood; but more essentially, between the words I 
intend to say and those I say does anything have to be overcome? While writing the 
present work I have often hesitated over the phrasing, knowing essentially what I 
mean to say but being unable to find the suitable expression. Sometimes I do recall 
it, other times I have had to reconcile myself with not expressing it exactly as I 
would have wanted. It seems doubtful that a computer software would be able to 
identify the intended word from my brain activity if I cannot call it to mind myself. 
Interestingly, scientists have found that each of the 40 or so phonemes of which the 
English language is made up has a unique signal in the brain which can be detected 
as we form a word, either aloud or only in thought. Although there is not yet the 
capacity directly to read one’s inner thoughts and translate them into words, the 
principle is firmly established.
86
 For such thoughts to be deciphered of course, they 
must be fully articulated into words otherwise there would be nothing for the 
computer to interpret. So we must agree with Croce here that a thought or intuition 
that is not expressed is an oxymoron. We may like to flatter ourselves that the mind 
is a breeding ground of ideas and thoughts that are more than we can consciously 
put into words, but this seems exceedingly naïve. 
 
The American philosopher Daniel Dennett discusses the process by which we find 
the words to say in ordinary speech and opposes what he calls the ‘Bureaucratic’ 
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model of speech generation to the ‘Pandemonium’ model. This replaces the notion 
of a central meaner – an inner Cartesian homunculus with something he intends to 
say and then trying to find the words to express it – with a quasi-evolutionary 
process, where meaning is generated in and through the process of selecting words 
rather than coming before: ‘There is thus not one source of meaning, but many 
shifting sources, opportunistically developed out of the search for the right 
words.’87 There is an internal back and forth competition amongst the words and 
the communicative intentions, and those that win out make their appearance in an 
utterance which is the first time that those words and intentions are manifested and 
made known to the speaker. It is not too much of a leap to extend this to artistic 
intentions and suggest that they too are generated through the act of realisation and 
not in advance. 
 
Dennett stresses how we sometimes do not know why we say certain things and we 
attribute meaning to them as we hear ourselves speaking. The same can be said for 
a painter, musician, novelist or philosopher finding inspiration and being surprised 
by what they discover themselves doing: 
 
As E.M. Forster put it, ‘How do I know what I think until I see what I say?’ 
We often do discover what we think (and hence what we mean) by 
reflecting on what we find ourselves saying – and not correcting. So we are, 
at least on those occasions, in the same boat as our external critics and 
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interpreters, encountering a bit of text and putting the best reading on it that 
we can find.
88
 
 
This would appear to be diametrically opposed to Croce’s model, because here 
there can be no internal self who is ‘there’ to intuit the outcome prior to setting the 
process of realisation in motion. It is also clear that this has implications for the 
brain technologies, because as has been noted it would require for the 
communicative or artistic intentions to be fully known and worked out prior to their 
expression. This again calls into question the possibility of improvisation or 
spontaneity when using these interfaces. Suggesting that any of these technologies 
could express a preconscious thought that we have not yet ourselves expressed 
would be to fall into the bureaucratic paradigm, positing a fully self-transparent 
inner controller who hands out orders to underlings to find the correct words to 
match his intentions. If this were the case then it would not be too much of a stretch 
to suggest that this latter task could also be accomplished by a computer, but this 
assessment should be avoided. 
 
To rescue Croce here, and also a form of literary improvisation through the BCI, we 
would stress that firstly there is no reason to assume that the spontaneous process 
through which we find ourselves taken aback by our own ideas or expressions 
should only apply to those that we externalise and hence only in the process of this 
externalisation. Surely an idea can itself go through this evolution and 
development, growing out instinctively as it is worked through. It is not uncommon 
in certain situations, where what one says needs to be carefully worded, to find 
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oneself rehearsing what one wants to say internally beforehand. So the evolutionary 
procedure described by Dennett through which words and meanings are generated 
by no means requires there always to be an actual spoken utterance. The on-the-
hoof formation of communicative intentions could be compared to the earlier 
description of the methods of an artist such as Jackson Pollock and how this was 
shown to be not necessarily in conflict with a model of prior, internal aesthetic 
intuitions. Abandoning the Cartesian homunculus thus need not necessarily entail 
abandoning the notion of ‘ideas’ altogether. Furthermore, as evidenced by the 
Freudian exercise of free association, words and phrases can spew out of us which 
seem to originate outside of our conscious control, so applying this to an artistic 
context we could quite easily envisage using this technology to engage in 
something akin to the surrealist practice of écriture automatique, or even the stream 
of consciousness techniques of Proust, Virginia Woolf and Jack Kerouac. Whether 
or not we would want to assign a psychoanalytical significance to such products, or 
aesthetic merit for that matter, would be debatable, but it would certainly be an 
instant, unpremeditated form of creation. 
 
We are now in a position to move away from our preliminary consideration of the 
implications these technologies may carry for artistic activity and towards a more 
fundamental investigation into the very gap between the ‘in here’ of thought and 
the ‘out there’ of external actuality that has lain at the root of the problem. It may 
transpire that the power or ability granted to us by these technologies, by bridging, 
cancelling, or effacing this gap, could fundamentally alter not just the notion of 
artistic creation but actually what it means to be a subject, putting the very 
condition of our finitude and of our freedom or spontaneity at stake.
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Chapter Two: Intellectual Intuition and Finite Creativity. 
 
Thus what the study of nature and of the human being teaches us sufficiently 
elsewhere may well be correct here also, viz., that the inscrutable wisdom through 
which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in what it has refused us than in 
what it has allotted us. 
– Kant, Critique of Practical Reason1 
 
Throughout our previous chapter the question that insistently returned again and 
again was this: what would become of the creative process if the temporal and 
ontological gap between the artist’s intention-to-create and the piece of work itself 
were to be closed, so that ‘mere thought’ and actuality would coincide: would this 
amount to a direct, unmediated form of expression? The question that faces us now 
is, just what kind of ‘creation’ would such a faculty be? What would it mean for us 
to be given the ability to manipulate external reality via thought alone? Or for the 
‘inner’ contents of the mind to be immediately transposed ‘outside’ as an object? 
Here a very intriguing remark from Slavoj Žižek’s The Parallax View will come to 
our aid and help guide us in this direction. Roughly a third of this, his self-
proclaimed magnum opus,
2
 is devoted to the cognitive sciences and their 
implications for our conceptions of consciousness, subjectivity and free will. In this 
context Žižek briefly addresses the BCI technology we have been discussing, in 
particular the aforementioned monkeys who learned to feed themselves using a 
brain-controlled mechanical arm, as well as similar experiments carried out on 
human volunteers playing computer games which had been programmed to 
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recognise brain activity corresponding to movements of the joystick, the result 
being that the joystick was no longer necessary and the game could be controlled 
merely by their thoughts. As Žižek writes, 
 
Even Steven Hawking’s proverbial little finger – the minimal link between 
his mind and outside reality, the only part of his paralysed body that 
Hawking can move – will thus no longer be necessary: with my mind I can 
directly cause objects to move […] In the terms of German Idealism, this 
means that what Kant called ‘intellectual intuition’ – the closing of the gap 
between mind and reality, a mind-process which, in a causal way, directly 
influences reality, this capacity that Kant attributed only to the infinite mind 
of God – is now potentially available to all of us, that is to say, we are 
potentially deprived of one of the basic features of our finitude. And as we 
learned from Kant as well as from Freud, this gap of finitude is at the same 
time the resource of our creativity […] the direct short circuit between mind 
and reality implies the prospect of a radical closure.
3
 
 
There are three significant claims here: the first is that a capacity of thought 
characterised as belonging only to God is made available to us by these 
technologies; the second is that this capacity would enable us to overcome our 
finitude; and the third is that this very overcoming of finitude, rather than 
bestowing upon us a new form of unconditional freedom would actually deprive us 
of the very form of creativity that is particular to us. However, the impact of such a 
revolution would surely not only implicate future acts; it would cast its shadow 
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back retroactively, suggesting that perhaps human finitude, and creativity, are not 
what we thought they were. So this ‘deprivation’ would be total and irreversible, 
and the genie cannot be put back into the bottle once it has been opened. 
 
The aim of the present chapter has thus been outlined; it will be an attempt to 
grapple with this rather extraordinary claim which, characteristically, Žižek does 
not develop further but leaves as a tantalising, almost throwaway remark. This will 
necessitate firstly our coming to a thorough understanding of this notion of 
intellectual intuition in its precise Kantian formulation, foregoing the various 
transformations and modifications this term subsequently underwent in the hands of 
Fichte and Schelling. We must then consider how and in what respects our freedom 
or creativity rests on finitude, such that any ‘overcoming’ of finitude would put this 
freedom at stake. 
 
The task of providing a coherent, univocal definition of intellectual intuition (or the 
intuitive or archetypal intellect which would possess such a faculty) is a particularly 
tortuous one. All the references Kant makes to it – and it appears in all three 
Critiques as well as numerous other works – are ‘episodic’, dealing with problems 
that at first sight appear heterogeneous; thus it is a slippery, multifaceted concept.
4
 
This is no doubt due to the fact that it is always used negatively or problematically; 
indeed the main thematic treatments of it in the Critique of Pure Reason (see in 
particular B68, B72, B145, B153, B307) were only added in the second edition, 
which provides a clue to its function as a bolster for Kant’s system, but as a limit 
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rather than a positive addition. It functions primarily in order to demonstrate that as 
soon as we step outside of this system we immediately involve ourselves in 
contradictions and absurdities. Thus it is invoked merely to ground our finite 
cognition and root it in the senses, and is introduced only to be denied as a 
possibility. 
 
The theme of the intuitive intellect as a faculty of the infinite mind of God appears 
in Kant’s work as early as the Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the 
Sensible and the Intelligible World of 1770, where he writes, ‘the divine intuition 
[is] the cause, not the consequence, of objects’.5 Two years later, in the letter to 
Marcus Herz in which he famously announces his readiness to embark on the 
critical project, he returns to it with regard to the correspondence between the 
object of our representation and the representation itself: What, he asks, guarantees 
the reference of the internal representation to the external object? If the former is 
merely the result of the subject’s being affected by the latter then it can be 
explained as of cause to effect. Otherwise, if the representation was ‘active’ in its 
relation to the object – ‘i.e., if the object were produced by the representation itself 
(as one thinks of divine cognitions as the archetypes of things)’ – then we could 
likewise understand the congruence between internal and external: 
 
And so one can at least understand the possibility of both an archetypal 
intellect, upon whose intuition the things themselves are grounded, as well 
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as an ectypal intellect, which attains the data of its logical activity from the 
sensuous intuition of things.
6
 
 
From these brief readings we can already begin to understand what Žižek has in 
mind and why for him such a divine faculty is ‘potentially available to all of us’. 
The representations in the mind of God are characterised as being the ground or 
cause of the objects themselves, while the opposite is the case for human cognition. 
However, what these technologies facilitate is for a purely psychical event to have 
real effects in the outside world and even for it to be made manifest as an object, 
thereby seemingly transforming our passive representations into the active ground 
of physical events. 
 
Ob-jects and E-jects 
 
Kant develops his system of Transcendental Idealism in opposition to what he calls 
Transcendental Realism, the latter referring to all pre-critical metaphysics which 
tacitly assume that the things as they appear to us are the same as they are outside 
of any reference to our faculties of cognition. Such a doctrine assumes an eternal 
God’s-eye perspective as the normative, ideal archetype, of which our human 
perspective is but a less perfect, confused, although strictly homogeneous version. 
The belief is that the further we extend our understanding of the way things are – 
the structure of being – the closer we come to absolute knowledge.7 The move Kant 
instigates is to radically separate finite human cognition from infinite divine 
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cognition, and this is at the root of the famous division into appearances and things 
in themselves, this dichotomy being the difference between things as they appear 
from our human standpoint and the same things as seen in their intrinsic being by a 
divine observer. The things that we experience outside of us, while being 
empirically real are transcendentally ideal, i.e., they are mere appearances which 
conform to our modes of representation, which does not mean that they are mere 
illusion or false semblance. As is commonly known, for Kant space and time are 
nothing but the pure forms of our intuition and do not exist as self-subsistent real 
entities or real relations between entities. Space is the pure form of outer intuition 
and the condition of everything that appears to us externally, and time is the pure 
form of inner intuition, so the condition of everything that appears as such. Things 
in themselves, as seen from the perspective of the Supreme Being, have neither a 
position or extension in space nor a temporal duration, but this negative description 
is as far as our knowledge can stretch and beyond it we can know nothing at all 
about how things may be outside of our mode of intuiting them. 
 
As Kant states in the first lines of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and hence the first 
lines of the Critique of Pure Reason proper, intuition is the means by which our 
cognition refers directly to an object, and all thought refers only mediately to these 
objects, gathering and ordering the data that has been intuitively given: 
 
Intuition, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but 
that, in turn, is possible only – for us human beings, at any rate – by the 
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mind’s being affected in a certain manner […] Hence by means of 
sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone supplies us with intuitions.
8
  
 
So there are two features to our faculty of intuition, the first and primary factor 
being that the objects pre-exist and condition the act of intuition, hence it is 
receptive and not productive. Secondly, since thought cannot directly access these 
beings it must take place through the sense-organs, therefore it is sensible rather 
than intellectual, and we can have no knowledge and no access at all to objects 
without those objects being first intuited in this way: 
 
Our kind of intuition is called sensible because it is not original. I.e., it is 
not such that through this intuition itself the existence of its object is given 
(the latter being a kind of intuition that, as far as we can see, can belong 
only to the original being). Rather, our kind of intuition is dependent on the 
existence of the object, and hence is possible only by the object’s affecting 
the subject’s capacity to present […] For the reason just set forth, 
intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the original being, and never 
to a being that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (an 
intuition that determines that being’s existence by reference to given 
objects).
9
 
 
As we saw in the passage from the letter to Marcus Herz, Kant sees only two 
possible bases for the relationship between our intuition of an object and the object 
thus intuited: one must be the ground of the other. Since declaring our intuition to 
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be the grounding cause would see us fall into the ‘material idealism’ of Berkeley, 
whereby objects themselves only exist in and for an act of perception, the object 
must be the cause of the intuition. But the appearance of that object in perception is 
transcendentally constituted by our a priori forms of representation, space and time, 
which do not exist outside of us but are the conditions which allow something to 
become an object for us. Our intuition is only capable of receiving something 
given, and since all thought only aims at the material so given we are entirely 
dependent on these given objects which exist in their own right, and without them 
we can have no knowledge. But Kant also says something more than this: we are 
dependent on the receptivity of our intuition not merely for our knowledge of the 
external world but also in terms of our very existence, that existence being 
determined ‘by reference to given objects’. This point is intended as a further 
defence against material idealism, whether of the ‘dogmatic’ kind associated with 
Berkeley or the ‘problematic idealism’ of Descartes, the latter asserting that 
absolute certainty belongs only to inner experience, meaning the existence of 
external reality can only be inferred and never proven. But what Kant means to 
demonstrate is that it is only by reference to the objects of outer intuition that we 
are able to determine our own existence, thus any doubt or outright denial of the 
existence of an external world is precluded. But it is not until the ‘Refutation of 
Idealism’ some two hundred pages later that this is fully accounted for. 
 
As we have seen, the pure form of inner intuition, that wherein I intuit my own 
activity abstracted from all empirical elements, is time. But I can only sense 
something as determined in time by measuring it against something permanent, for 
without perception of something permanent all changes of time would have no 
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‘anchor’ as it were, and there would be nothing to connect the successive moments 
from disappearing as soon as they arrive and for no continuity to be detected. This 
permanent something can obviously not be a mere representation within me if it is 
to be something against which I measure myself, so ‘determination of my existence 
in time is possible only through the existence of actual things that I perceive outside 
me.’10 (This notion of ‘permanence’ as the condition of time perception will be 
returned to and clarified later.) I have intellectual consciousness of my existence 
only as the bare I think of transcendental apperception but this is nothing without 
sensuous intuition. If, on the other hand, ‘with that intellectual consciousness of my 
existence I could at the same time link a determination of my existence through 
intellectual intuition, then this determination would not include necessarily the 
consciousness of a relation to something outside me.’11 Only a being in possession 
of such a faculty could through the mere thought of itself simultaneously determine 
itself, because that act of the intellect would, through its immediate access to the 
‘object’ (the self), simultaneously create it and all its determinations, causa sui, and 
would not be dependent upon external objects. Precisely because we are not in 
possession of such a faculty we can only gain knowledge even of our own selves 
through the receptivity of intuition and the independent existence of external 
objects. So Kant’s rejoinder to the empirical idealist or the sceptic is to say that 
without objective outer experience, which to them is doubtful, there would be no 
inner experience. Therefore receptivity is primordial; our intuition is not receptive 
simply because we happen to have the particular sense organs that we do, rather it 
is only because we are in the midst of beings that are not of our creation and not 
under our power that we must be in possession of organs of sensibility through 
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which these beings can make themselves known. This predicament of ours where 
we find ourselves always-already amidst a pre-given world of objects upon which 
we are reliant and over which we are not master is what Heidegger calls facticity, or 
thrownness, and as we shall see, our being thus thrown into a world, and the 
impossibility of getting ‘behind’ ourselves, is for Kant as well as Heidegger, the 
essence of our status as finite beings and the very condition of our freedom. 
 
Our mind, as discursive, is split into a faculty of receptivity – intuition – and 
spontaneity – understanding. The latter is spontaneous because it functions as an 
active ordering or synthesis of sensible data. No order or composition is taken in 
through the senses, which without the unity bestowed upon it by thought is merely 
a ‘blind play of representations’.12 This point is intended to contest Hume’s denial 
of the self and its reduction to mere ‘bundles’ of perceptions or sensations. In 
Kant’s account these ‘bundles’, without something constant accompanying them – 
namely the synthesis enacted by the transcendental unity of apperception – would 
never lead to a feeling of selfhood at all and the I itself, if it were mere receptivity, 
would dissolve amidst the confusion of sense-impressions. This unity of 
apperception, however, as we have just touched on above and will return to in more 
detail, does not amount to knowledge of the self. It is merely intellectual and an 
empty point of formal unity. By way of this – and through the categories (pure a 
priori concepts of understanding) – thought brings the ‘blind play of 
representations’ to objective knowledge of objects: ‘thus receptivity can make 
cognition possible only when combined with spontaneity.’13 
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Due to this productive, spontaneous nature of thought we can begin to see more 
clearly why an intuition that would be intellectual (or an understanding that is 
intuitive) could not be considered to be receptive, but must necessarily be a form of 
cognition which would render the object of thought immediately present through 
the mere act of thinking it. This is because the understanding does not derive its 
concepts from experience but rather brings them to experience. If thought were not 
reliant for its objects on their being given from elsewhere but could somehow 
communicate with them directly, the only way this relation could be conceived is if 
thought was itself the ground of that object. Thus, as we can see, our intuition is 
finite in two fundamental respects: firstly because it is dependent upon the object 
being given and cannot freely create the objects that it intuits, and secondly, 
because it needs to be supplemented by understanding in order to possess 
knowledge, that is, that the object intuited is not fully transparent to that act of 
intuition but needs to be determined by thought. The infinite mind of God could not 
conceivably be dependent upon objects to which it has to conform because this 
would amount to a limitation and the Supreme Being, as infinite, could have no 
such limitations, so its objects must spring forth from the cognition itself. Indeed, as 
Heidegger puts it, 
 
Absolute cognition itself reveals the essent [existent being] in the act of 
letting it come forth and possesses it ‘only’ as that which arises from this 
very act, i.e., as e-ject [Ent-stand]. Insofar as the essent is manifest to 
absolute intuition, it ‘is’ precisely in its coming-into-Being. It is the essent 
as essent in itself, i.e., not as object. Strictly speaking, then, we fail to hit 
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upon the essence of infinite knowledge if we say its ‘object’ is produced in 
the very act of intuition.
14
 
 
So we think naïvely if, in an anthropocentric way, we conceive of God’s relation to 
objects (or ‘e-jects’) as something that springs ‘out’ from the mind, in the way that 
we would imagine such an ability in ourselves; that is, as something inner which 
takes on substantial being outside the mind. For the infinite mind there could be no 
‘outside’ against which it could define an ‘inside’, for as we saw, externality itself – 
space – is only a form of human intuition and as such is a mark of finitude. Once 
this being of thought would have taken on objectivity then it would no longer be 
under the mind’s power and would exist in its own right, regardless of how it came 
into existence.
15
 So the arising in and for the act of intuition is the mode of being 
that such ‘e-jects’ would have. Our knowledge, as finite, ‘necessarily conceals’ the 
thing in itself and ‘because the appearance gives the essent only as ob-ject, it is 
basically impossible for it to let the essent be seen as e-ject.’16 
 
However, here we are faced with a problem which Kant seemingly cannot address, 
namely of accounting for our world of appearances from the perspective of the 
Supreme Being. If things in themselves remain completely under God’s power and 
their mode of being is identical with their arising in thought, then what does God 
                                                 
14
 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Hereafter: KPM), trans. James S. 
Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) p. 36. 
15
 As Sartre puts it in the ‘Introduction’ to Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2003), ‘being, if it is suddenly placed outside the subjective by the 
fulguration of which Leibniz speaks, can only affirm itself as distinct from and opposed to its 
creator; otherwise it dissolves in him. The theory of perpetual creation, by removing from being 
what the Germans call Selbständigkeit, makes it disappear in the divine subjectivity. If being exists 
as over against God, it is its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a 
word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it 
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know of spatiotemporal determinations? The only way of resolving this difficulty is 
by making the split, so to speak, ‘symmetrically asymmetric’, so that not only is it 
the case that we, as finite beings, cannot know anything of the things as they are in 
themselves, also from the side of the things in themselves it cannot be accounted 
for as to where or why it splits off into appearance. Each ‘side’ must structurally 
obscure the other. But this is as much as saying that there is something, namely the 
finite world of appearance, that is outside of God’s power, which can only 
undermine His status as supreme. If to resolve this situation we say simply that it is 
a consequence of our restricted view of the things in themselves – as they really are 
– then we return to a pre-critical metaphysics that treats the finite as merely the 
limited perspective on the infinite; but finitude cannot be incorporated into the 
infinite as of the part to the whole. In short, if we start from the side of the infinite 
there is no way of accounting for how the finite comes to be, so for Kant we can 
only start from the side of the finite. The things in themselves can be conceived 
only as regards how they must be determined for us; the infinite cannot be thought 
in itself but only in its relation to the finite. What this leaves unasked and incapable 
of being asked is the question of finitude itself: why finitude? The only way this 
question could be addressed is by precisely leaving finitude behind, in a Hegelian 
move, and accounting for it as the self-limitation of the absolute, but for Kant this 
would be wholly illegitimate. More than once Kant stresses that we cannot ask why 
these categories and no others, or why do we have the particular form of intuition 
that we do, because here we encounter the unsurpassable limits of our knowledge.
17
 
However, in a strangely paradoxical fashion, this very limitation of our knowledge 
seems to privilege our perspective over that of the Supreme Being, since from our 
                                                 
17
 Cf. for example, CPR, B145-6. 
93 
 
side, presupposing finitude as already given, we can account for things in 
themselves – as the necessary substrate of appearance – and to a certain extent we 
can determine them as such. Conversely, from the other side, finitude is completely 
incomprehensible and unaccountable. These are themes that will be returned to and 
fleshed out, but for now let us set it aside and return to our analysis of the Kantian 
structure of cognition. 
 
Possibility and Actuality 
  
If our intuition, as receptive, is the source of the finitude of our knowledge, then 
does this mean that thought, if it were capable of being liberated from sensuous 
intuition, would be freely productive and hence creative? As Kant describes, 
 
[The laws and regularity that we find in nature] are not taken from 
experience; rather they must provide appearances with the latter’s law-
governedness, and exactly thereby make experience possible. Hence 
understanding is not merely a power of making rules for oneself by 
comparing appearances; understanding is itself legislative for nature. I.e., 
without understanding there would not be any nature at all, i.e., any 
synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules.
18
 
 
This law-giving power of the understanding, along with the transcendental ideality 
of space and time, is of course the crux of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’. Since 
the objects of experience are not encountered as they are in themselves but only as 
                                                 
18
 CPR, A126. 
94 
 
they appear to us then they must conform to our modes of presentation rather than 
the other way around. So the law that the same effect will always follow from a 
given cause is necessary because it is a condition of our experience, not because the 
things themselves are so arranged. If this were not the case, Kant argues, then all 
knowledge would be empirical and no universal, necessary laws could be known, 
since experience could never acquaint us with necessity but only with what has so 
far been the case. No amount of observation of an event following on from another 
event could lead us to the knowledge of the necessity of such a correspondence. 
This is why Kant can say that ‘the conditions for the possibility of experience as 
such are simultaneously conditions for the possibility of objects of experience.’19 
 
The understanding, then, is spontaneous, and since its pure concepts (categories) 
are not derived from experience it is seemingly independent from intuition, while 
the latter, it would appear, is wholly dependent upon the former. Thus there is cause 
to claim, as Kant himself does in his Inaugural Dissertation, that the senses provide 
us with ‘the representation of things as they appear, while the intellectual 
presentations are things as they are.’20 This is the distinction between the respective 
worlds of phenomena and noumena, or alternatively mundus sensibilis and mundus 
intelligibilis. For dogmatic metaphysics (including, to a certain extent, the early 
Kant), the world of phenomena is that which we see, sense, touch, hear, in our day 
to day existence, while the world of noumena is the purely rational world of pure 
understanding. Hence the body keeps us tied us down to the material world of sense 
but the understanding, through logical inference, can ascend freely into the 
absolute. However, for Kant after the critical turn this cannot be the case, because 
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the understanding is nothing but a faculty of rules for ordering the sensible 
manifold and without that data it is completely empty, hence ‘through [the 
categories] alone we are unable to think or determine any object.’21 This is why 
Heidegger characterises the understanding as even more finite than intuition, 
because intuition is primary and provides the sole immediate access that we have to 
beings, while understanding is indirect and must refer to something general in order 
to return to the particular; and ‘this detour (discursiveness), which is essential to the 
understanding, is the clearest index of its finitude’.22 In an intuition undetermined 
by thought something is at least given, whereas a faculty of combining the manifold 
can signify nothing at all if no manifold has been given. So, because of the 
irreducibly finite nature of thought, ‘all [God’s] cognition must be intuition rather 
than thought which always manifests limits’.23 
 
If the understanding could do without sensible intuition and itself deal immediately 
with the object, then due to the spontaneous nature of thought, as we have seen, the 
object that it acts upon and determines would not have been given to it from outside 
– for this could only come about through the senses – but would be freely given by 
and for itself. However, such an understanding would bear no relation to our 
discursive faculty: 
 
For if I were to think of an understanding that itself intuited (as, e.g., a 
divine understanding that did not present given objects but through whose 
presentation the objects would at the same time be given or produced), then 
in regard to such cognition the categories would have no signification 
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whatever. The categories are only rules for an understanding whose entire 
power consists in thought, i.e., in the act of bringing to the unity of 
apperception the synthesis of the manifold that has, in intuition, been given 
to it from elsewhere. Hence such an understanding by itself cognises 
nothing whatever, but only combines and orders the material for cognition, 
i.e., the intuition which must be given to it by the object.
24
 
 
Because these rules of the understanding are not taken from the senses, however, 
we are naturally led into the fallacious belief that they are independent from sense 
and that purely logical reasoning can give us insight into a supersensible world, but 
once again this could only be the case for an understanding that intuited, for by 
itself it has no capacity to access objects. Therefore, the grounding condition of 
sensible intuition, that it is reliant upon already existent objects to be given, is a 
fortiori true for the understanding. 
 
However, the concept of noumena cannot simply be discarded because we find 
ourselves unable to know anything of it. Since the objects of experience are only 
appearances, there must be something underlying that appearance, and because it is 
only for us that the conditions of sensibility hold, then this underlying substrate will 
not be such as is extended in space nor will it have a temporal duration. Thus the 
understanding can conceive of this supersensible world but only negatively, that is, 
by abstracting from the conditions of our sensible intuition. So Kant’s doctrine of 
sensibility does not only leave a space open for the concept of noumena in the 
negative sense while remaining agnostic, it actually requires it because of the very 
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fact that appearances are not things in themselves and that our form of intuition 
cannot be the only possible kind.
25
 If, on the other hand, we were to think of 
noumena in the positive sense, i.e., as the ‘object of a nonsensible intuition’,26 we 
would need to assume an intellect that is capable of accessing this other dimension. 
This must be a faculty of intuition, because only intuition provides direct access to 
objects, but since the ‘object’ here is non-sensible, this intuition must therefore be 
an intellectual one. The Noumenon then, like intellectual intuition, is a problematic 
concept, serving only to indicate the boundaries of our finite cognition. If we did 
not have such a concept then nothing would prevent us from considering our way of 
intuiting to be absolute, and hence the world of appearances to be the world as it is 
in itself. So the concept of noumena as limit is essential to the Kantian system. In 
this way our understanding can venture beyond its proper sphere, but only 
problematically, and the actual existence of this world can in no way be determined 
by the mere concept. However, indicating the boundaries beyond which our 
knowledge cannot go still amounts to an extension of knowledge, albeit a negative 
extension. 
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The concept of a purely intelligible object is an entirely undetermined one because 
we cannot think of any way in which such an object could be given. Indeed, as 
Heidegger drew our attention to above, the very concept of a noumenal object is 
self-contradictory. As Kant writes, 
 
We cannot call the noumenon such an object; for this signifies precisely the 
problematic concept of an object for a quite different intuition and for an 
understanding quite different from ours – an object that hence is itself a 
problem. Hence the concept of the noumenon is not the concept of an 
object; rather, it is the problem, linked inevitably with the limitation of our 
sensibility, as to whether there may not be objects wholly detached from 
this sensibility’s intuition.27 
 
The unknown thing called noumenon is not an object since objectivity itself is the 
result of an act of synthesis performed by our cognitive faculties. For, again, the 
sense-data that we take in via intuition is not given to us as unified, which can only 
be an act of our intellect. This synthesis does not apply only to the chronology of 
our experiences so that one thing follows another or certain things are perceived to 
take place simultaneously; the very wholeness or consistency of an object is not 
intuited directly but is a form bestowed upon the manifold. Thus, exactly 
corresponding to the transcendental unity of apperception touched upon earlier is 
the concept of the transcendental object. This, likewise, is a purely formal point of 
unity, or frame, to which we refer the matter of sensation and whose role is to keep 
our cognitions from ‘being determined haphazardly or arbitrarily, [and ensure] that 
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they are determined a priori in a certain way.’28 This transcendental object is thus 
unknowable, but not in the same way that the noumenon is unknowable, i.e., 
entirely outside of all possible experience and having no relation whatsoever to our 
faculty of cognition. It is unknowable because, having no content, there is nothing 
in it to know. It is nothing but the concept of an object in general, which as such sits 
on the limit between the inside and the outside of experience. If it fell on the inside 
then it would be just another piece of sense-data which itself would then need to be 
determined according to some other rule of synthesis. If it were outside of 
experience, like noumena, then it could have no determining influence on our 
cognition. 
 
The distinction into mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibilis assumes our senses 
and our understanding to refer to two ontologically distinct regions, but as Kant 
repeatedly reminds us, they can ‘determine objects only in combination. If we 
separate them, then we have intuition without concepts, or concepts without 
intuitions; but in either case we have presentations that we cannot refer to any 
determinate object.’29 If our understanding were to think an object, for example, 
noumena, of which we could have no intuition, and yet we wanted to assert the 
actual existence of such an object then the existence, along with the thought could 
only spring from the understanding itself, which for us is impossible, because by 
understanding alone we can divine only the possibility of a thing; for the actuality 
of the object corresponding to this possibility some sensation must be given. It is 
here that we hit upon another aspect of intellectual intuition, this time from the 
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Critique of Judgement. For it is only for a mind structured as ours is, into sense and 
understanding, that there exists such a distinction between possibility and actuality: 
 
Human understanding cannot avoid the necessity of drawing a distinction 
between the possibility and the actuality of things. The reason for this lies in 
our own selves and the nature of our cognitive faculties. For were it not that 
two entirely heterogeneous factors, the understanding for concepts and 
sensuous intuition for the corresponding objects, are required for the 
exercise of these faculties, there would be no such distinction between the 
possible and the actual. This means that if our understanding were intuitive 
it would have no objects but such as are actual. Concepts, which are merely 
directed to the possibility of an object, and sensuous intuitions, which give 
us something and yet do not thereby let us cognise it as an object, would 
both cease to exist. Now the whole distinction which we draw between the 
merely possible and the actual rests upon the fact that possibility signifies 
the position of the representation of a thing relative to our concept, and, in 
general, to our capacity of thinking, whereas actuality signifies the positing 
of the thing in its intrinsic existence apart from this concept. Accordingly 
the distinction of possible from actual things is one that is merely valid 
subjectively for human understanding.
30
 
 
As we can see, since it is only for us that this distinction holds, in the mind of the 
Supreme Being the actual and the possible would coincide as one, and anything 
conceived would immediately be. To grasp the full import of this passage we must 
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turn our attention back to the first Critique, in particular, to the ‘Postulates of 
Empirical Thought As Such’, the fourth set of synthetic principles of the pure 
understanding. Here the possible is defined as that which ‘agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience’ and the actual as that which ‘coheres with the material 
conditions of experience (with sensation)’ [my italics]. The third postulate, that 
‘that whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal 
conditions of experience is necessary (exists necessarily)’31 we shall leave aside. 
Unlike the first two principles (governing the axioms of intuition and the 
anticipations of perception), the ‘postulates’ do not in any way determine the object 
and are not added to the concept of a thing as a predicate. For as Kant demonstrates 
in his famous refutation of the ontological proof of God, being or existence is not a 
real predicate and can in no way be asserted from the mere concept of a thing. No 
matter how far we explicate our concepts, unless there is some object given to 
intuition we can know nothing whatsoever about whether this concept corresponds 
to a real thing. So rather than contributing to the concept or determining the object 
itself, the postulates express ‘only the object’s relation to the cognitive power’,32 
thus whether that object is given to us as possible, i.e., only to the understanding, or 
as given also to sense and therefore actual. 
 
We can conceive and cognise the possibility of things without the actual existence 
of the thing coming first, but only by referring to the formal conditions of 
experience. Although in our mind we could play with all sorts of fanciful forms and 
ideas, when it comes to considering the real possibility of the thing it must conform 
to the conditions of a possible experience. So the range of possibilities is already 
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strictly determined in advance according to insuperable limits. Typically the scope 
of the possible is held to be infinitely wider than that of the actual and to extend to 
encompass anything that can be conceived so long as it obeys the principle of non-
contradiction, such as Leibniz’s possible worlds. However, in this case, when their 
possibility rests under conditions that are themselves only possible, such entities are 
not possible ‘in every respect.’33 The latter is mere logical possibility and can lead 
to all sorts of rich speculation but no knowledge. When it comes to real possibility 
experience is the only guide. So nothing can be added to the possible, its limits are 
strictly determined by the conditions of experience and anything that lies outside of 
those limits is impossible. All that can be added to is our understanding of what is 
possible. Surely, however, we must assume that although the possible and the 
actual do not belong to metaphysically different realms and are subject to the same 
conditions, there must be a fundamental ontological difference in status – the type 
of being belonging to the ‘object’ in each case. This type of being, however, 
depends entirely upon its relation to our cognition. As Kant puts it, 
 
Through the actuality of a thing I do indeed posit more than the possibility 
of it, but not in the thing; for the thing can never contain more in its 
actuality than what was contained in its complete possibility. Rather, while 
the thing’s possibility was merely a positing of the thing in reference to the 
understanding (to understanding’s empirical use), actuality is at the same 
time a connection of the thing with perception.
34
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So once again, on the side of the thing itself, and hence in reality, actuality and 
possibility are entirely indifferent. They merely signify whether an actual 
perception accompanies the thought of the thing in the subject. If I am thinking of 
an imaginary oak tree and then I encounter a real oak tree, the former’s being-
possible and the latter’s being-actual do not tell us anything at all about the thing 
concerned, about what it is. All it tells us is how the thing is related to our cognitive 
faculties. So possibility signifies something ‘inside’ us while actuality must refer to 
something ‘outside’ us, and we have already seen that this cannot be the case for 
the supreme being which is not given but gives its objects. For us what is actual is 
entirely contingent and outside of our powers to determine, which is of course the 
essence of our finitude. With this in mind, if we were able via technological 
advancements to freely create actuality from mere possibility, as appears to be the 
case, then surely what Žižek says hits the mark and for us too this distinction could 
be negotiated at will. We could not destroy it altogether because it corresponds to 
the unalterable structure of our cognition, but we could at least master it. However, 
the realm of possibility is only seemingly more under our power than that of 
actuality; it too is marked by finitude even though our knowledge of it does not rely 
on the empirical. Limits are set to the possible, and all we can do is bring our 
understanding to determine these limits; we cannot freely change them through the 
power of speculation, or get ‘behind’ them and give an account of them (‘why the 
categories?’ ‘why space and time?’). So when the distinction between possibility 
and actuality is as modest as it is in Kant, the ability to traverse it at will is not a 
supreme power. These pre-given limits conditioning the possible in advance 
already thwart our attempts to overcome finitude. 
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The actual in experience must agree with the form of possible experience in 
general, and this form can be known a priori but not the matter, which is always a 
posteriori. But one of the fundamental doctrines of pre-critical metaphysics is that 
matter must precede form, that is, the components must precede their arrangement. 
This, Kant argues, is because there is an assumption that the understanding has a 
direct insight into being, unconstrained by the conditions of sensuous intuition. 
Therefore, since the understanding requires for something first to have been given 
in order to then determine it, in this account unbounded, absolute reality is first 
given as the ground of all possibility, which is subsequently determined by 
limitations – space and time. ‘And thus it would in fact have to be, if pure 
understanding could be referred directly to objects’.35 Since this is not the case and 
we have knowledge only of appearances – which must conform to the conditions of 
sensuous intuition (space and time) – then the form must precede the matter, which 
is unthinkable for the ‘intellectualist philosopher’. Limitation does not come after 
to determine a given infinite substance, but is irreducible and is in fact the condition 
of the possibility of experience. This sheds further light on our questions above 
concerning the impossibility of accounting for the emergence of the finite out of the 
infinite. In Kant everything starts with finitude but finitude cannot be absolute, so 
the realm of the noumenal thing-in-itself is posited as a necessary correlate of the 
thing-as-appearance. There is not originally the thing in itself, generated through 
the infinite intellectual intuition of the Supreme Being, which is subsequently 
limited in space and time when perceived by human intuition, because this would 
collapse the two heterogeneous aspects into one and treat our sensuous perspective 
as if it were merely a confused intellectual intuition. If finitude comes first, 
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however, and God is only posited out of the necessity of stabilising our phenomenal 
world of appearance, then once again we, as finite beings, in a strange reversal, 
seem to be placed above the infinite being. 
 
The Imagination and the Schematism 
 
As Heidegger remarks, in the course of the elaboration of the distinction between 
possibility and actuality, ‘it turned out that the positing of the actual proceeds out of 
the bare concept of the possible, out into the outside, over against the inside of the 
subjective condition of the subject.’36 Because the conditions of possibility stem 
from our cognitive faculties, we project the form in advance to which the actual 
must conform in order to confront us as outside of us. This horizon, through which 
alone beings are able to be encountered, is the guiding theme of Heidegger’s early 
work. In his so-called ‘Kantbuch’ from 1929, this takes the form of a radical, and in 
some quarters highly contentious, phenomenological interpretation of the 
transcendental imagination. 
 
The imagination is defined by Kant in the second edition of the Critique as ‘the 
power of presenting an object in intuition even without the object’s being 
present.’37 It is the first act of synthesis performed by the mind, which brings the 
sensible manifold together as an image. This combination thus given is called by 
Kant apprehension, but apprehension is not yet knowledge, for this we require 
comprehension which the understanding provides. So the synthesis of imagination 
acts as a mediating faculty, falling between sensibility and understanding and 
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enabling the latter to perform its conceptual operations. Before the understanding 
can act upon the given and bring it to unity, the prior synthesis of imagination must 
have taken place. There is, however, some confusion over the peculiar status of the 
imagination and whether or not it is to be positioned alongside sense and 
understanding as one of the fundamental faculties, or indeed even as the 
fundamental faculty as Heidegger asserts. But the first line of the Transcendental 
Logic could not be more clear: 
 
Our cognition arises from two basic sources of the mind. The first is our 
ability to receive presentations (and is our receptivity for impression); the 
second is our ability to cognise an object though these presentations (and is 
the spontaneity of concepts).
38
 
 
In the first edition version of the Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories, however, Kant writes, 
 
[There] are three [my italics] original sources (capacities or powers of the 
soul) that contain the conditions for the possibility of all experience, and 
that cannot themselves be derived from any other power of the mind: viz., 
sense, imagination, and apperception. On them are based (1) the a priori 
synopsis of the manifold through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold 
through imagination; and finally, (3) the unity of this synthesis through 
original apperception.
39
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This apparent inconsistency is underscored by the imagination’s ‘homelessness’, as 
Heidegger puts it, since the division of the doctrine of elements into Aesthetic and 
Logic corresponds only to the two primary faculties. The reason for this is that the 
imagination does not seem to be a separate source of knowledge whose elements 
and contribution to cognition can be examined in isolation, like sensibility and 
understanding can, but it performs an indispensable function that neither can do in 
its place. It is both receptive and spontaneous, performing a figurative rather than 
conceptual act of synthesis. 
 
Kant names two distinct functions of the imagination, to which he gives the names 
reproductive and productive imagination. The operation performed by the 
reproductive imagination is that which allows the mind to recall a previously given 
content. This is not just the power of long-term memory, of bringing something 
back to mind that occurred in the recent or distant past, but is actually responsible 
for the consistency of the time series. Without the reproductive imagination to hold 
onto what has been given each new moment would wipe away the last and there 
would be no experience, just, perhaps, a constant feeling of surprise that we exist. 
This power of holding and retaining is essential for experience, but since it is 
entirely subject to empirical laws there can be no a priori act of reproduction. The 
productive imagination, however, differs from the reproductive in that it freely and 
originally gives form to the content received from intuition. Like the categories of 
the understanding, the form thus bestowed is not taken from experience, precisely 
because there is no form to be so given until it has performed its function; hence it 
is spontaneous. However, because it deals directly with the matter of intuition, 
rather than indirectly via concepts, it is simultaneously receptive. This aspect-
108 
 
giving is not a subsequent act of assembly that is performed only once the 
disordered raw materials have been given, it gives this form in advance so that the 
manifold conforms as it is given. So we might say that the reproductive 
imagination’s power of retention is the enabling source of the past, while the 
productive imagination projects in advance out of the future, and it is only through 
their joint holding-projecting (or retention and protention in the language of 
Husserl) that we can experience the consistency of the present. 
 
Because this productive power of the imagination, unlike the reproductive 
imagination, is not reliant on empirical laws for its operation, it is able to produce 
images that have not been taken from experience. In his Anthropology Kant 
describes it as ‘a faculty of the original representation of the object (exhibitio 
originaria), which consequently precedes experience’,40 but as Heidegger puts it,  
 
This original presentation, however, is not as ‘creative’ as intuitus 
originarius [original intuition], which creates the essent in the act of 
intuiting it. The productive imagination only forms the aspect of a possible 
object, which last under certain conditions may be realisable, i.e., capable of 
being made present. This realisation, however, is never accomplished by the 
imagination itself.
41
 
 
However, what if we were to be in possession of an ability or mechanism which 
actually did allow the imagination itself to accomplish this realisation? We are 
referring, of course, to the brain-computer interface and cognitive imaging systems 
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we discussed in our previous chapter and which Žižek claims grant the user the 
faculty of intellectual intuition. If the only difference between the original 
exhibition of the productive imagination and the original intuition of the divine 
intellect is the former’s confinement to playing with forms of possible objects and 
its inability, unlike the latter, to bring about the presence of the actual object in 
reality then we are indeed faced with the possibility of a new faculty of the mind 
which could at least be likened to intellectual intuition, and Žižek’s seemingly 
extravagant claim is closer to the truth than it first seemed. But exactly how 
productive is the productive imagination, and is it completely independent from the 
receptivity (hence finitude) of our sensible intuition? 
 
What is at issue here is our ability to bring about something wholly new, and 
whether there is a resource in the mind that is not dependent upon given material. 
Faith in such an ability is what leads artists, writers and musicians to experiment 
with ‘mind expanding’ hallucinogenic drugs. This is a question of whether the 
products of our deepest, wildest imagination, if plucked straight from the mind and 
given substantial existence, would amount to a creatio ex nihilo. However, in the 
very next paragraph of the Anthropology, just after Kant has outlined the powers of 
the productive imagination and its independence from experience, he immediately 
limits its scope, insisting that ‘[the] productive faculty, however, is nonetheless not 
creative, because it does not have the power to produce a sense impression which 
has never before occurred to our senses. One can always identify the material which 
gave rise to that impression.’42 So the productivity of the imagination only amounts 
to a reorganisation of sensibly given material. To take a concrete example, the 
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music created through the BCI that we discussed at length in the previous chapter 
will always be operating within a pre-given musical language that is simply being 
triggered by the mind rather than physically played. Even if it were to so radically 
shake up that language that it sounded to listeners as if it were an entirely new 
vocabulary – like Schoenberg’s twelve-tone serialism for instance – thought does 
not by itself and out of nothing give ‘the existence of its object’ as the faculty of 
intellectual intuition was characterised as doing. This is why even the most 
inventive piece of science fiction is always on some level recognisable and familiar 
and cannot escape earthly concerns, introducing creatures or intelligences that are 
identifiably of our world. How many times have we seen aliens in film or on 
television portrayed as insect-like, fish-like, reptilian, or simply human-like with 
distorted or exaggerated features (a la Star Trek.) Kant himself uses the example of 
artistic renderings of Gods and angels which always appear in human form because 
we simply cannot imagine any other form for a rational being to take. Of course, 
this is not a melancholy diagnosis, and is not intended to deny or downgrade 
originality, but only to assert that originality is strictly finite and limited to 
producing new combinations, and is not capable of creation in the sense that we 
would ascribe to the divine intellect. Indeed this is nothing more than saying that 
the poet does not with every new poem invent an entirely new vocabulary from 
nothing but must work within the constraints of language, and the production of 
something new and unfamiliar out of the familiar is exactly what originality is. As 
we saw with Kant’s account of aesthetic ideas, the artist of genius can take this 
sensibly given material and create images which cause the mind to transcend the 
sensible, but she cannot present such suprasensible ideas directly. 
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This inability of ours to create out of nothing is not only a subjective limitation, it is 
also an ontological condition, for the very consistency of experience rests on there 
being no rupture in the time-order. In the Analogies of Experience, the third set of 
synthetic principles of the pure understanding, Kant lays out the rules for 
connecting and unifying the objects of intuition in order to allow for empirical 
experience. As noted above, if we are to experience change or succession, Kant 
insists that we must employ the concept of substance as the constant permanence 
underlying all change. Therefore all change is to be regarded only as the 
modification of permanent substance. If this were not the case then every change 
we experienced would be a pure arising and passing away and there would be no 
way of connecting the thing that arises to the thing that passes away. A melting 
block of ice would be experienced as the simultaneous disappearance of ice and 
appearance of water, rather than the changing state of one and the same thing. This 
is not to say that the ice and water are made up of a permanent substance that 
endures throughout all its changes of state, but that it is only because something 
endures in all variation that any change can be experienced as such. In fact it is only 
through the permanent that time itself can be experienced, because time has no 
succession, only things that are in time succeed one another. If everything was in 
constant flux and there were no permanent substrate with which to determine the 
time series, then there could be no experience. So if something were to arise out 
from nothing then there would have to have been a point of time in which it was 
not, but as Kant says, ‘to what will you fasten this point of time, if not to what is 
already there?’43 It would make no sense to speak of an empty time because this 
could not be an object of experience, or of a different time because for this different 
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time stream to have any influence on our time it must connect to it in a relation of 
succession and thus annul itself. Thus if the arising is tied to things that existed 
beforehand and that endure up to the arising itself, then ‘this something that arises 
was only a determination of what, as the permanent, was beforehand.’44 
 
The inevitable problem Kant must deal with now is how I am to distinguish the 
subjective succession of my apprehension from the objective succession of objects. 
When reading a book I apprehend the words and sentences as following on from 
one another, while in fact this is only the succession of my attention, the words 
themselves of course existing simultaneously. While watching a train go by, on the 
other hand, I also experience it in succession, however here the succession is in the 
object itself. On Kant’s account, the only way for me to distinguish real succession 
from subjective succession is by reference to necessary laws that are irreversible, 
and this is the law of cause and effect. My reading one word after another does not 
alter anything in the object and the order could just as easily be reversed or 
changed. In my apprehension of the moving train, on the other hand, its position at 
one end of the track is followed by its position further down necessarily and could 
not have been taken to occur in a different order. So the very possibility of 
objective experience rests on the necessity of cause and effect, and this precludes 
any new event or emergence from occurring without there being a discoverable 
cause:  
 
Hence arising is only change, and not origination from nothing. For if this 
origination from nothing is regarded as effect of an extraneous cause, then it 
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is called creation; and creation cannot be admitted as an event among 
appearances, because its very possibility would already annul the unity of 
experience.
45
  
 
We will discuss what this entails for our power of free-will at a later stage. 
  
So far we have been dealing primarily with the empirical use of the productive 
imagination, in keeping with Kant’s procedure in the Anthropology, but there is 
also a transcendental use, which comes to light in the short section of the Critique 
called ‘On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ – according 
to Heidegger the key section of the whole of the Critique – where its character as 
receptive-spontaneous and its position as the central point of unity between 
sensibility and understanding is confirmed. 
 
The schematism deals with the simple-sounding problem of how a concept is to 
refer to an object, which is the question of how something entirely general can 
apply to something particular. For this to happen the two factors must be 
homogeneous, meaning the concept must ‘contain what is presented in the object 
that is to be subsumed under it.’46 By way of illustration, Kant cites the 
homogeneity between the empirical concept of a plate and the geometrical concept 
of a circle, ‘inasmuch as the roundness thought in the concept of the plate can be 
intuited [also] in the circle.’47 However, Kant reaches a problem when it comes to 
the pure concepts (categories) of the understanding, because nothing in the mere 
concept of causality, as the relation of ground to consequent, tells us anything at all 
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about objects of experience and so its application to experience seems 
unsubstantiated. In Heidegger’s terms this is the problem of the unity of ontological 
knowledge: how pure sensibility is to be joined to pure understanding to form a 
whole. Kant’s solution is to locate a third element that is homogeneous with both 
the category and the appearance, being at once intellectual and sensible, that can act 
as mediator between them. This is named as the transcendental schema, and it is a 
product of the pure imagination. 
 
The schema is the a priori condition of sensibility of the concepts of the 
understanding, the restricting condition under which alone it can apply to objects, 
and the schematism is the procedure of the sensibilisation of these concepts. So the 
schema is produced by the imagination and employed by the understanding in order 
to apply its concepts. Above we outlined the way the imagination forms an image 
out of the sensible manifold of intuition, but the schema is not a simple image. 
Rather, it is the ‘universal procedure of the imagination for providing a concept 
with its image’.48 Kant’s example is that no image of a triangle could ever reach the 
concept of triangle as such, for it would only be a particular instance that could not 
extend to cover all possible images of a closed three sided geometric figure. So the 
schema of the triangle exists only in thought and never in concreto, and acts as the 
rule or guide governing the application of the concept of triangle. The same applies 
to an empirical concept, for (to again take Kant’s example) no particular dog we 
could encounter in experience could adequately attain to the mere concept of dog. 
But this schema of the concept ‘dog’ is not a generalisation of every possible breed 
of dog mangled together into one monstrous hybrid; in fact it is not an image at all, 
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but rather allows for the image of a dog corresponding to the concept to be formed 
and for an actual dog to be identified as such. 
 
When it comes to the categories there can be no image at all, for how could one 
form an image of possibility or impossibility, or reality and negation? Since the 
sensibilisation of the categories could only be pure, the key to their schematism 
must be sought in the pure form of sensibility. This pure form of sensibility is time, 
which Kant holds to be more essential than space because all objects spatially 
intuited must also be temporal, whereas the reverse is not true. This is not to say 
that space can be reduced to time but only that the latter encompasses the former 
and is thus the most basic. Hence, the transcendental schemata are defined as ‘a 
priori time determinations according to rules’.49 The only way the pure concept of 
substance can be applied is by the schema, which is the ‘permanence of the real in 
time’.50 Likewise, the schema of reality and negation are given as either filled or 
empty time, and so on. So if we were to start with the two heterogeneous poles of 
pure apperception and pure sensibility (time), with no intermediary, there is no 
conceivable way of bringing them together into a unified whole. Time, by itself as 
pure intuition, is completely undetermined and unrelated to the categories, which in 
turn, taken alone are purely abstract and have no application to time. The 
transcendental schemata allow for time to be brought to unity and thus determined 
for thought, and on the side of the thought it enables the application of the 
categories and thus gives them content. For the concept of substance, by itself, 
signifies nothing and has no relation to an object; only by the relation to time can it 
have any content at all. Unschematised concepts signify nothing, but undetermined 
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intuition is likewise nothing for us, so in forming the schemata the imagination 
provides an indispensable role. Thus it is not the case that we need only intuition 
and thought in order to possess knowledge, for this only gives us the bare bones and 
fails to account for their unity. Only the schemata can complete the picture and 
allow for both sides to correspond, but it is a particularly slippery operation that it 
performs. As Sebastian Gardner observes, ‘it is not just that we can say relatively 
less about schemata than we can about intuitions and concepts, and that we cannot 
identify their ultimate source’, for as we have already seen, we are likewise 
necessarily ignorant of the source of the categories of the understanding and the 
forms of intuition. Rather, transcendental schemata ‘remain in a special sense hard 
to grasp, because they are required to combine in themselves two kinds of property, 
or representational functions, the seeming immiscibility of which is precisely what 
made us introduce them in the first place.’51 
 
As Gardner asks, is the schema a thought about time or time thought about in a 
certain way? The answer is that it is both and neither at the same time, because as 
soon as it becomes one or the other it loses its function as mediator, but the only 
way it can be thought at all is by assimilating it to one side or the other. It therefore 
vanishes as soon as we try to grasp it. 
 
We can see from this and the earlier considerations why the imagination plays so 
key a role in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, and why the schematism is of such 
pivotal importance. Heidegger reads the Critique of Pure Reason as oriented toward 
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a ‘laying of the foundation of metaphysics’,52 that is, an investigation into the very 
possibility of metaphysical inquiry, which necessarily leads to a disclosure of the 
primordial ground from which it springs. Kant’s investigation into the possibility of 
a priori synthetic judgements, starting with the pure forms of sensibility and 
understanding and going on to their unity, Heidegger takes as treating of the 
possibility of ontological knowledge, which latter makes empirical knowledge 
possible. In Heidegger’s terms this concerns the passing beyond (transcending) 
given beings to the horizon upon which these beings can originally come to be. 
Thus Kant’s project is violently grafted onto Heidegger’s own in a virtuoso 
interpretation that enacts the point at which scrupulously close reading turns into 
radical reinvention. 
 
Ontological Knowledge: Heidegger and the Transcendental Imagination 
 
Heidegger begins his analysis with a radical insistence on receptivity, the true 
import of which is said to be missed by interpreters who treat mainly of the role of 
logic in Kant and ignore the central position of the transcendental aesthetic, and 
hence the primary status of intuition. However, before something can announce 
itself to us in this act of receptivity there must be a precursory act of orientation, 
which lets the beings thus given be, and be revealed:  
 
In this primordial act of orientation, the finite being first pro-poses to itself a 
free-space within which something can ‘correspond’ to it. To hold oneself in 
advance in such a free-space and to form it originally is nothing other than 
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transcendence which marks all finite comportment with regard to the 
essent.
53
  
 
So there must be some prior act which takes place before we can be faced with any 
being which our intuition can receive or our understanding act upon. We must have 
projected in advance the horizon upon which this encounter can take place. This 
horizon is nothing less than knowledge – or more accurately ‘pre-comprehension’ – 
of being. This knowledge of being acts as a ‘clearing’ that allows us to set beings 
before ourselves, for before anything can confront us as what or how it is we must 
first have the implicit (non-thematic) knowledge that something is. This always-
already disclosed / disclosing opening of being and its covering-over in the history 
of western philosophy (i.e. metaphysics), is of course the driving problem behind 
Heidegger’s entire philosophical project. 
 
In this ontological knowledge we do not direct ourselves toward beings because it 
is only through this knowledge that beings are enabled to be. It must pass beyond 
beings to their horizon, but from the perspective of beings this thing we are directed 
towards can only be called a nothing, because it is not a being. Being ‘is’ not, that is 
being cannot be, otherwise it would no longer be being but would be a being, an 
entity. But in spite of this it is still in some sense given (given as the giving itself), 
and this opening must be ‘kept in view’54 but cannot be intuited as such. In 
Heidegger’s Kant interpretation this is where the transcendental object comes in, 
that unknowable X which acts as the ‘terminus of the precursory orientation’.55 It 
cannot be perceived as an object precisely because it is the horizon of objectivity 
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itself. So since it will never be encountered as a being it is nothing, but the nothing 
out of which beings unfold. 
 
Ontological knowledge, then, forms transcendence: ‘[this] totality composed of 
pure intuition and pure understanding, united in advance, “constitutes” the free-
space within which all essents can be encountered.’56 Because of the central place 
occupied by the transcendental imagination in this unity, as demonstrated by the 
mediating act it performs in the ‘A Deduction’ and its role in the schematism, 
imagination becomes the foundation on which the possibility of ontological 
knowledge is founded, and hence the possibility of transcendence. In fact, for 
Heidegger, the imagination is not only the unifying central faculty but is actually 
the root source of sensibility and understanding and the ground from which they 
emerge. The free, aspect-forming role of the imagination, characterised above, is 
the projection of the horizon of transcendence and is necessarily prior to receptive 
intuition and spontaneous thought, allowing them to be what they are. From this we 
then learn that in themselves pure intuition and pure understanding are imagination, 
which does not mean that they are only imagined or dreamed up, but that its 
formative act makes their functions possible. 
 
Let us try to explicate this bold claim and understand it a little better. Pure intuition, 
as pure, does not receive something present, because it must be prior to all 
empirical intuition. Since its pure form, time, is nothing outside of the subject, but 
rather enables these beings outside the subject to be intuited, it is in fact given by 
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pure intuition. It ‘furnishes an aspect’57 in advance of experience, hence pure 
receptivity in itself is pure spontaneity: the giving which allows that which is given 
to be received. What the mind intuits in pure intuition is actually its own activity, so 
pure intuition is pure auto-affection, but since this intuition by itself could only ever 
intuit ‘the actual now, but never the now-sequence as such’58, and because the 
‘actual now’ is an abstract fiction, it actually intuits nothing at all without the prior 
synthesis of the imagination which presents time as pure arising and passing away. 
This can be confirmed by reference to the schematism, because the ‘actual now’ as 
opposed the ‘now sequence’ would be the undetermined intuition of time. It is only 
through the schemata that we are able to, as Kant puts it, intuit ‘the time series, the 
time content, the time order, and finally the time sum total.’59 
 
In a similar move, the pure understanding, characterised by Kant of course as 
spontaneity, is shown ‘in itself’ to be pure receptivity. The rules of connection 
which the understanding employs are not ‘apprehended as actually given “in 
consciousness”’ but only manifest themselves in the act of their application, when 
they ‘compel as they connect.’60 The understanding gives this order and unity to 
experience in and through its very submission to it, hence it is only through 
reception that it is capable of the act of synthesis. So just as the ‘spontaneity’ at the 
root of pure intuition is what enables its receptivity, here the reverse is true and 
spontaneity implies ‘placing oneself under a necessity which is self-imposed’.61 
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In this way, pure intuition, as spontaneous receptivity and pure thought as receptive 
spontaneity are reduced to functions of the transcendental imagination. Both are 
characterised as self-giving, as forming that which it is able receive, whether 
through the auto-affection of time or the self-imposition of rules. 
 
But is it legitimate to characterise pure intuition as self-giving spontaneity, and 
does this not in fact misrepresent the specific character of sensibility? If this act is 
originary and prior to receptivity does this mean that the latter is derivative and that 
on a more primordial level our finitude is overcome? After all, the very mark of 
human finitude for Kant is that, unlike the divine mind, ours is irreducibly split into 
sensibility and understanding. So does not treating these poles as two stems from a 
common root and tracing this back to a site of original unity – imagination – lead 
Heidegger to lose sight of what was in fact one of his key insights: the receptivity, 
and hence finitude at the core of our being? As the philosopher Heinrich Levy 
remarked in an early review of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
 
Has not finite pure intuition and finite pure understanding herewith obtained 
the structure of the Kantian infinite intellectual intuition and the infinite 
intuitive understanding – and indeed as completely as possible? Has not 
Heidegger thereby established even that his interpretation – and thereby his 
philosophy to which this interpretation leads – is more related to German 
Idealism than to Kantian criticism, despite the fact that he believes it moves 
in a contrary direction to German Idealism?
62
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While there is a grain of truth here – and Heidegger has often been said to be much 
closer to absolute idealism than he himself believed – such a criticism misses the 
point, because Heidegger is constantly at pains not to allow the spontaneity of 
transcendental imagination to be confused with the creation of an intuitive intellect. 
The aspect-forming act of transcendence is, says Heidegger, ontologically creative 
but not ontically creative, so the question must be asked whether this ‘overcomes 
the finitude of transcendence or whether, on the contrary, it immerses the finite 
“subject” in the finitude proper to it.’63 It is expressly because we are finite beings 
thrown into the midst of beings that we must be capable of holding open this 
horizon of transcendence. This latter is by no means an originary cry of ‘let there be 
light!’ which directly leads to the existence of those beings that surround us and 
simultaneously allows us to encounter them. Creativity on the ontological level 
does not mean that we actually create being itself, because this is quite clearly 
beyond the capacity of a finite subject. Rather it means, once again, that it furnishes 
to itself the horizon within which beings reveal themselves to it, but that those 
beings thus revealed are outside of its power and in themselves indifferent to its 
knowing them. So understanding of being and this horizon of transcendence is 
finitude itself, necessitated because we are not capable of intellectual intuition and 
do not have beings under our power. But, for Heidegger, this cannot be an 
absolutised finitude, for the philosophy of finitude must itself be finite and never 
claim to have arrived at the ‘final truth’ of finitude. Thus his response to the 
question ‘why finitude’ would be to say that if we could answer this question we 
would not be finite beings. 
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Kant is keen to ground finitude on the steady dual foundations of intuition and 
thought, and even though we cannot inquire into the origin of these foundations we 
can at least thoroughly delineate their properties and know that nothing is prior to 
them. Heidegger, however, by reducing these to branches of the transcendental 
imagination is by no means endeavouring to excavate a more primordial but no less 
steady ground. Rather, he intends precisely to de-stabilise the ground itself, for the 
imagination is not a solid ground but an abyssal non-ground which nevertheless 
grounds. At once spontaneous and receptive, it springs out of itself and so is 
founded on nothing. Heidegger accounts for the reduced role the transcendental 
imagination plays in the second edition of the Critique as Kant’s recoil from the 
abyss that he had uncovered. In regressing to this groundless ground, however, this 
does not mean that we have surpassed our finitude and thus accounted for it. The 
spontaneity at the source of our receptivity does not amount to a free creation of 
oneself, or the total mastery over our being. For as Heidegger puts it in a typically 
elliptical remark in Being and Time, ‘Dasein is not itself the ground of its being, 
because the ground first arises from its own project, but as a self, it is the being of 
its ground.’64 In being its ground, Dasein understands its situation as thrown and 
grasps the possibilities that arise from this thrownness and takes them up as its own, 
or takes responsibility for it. It is not the ground of its being, however, for the very 
reason that it is thrown and not self-created, and does not give itself to itself. 
 
For Heidegger, of course, Dasein does not ‘have’ possibilities as something like the 
property or possession of a self, something that the already existing I-self can do or 
be; rather Dasein is its possibilities. The way I relate to and understand myself is 
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not as some static being but as possibilities of myself, what I will be and what I can 
be, thus ‘[Dasein] is existentially that which it is not yet in its potentiality of 
being.’65 Existence (or Ek-sistence), in Heidegger’s terminology means being ahead 
of oneself, projecting upon one’s potentiality of being, but these possibilities are not 
limitless, in fact they are conditioned by the very withdrawal of other possibilities, 
as we shall see. This is due to the structure of what in Being and Time is called 
Care: the ontological being of Dasein as thrown-project. 
 
As finite beings, we are thrown in the midst of beings that are not of our making, 
nor of our choosing. But the very process through which we find ourselves thus 
thrown is in the self-projection of possibilities. Only in surpassing the beings which 
surround me do I first find myself among and ‘absorbed’ by such beings. 
‘Transcendence means projection of world in such a way that those beings that are 
surpassed also already pervade and attune that which projects’.66 The way we 
initially encounter things is through using them for something: I discover a chair 
not in studying its properties but in using it for relaxation, work, etc. It is not the 
case that the true being of the things around us is obscured by familiarity and that 
only by making it alien and unfamiliar do I truly discover what it is, rather the 
reverse is true. If I were to approach the chair as a piece of design or craftsmanship 
then I would completely miss what it ‘is’, as something handy and useful. What 
Heidegger calls ‘world’ is the totality of significance that such ‘innerworldly’ 
beings (e.g. the chair) refer to, their ‘what-for’ and ‘in order to…’, that forms a 
chain of reference. The world thus projected is anchored or grounded in a ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ that is of course Dasein itself. The referential chain orbits around 
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and returns to the being that projects: this thing is for that purpose, which in turn is 
for another purpose, and so on, and it all refers back to Dasein as that ‘for the sake 
of which’ it all is. This is obviously a brutally crude summary that does not 
approach the elegance and complexity of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s being-
in-the-world, and the ‘worldliness of the world’, but it is sufficient for our present 
purposes, which was only to understand the statement that beings are first 
encountered through transcending them. I am not just one being among others and 
do not exist alongside the chair that I sit in. In using such beings through world-
projection, which is for the sake of my own possibilities, I surpass them, and only 
thus do I ground myself in the midst of beings. 
 
This is what is meant by Care as thrown-project; in projecting upon future 
possibilities I discover myself as thrown, and only through being so thrown am I 
free to project upon these possibilities of myself. Both elements are ‘equi-
primordial’ structural factors that cannot be separated from one another, meaning 
that I do not first find myself among beings and then subsequently carve out 
possibilities for myself, nor do I start out from a state of unconditional freedom 
which is then limited by my factical surroundings. So in ‘being-ahead-of-oneself’ 
Dasein is co-constituted as being-already-in (the world) and being-together-with 
(innerworldly beings), and again this forms a whole rather than individual moments 
that jostle and restrict one another. From this it follows that freedom is constituted 
by a twofold unfreedom, firstly through Dasein’s inability to get behind its ground 
and secondly through the fact that taking on possibilities of being is simultaneously 
the turning away from other possibilities. Whatever I choose is marked and 
conditioned by those choices that I did not take and was unable to take. To spell out 
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this unfreedom more clearly: I did not choose the factical situation into which I was 
thrown and out of which I project possibilities of being, I do not have power over 
facticity because then it would no longer be facticity. This provides the condition of 
these projected possibilities through at the same time precluding other possibilities 
that would have been open were I to have found myself in another set of historical, 
geographical surroundings etc. So before any choice has even been made, those 
choices are necessarily limited. Then, in every choice that I do make, other 
openings are closed off; every decision is what it is only through the choices that I 
did not take, even if these ‘other possibilities’ were not apparent to me. Thus Care, 
the ontological constitution of Dasein, means being the ‘(null) ground of a 
nullity.’67 
 
In the essay ‘On the Essence of Ground’ Heidegger puts it thus: 
 
The ready possession of possibilities belongs to Dasein, however, because, 
as projective, it finds itself in the midst of beings. Certain other possibilities 
are thereby already withdrawn from Dasein, and indeed merely through its 
own facticity. Yet precisely this withdrawal of certain possibilities 
pertaining to its potentiality for being-in-the-world – a withdrawal entailed 
in its being absorbed by beings – first brings those possibilities of world-
projection that can ‘actually’ be seized upon toward Dasein as its world […] 
transcendence at once exceeds and withdraws. The fact that the ever-
excessive projection of world attains its power and becomes our possession 
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only in such withdrawal is at the same time a transcendental testimony to 
the finitude of Dasein’s freedom.68 
 
Transcendence exceeds in that being ahead of ourselves we are always more than 
what we are – in being I exceed myself – but it withdraws because my freedom is 
permeated with nullity. This is not an external limitation on our freedom but 
belongs internally to its structure, so that possibilities are only possibilities because 
they are always preceded by and accompanied by the withdrawal of other 
possibilities. This is exactly what finite freedom is for Heidegger, and infinite 
freedom would not be freedom at all. A pure space of ‘infinite possibility’ would 
therefore pass over into its opposite and be a space of no possibility, or 
impossibility. Sartre, following Heidegger, asserts that a freedom which did not 
face ‘resistance’ or ‘obstacles’ is inconceivable and contradictory. If the ‘ends’ or 
‘possibles’ which I project were immediately realised, ‘if it were sufficient to hope 
in order to obtain’,69 then my very subjectivity and sense of self would be at stake. 
For if, as we have seen, it is out of my future projections that I know and am 
conscious of myself, then were these projected possibles to become automatically 
fulfilled, ‘no project of myself would be possible since it would be enough to 
conceive of it in order to realise it. Consequently my being-for-myself would be 
annihilated in the indistinction of present and future.’70 So ‘once the distinction 
between the simple wish, the representation which I could choose, and the choice is 
abolished, freedom disappears too.’71 
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This brings us to the third point of the citation from Žižek that we started with, 
namely that closing the ‘gap of finitude’ would deprive us of our freedom. For 
Heidegger, the pre-eminent thinker of finitude, we can see that this is clearly the 
case but we have yet to show why and how it is also the case for Kant, such that 
anything approaching intellectual intuition in a finite being would lead to the loss of 
that being’s spontaneity. 
 
Kant, Žižek and the Problem of Freedom 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the question of freedom is approached from the 
problem of accounting for how, out of the binding necessity of natural laws 
anything like a free act can occur that would not be capable of being traced back to 
a preceding cause. After all, we saw above how the consistency of experience rests 
on the necessary continuity of the laws of nature and hence the impossibility of 
something arising out of nothing. This theme is taken up in the third of the 
Antinomies of Pure Reason, the dialectical conflicts that reason is led into when it 
ventures beyond its proper domain. Each antinomy is made up of a thesis and an 
antithesis, both of which being equally plausible but mutually exclusive 
metaphysical claims about, respectively, (1) the origin of the world/cosmos and 
whether or not it had a beginning, (2) the divisibility of matter and whether or not it 
is made up of simple parts, (3) the laws of nature and whether or not there can be 
such a thing as a free cause, and (4) the existence or otherwise of an absolutely 
necessary being. The thesis of the third antinomy states that we must assume a free 
cause to co-exist alongside the laws of nature in order to account for causality 
itself. If nothing occurs without there being a prior cause then the very existence of 
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the causal chain, which is after all an occurrence, must likewise be grounded. This 
latter obviously cannot fall within that chain without simply becoming a part of it, 
so it must be outside it and hence free. The antithesis on the other hand asserts that 
freedom is incompatible with natural laws and cannot be incorporated without 
either destroying those laws or conjoining with them and losing its status as 
freedom. The notion of a free cause is therefore impossible. 
 
As with all of the antinomies, the two competing positions appear at first sight to 
exhaust all of the possible alternatives: either freedom exists or it does not. But 
Kant’s solution in each case is to dissolve the conflict by demonstrating that it rests 
on a transcendental illusion, which only persists as long as appearances are 
regarded as things in themselves. While the first two antinomies are resolved by 
both the thesis and antithesis being declared false, in this case both are shown to be 
true because the ontological region to which each refers is heterogeneous. What 
Kant suggests is that the thesis is true of the things in themselves while the 
antithesis is true of appearances. In the world of sense we can never happen upon a 
free cause because every temporal event succeeds a prior state upon which it is 
consequent and no matter how far we trace back in the series of conditions we will 
never discover an unconditioned. However, as we saw, the relation of cause and 
effect is necessary only for experience, not absolutely. The things in themselves, as 
extra-temporal, are not subject to this condition, so they can only be considered as 
the free, unconditioned cause of appearance as such. So for Kant one and the same 
event viewed now under the sensuous aspect and now under the intelligible could 
be both naturally conditioned and free. As regards the event as appearance, it is 
conditioned by what preceded it in time, but as regards the very same event on the 
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side of the thing in itself, it is free. Thus only transcendental idealism can account 
for freedom, because without the critical schism into appearance and things in 
themselves the antinomies remain irresolvable. 
 
But what remains unclear is how this rescues the notion of human free-will, which 
is after all the only reason the question of freedom becomes a problem in the first 
place. If freedom exists only in the noumenal dimension (of which we have no 
knowledge whatsoever) freedom of the will becomes a mystical power belonging to 
some unknowable, intelligible ‘self’ which pulls the strings of our phenomenal self 
while we remain perfectly unaware of who is really in charge.
72
 Secondly, since the 
split into appearance and thing in itself applies to everything, what makes us any 
different from an acorn or a spoon? Are they too causally determined as phenomena 
and free in the noumenal sphere? But all Kant needed to show here is that freedom 
can logically co-exist with nature and can be conceived without contradiction, for 
only once transcendental freedom has been assumed as a possibility can practical 
freedom (i.e. freedom of the will) then be taken up. 
 
The reason man differs from the rest of the natural world is that in addition to 
sensible receptivity he also cognises himself through pure apperception: ‘viz., in 
actions and inner determinations that he cannot class at all with any impression of 
the senses. And thus he is to himself, indeed, on the one hand phenomenon, but on 
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the other hand – viz., in regard to certain powers – a merely intelligible object.’73 
Over and above the stream of sensuously given material I am also conscious of my 
own intellectual act of synthesis – the original unity of apperception, through which 
‘I am not conscious of myself as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but am 
conscious only that I am’.74 Thus, more than mere sensible appearance but still not 
consciousness of a noumenal self, I think myself in pure apperception only as the 
consciousness of thinking, the awareness of the results of intellectual synthesis 
being products of my spontaneous activity. Because of this awareness, which once 
again does not amount to knowledge of a purely intelligible self, we know ourselves 
to have not just a sensible but also an intelligible determining ground. 
 
Therefore, in understanding and reason we have faculties of the mind which are not 
sensibly conditioned and which are capable of guiding our actions independently of 
sensuous impulses. What is more, through reason we have an ability to generate 
transcendental ideas which are purely intelligible, hence cannot be schematised and 
become objects for the senses, and this power has a causality of its own in 
determining our will. This other kind of coercion is manifested in the necessity 
imposed by the feeling of ought, which obviously cannot be found to occur 
anywhere in nature. We could not say that a cat ought not to chase mice any more 
than we could say that the sky ought to be blue, because nature knows nothing of 
ought, only what is, has been, or will be: ‘Now this ought expresses a possible 
action whose basis is nothing but a mere concept, whereas the basis of a mere 
action of nature must always be an appearance.’75 So human beings are unique in 
that alongside sensuous impulses such as hunger or tiredness we also have a purely 
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conceptual determining influence expressed in the feeling of ought: I ought not to 
do that even though I want to. If we pay regard only to the sensuous causes behind 
our actions, there will always be mitigating factors such as upbringing, education, 
economic situation, etc., which are outside our control and can be considered as 
causes of our behaviour and the choices we have made. But this does not abrogate 
us from responsibility for our actions because we are also guided by reason, which 
provides us with another set of laws, namely the moral law, that elevates us above 
merely sensuous beings. Reason, being purely intelligible, is not subject to temporal 
conditions so it cannot be said to arise in time at a particular occasion leading to 
certain effects, it is the sensuously unconditioned and purely intelligible ground of 
our free will. All choices or actions except those governed by reason can be put 
down to pathological motives, so only when we act according to reason do we truly 
display freedom, as freedom from pathological drives. Nothing begins or ends in 
reason, it is timeless and unchanging, hence the law that reason prescribes is always 
the same; all that changes are the sensuous effects it has depending on the particular 
context. 
 
The fact that in addition to our sensible, animal impulses we know ourselves to be 
subject to a different set of laws that can interrupt the chain of natural causes 
provides practical (although not theoretical) proof of the supersensible world of 
noumena. Freedom is a mere idea, which speculative reason can only think and 
appeal to problematically, whereas through practical reason freedom can be 
asserted as a fact: the very fact that I display freedom when I act according to the 
moral law. This latter manifests itself when I draft maxims of the will for myself 
that cannot be traced back to sensible conditions. An obvious example of such a 
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maxim would be to never tell a lie, even if it is contrary to my own interests. But 
because we can no more access the purely rational ideas governing morality 
through practical reason than we can through speculative reason, we cannot defer to 
these laws directly and know for certain what is the right and just thing to do in 
each case. Therefore, in legislating my behaviour I must have recourse to what 
Kant famously calls the Categorical Imperative: ‘So act that the maxim of your will 
could always hold at the same time as a principle of universal legislation.’76 Hence 
I govern my actions only indirectly, not through immediate insight into 
supersensible ideas of ‘the good’ and ‘justice’. If I wish to judge the morality of my 
actions I must ask what would be the outcome if this principle (e.g. never telling a 
lie) were to be a universal law and everyone acted accordingly. I cannot calculate it 
against an eternal measure of ‘goodness’, which is a mere idea and inaccessible to 
me. This indirectness is a result of the fact we are sensuous (finite) as well as 
rational beings. If we did not have this limitation then we would act unfailingly in 
accordance with the moral law and would have no need for the categorical 
imperative. In the same section of the Critique of Judgement that we cited above in 
relation to possibility and actuality, and how this division applies only because of 
the way our mind is structured, Kant also says this: 
 
Hence it is clear that it only springs from the subjective character of our 
practical faculty that the moral laws must be represented as commands, and 
the actions conformable to them as duties, and that reason expresses this 
necessity not as an ‘is’ (an event) but as an ‘ought to be’ (as obligation). 
This would not occur if reason and its causality were considered as 
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independent of sensibility, that is, as free from the subjective condition of its 
application to objects in nature, and as being, consequently, a cause in an 
intelligible world perfectly harmonising with the moral law. For in such a 
world there would be no difference between obligation and act, or between 
a practical law as to what is possible through our agency and a theoretical 
law as to what we make actual.
77
 
 
So if we were governed entirely by reason, in a word, if we were not finite beings, 
then our actions would be in complete accordance with the moral law and the 
distinction between ought and is would no longer apply. But in such a case, where 
the law has been internalised to the extent that it is no longer a coercive force, 
would we even be speaking of a law per se? As Derrida has emphasised, no one 
more than Kant has stressed the indissociability of law and force; while there are 
laws that are in practice not enforced, ‘there is no law without enforceability and no 
applicability or enforceability of the law without force’.78 A law (in this case, of 
morality) that would be followed or applied without the aspect of force, without 
being experienced as (either external or internal) coercion, is simply not a law. Our 
relationship to the law, Derrida writes elsewhere, is an ‘interrupted’ one – it 
commands us while remaining inaccessible to us.
79
 Thus in order for the law to 
command me it is necessary that I remain forbidden from accessing it, for if I were 
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able to reach it and know it then I have power over it and its power over me is 
annulled. 
 
The following of laws hence applies only to finite beings and not to God. In the 
second Critique this is what is named holiness of the will as opposed to duty, the 
former being the property of a ‘maximally perfect being’, while the latter pertains 
to ‘every finite rational being.’80 It is the lot of the finite being to strive after the 
ideal of holiness, ‘in an uninterrupted but infinite progression’,81 without ever 
becoming equal to it. If we were to become totally equal to it then it would mean 
there being no possible desire or temptation at all to stray from the moral path. But 
is this not the definition of automatism and hence the exact opposite of autonomy? 
If we were mere animals without reason our actions would be determined entirely 
by sensuous impulses and instincts; but if we were free from animality altogether 
and purely rational beings we would be controlled by a higher but no less inhibiting 
set of ‘laws’. Therefore, it would appear to be the case that we are only truly free 
insofar as we are not governed wholly by reason and do not have immediate access 
to the moral law, for knowing it would mean that we were unable to do otherwise. 
These laws are timeless and unchanging, so acting in total harmony with them 
would entail always acting the same way, like morally perfect machines. The 
paradox here which deserves to be emphasised is that we only display freedom 
when we act according to reason and the moral law, but if we acted completely in 
accordance with reason then we would no longer be free. 
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This is where we come back to Žižek, whose contention is that Kant’s own 
identification of freedom as noumenal fundamentally misses the radical 
implications of his own thought, failing to recognise his key insight that freedom is 
neither phenomenal nor noumenal, but operates in the gap in between. As we saw 
above, the act of ‘I think’ (the transcendental unity of apperception), which 
accounts for our spontaneity is not a phenomenal appearance nor is it a noumenal 
entity; it is, as Žižek says, ‘trans-phenomenal’.82 It is an empty logical construct 
that is the vehicle of all empirical thought, thus ‘in itself’ it is nothing and it is 
known ‘only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and apart from them we 
can never have the least concept of it’.83 However, merely asserting the fact that I 
do not know what I am but only that I am is not enough, says Žižek, rather we must 
add that ‘this lack of intuited content is constitutive of the I’.84 I can only think and 
act as a spontaneous being so long as my ‘true’ noumenal self (as Kant puts it ‘this 
I or he or it (the thing) that thinks’85) remains inaccessible to me. Žižek astutely 
maps this I of transcendental apperception onto the Lacanian ‘subject of the 
enunciation’, and the void of this empty formal nothing is filled out with 
‘fantasmatic “stuff”’, which forms the self-identity which we construct for 
ourselves (the ‘subject of the enunciated’) and which can never be identical to the 
mere ‘I think’, whose ‘notion can never be filled out with intuited experiential 
reality.’86 The subject, for Žižek, lacks its place in the ‘great chain of being’,87 and 
cannot be integrated into reality. This neither/nor status of transcendental 
apperception is the reason why we are fundamentally ‘out of joint’ and hence free. 
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If mere consciousness of this thinking subject were to amount to an intellectual 
intuition of the self, ‘I would thereby lose the very feature which makes me an I of 
pure apperception; I would cease to be the spontaneous transcendental agent that 
constitutes reality.’88 
 
Žižek identifies the same logic at work in Kant’s ethical philosophy, in a passage he 
is fond of quoting from the Critique of Practical Reason bearing the grandiose 
subheading ‘On the Wisely Commensurate Proportion of the Human Being’s 
Cognitive Power to His Practical Vocation’. Here Kant asks the question, 
‘supposing now that nature had been compliant to our wish and had conferred on us 
that capacity for insight or that illumination which we would like to possess or 
which some perhaps even fancy themselves actually possessing’ – namely, absolute 
knowledge or access to the noumenal dimension – ‘what, presumably would be the 
consequences of this, as far as one can tell?’ In such a case, ‘unless our entire 
nature were at the same time transformed’ [my italics]: 
 
[Instead] of the conflict that the moral attitude now has to carry on with the 
inclinations, in which – after some defeats – moral fortitude of soul is yet 
gradually to be acquired, God and eternity, with their dreadful majesty 
would lie unceasingly before our eyes […] Transgression of the law would 
indeed be avoided; what is commanded would be done. However, the 
attitude from which actions ought to be done cannot likewise be instilled by 
any command, and the spur to activity is in this case immediately at hand 
and external […] Therefore most lawful actions would be done from fear, 
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only a few from hope, and none at all from duty; and a moral worth of 
actions – on which alone, after all, the worth of the person and even that of 
the world hinges in the eyes of the highest wisdom – would not exist at all. 
The conduct of human beings, as long as their nature remained as it is, 
would thus be converted into a mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet 
show, everything would gesticulate well but there would still be no life in 
the figures.
89
 
 
The difference between this passage and that which we took from the Critique of 
Judgement is that the latter imagines how a perfect being of reason without 
sensuous limitations would act, while this passage speculates upon what would 
happen if we, finite beings with our particular sensible makeup, were to be granted 
absolute insight into the noumenal dimension. The consequences, as we can see, 
would be catastrophic. The being of reason would act in total accord with the moral 
law because it is morally perfect, while the finite subject granted divine insight 
would act out of terror. The upshot in each case is that we would act according to 
the moral law not through choice or rectitude but because we would be incapable of 
doing otherwise, hence this would be no kind of freedom that we would recognise. 
True morality, for Kant, consists not only in acting according to the letter of the 
moral law but in doing so with pure motives, doing it because it is our duty – the 
‘right thing to do’. Any ‘objectively’ moral act that was carried out solely for our 
own gain, whether this is the hope of reward or simply the feeling of satisfaction of 
doing a good deed, would be counter to true morality. So in gaining insight into the 
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noumenal domain we would unfailingly fulfil our moral obligations but out of fear 
not duty and hence it would not be moral. As Žižek puts it, 
 
 [The] inescapable conclusion is that, at the level of phenomena as well as at 
the noumenal level, we – humans – are ‘mere mechanisms’ with no 
autonomy and no freedom: as phenomena we are not free, we are part of 
nature, ‘mere mechanisms,’ totally submitted to causal links, part of the 
nexus of causes and effects; as noumena, we are again not free, but reduced 
to ‘mere mechanisms’ […] Our freedom persists only in a space between 
the phenomenal and the noumenal. It is therefore not that Kant simply 
limited causality to the phenomenal domain in order to be able to assert that, 
at the noumenal level, we are free autonomous agents: we are free only 
insofar as our horizon is that of the phenomenal, insofar as the noumenal 
domain remains inaccessible to us.
90
 
 
The irony here is that in gaining ‘the insight which we would like to possess’ and 
which we think would allow us to throw off the shackles of bondage on the level of 
nature, this would only be to gain a new form of enslavement in a higher realm. So 
freedom must be conceived as the act which arrests the causal process and consists 
of the effects that the use of reason has in the world of appearance, rather than a 
state belonging to a higher being. So for Kant too, in spite of his own words to the 
contrary, freedom is strictly finite and, similar to Heidegger, stems from the fact 
that we are more than just another part of nature – i.e. transcendent – but yet 
without being entirely beyond it. So for both philosophers, any seemingly desirable 
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overcoming of finitude would lead to the loss of that very freedom, such that the 
term ‘infinite freedom’ would appear to be an oxymoron. 
 
Quentin Meillassoux and Intellectual Intuition 
 
The final part of Žižek’s assertion having thus been demonstrated, we should now 
pause and take stock of where we stand as regards the first, most significant claim. 
After a thorough but by no means exhaustive investigation into what Kant 
designates by the term intellectual intuition, is there any credence to the suggestion 
that a technological instrument, however advanced we may conceive it to become, 
has the capacity to grant this faculty to human beings? We should refrain from the 
immediate temptation to reject this as hyperbolical and try to envisage the 
experience of using such a device and the potential power it would allow us. 
Heidegger characterises our relation to objects as one of use rather than mastery. 
We are surrounded by beings which confront us in their opacity and autonomy as 
outside of our power. However, the ability to command and manipulate such 
objects via thought would surely amount to a higher form of control which would 
chip away at the gulf separating ‘out there’ (external reality) from ‘in here’ (the 
mind). 
 
So in terms of the ability that such a thing would grant us, let us take the example 
that Žižek uses, that of the human volunteers playing computer games with the 
mind. The technology the researchers developed was programmed to recognise the 
brain activity corresponding to the hand movements, so that instead of actually 
pressing buttons and manoeuvring the joystick they needed merely to think these 
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movements, and these thoughts directly controlled the game. Immediately we can 
see that simply because it is the brain that is in control rather than the hands, it 
would not necessarily make the user any better at the game. This sounds trivial but 
the point is that it would not be a new form of total mastery and we are still a step 
removed. After all, if my brain were completely in control I could command it (the 
game) to do anything I desired, but if these thoughts are concerned only with what 
my hands would ordinarily be doing if I were using a joystick then essentially this 
is no greater control than we had already. We ran up against similar limits with 
regard to the brain computer interface for music in the previous chapter, and how 
we could not expect it to channel previously untapped creative talent. 
 
The other technological procedures we explored, which scan the brain and display a 
‘live feed’ of inner phenomenological experience come somewhat closer to what 
we are dealing with. It should not be underestimated how profoundly uncanny it 
would feel to see a digital rendering of a mental image appear on a screen. 
Sometimes we can find it jarring to discover that an event happened differently to 
how we remember it, but how much more disconcerting would such an experience 
be if that event was something that happened in my own mind, such as a dream. 
These will be some of the themes of the following chapter, but for now all that 
needs to be considered is whether this would in any respect triumph over finitude. 
Superficially at least, the prospect of ‘creating’ an object through and by means of 
thought alone would seem to be akin to the divine faculty, but as we have drawn 
attention to again and again, the thought that generates this object is itself 
structurally dependent on receptivity and hence finite. The objects of the divine 
mind are not assembled from sensuous data but are pure creation, and since these 
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systems would be a kind of appendage or prosthesis to thought and not a rewiring 
of our cognition, such a faculty would still seem to be beyond us. 
 
Finally, most crucially, intellectual intuition, as well as being the spontaneous 
creation of its own object, is the intuition of a purely intelligible entity, and we as 
finite beings can have knowledge only of sensuously given appearances. We can 
never travel ‘outside’ our own thought of an object to access what or how the object 
thought about is independently of our thinking about it. This is the prevailing doxa 
of post-Kantian philosophy, the very idea of thought being able to have positive 
knowledge of something absolute – the impossible Real – outside of the knowing 
subject, being consigned to the metaphysical dustbin. So no matter how much 
psychical control over external reality we may be granted by cognitive technology, 
so long as we remain forever barred from reality in itself intellectual intuition seems 
chimerical. Finitude haunts us at every turn, not for nothing is it so closely 
associated with the phrase ‘always-already’. Moreover, this inability, characterised 
by Kant as an epistemological limitation, has since been hardened into a positive 
ontological thesis. So while Kant holds fast to the notion of an in itself completely 
distinct from our knowledge that is at least thinkable, in subsequent philosophies, 
particularly the post-Husserlian school of phenomenology, the very idea of a reality 
‘in itself’, that is not for some transcendental consciousness is completely 
unthinkable. 
 
The French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux calls this thesis correlationism, which 
consists in ‘disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of 
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subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.’91 In other words, there is 
no subject that is not already related to an object (the paradigmatic case being 
Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world) and no possibility of thinking an object 
‘in itself’, abstracted from its relation to a subject. This reciprocity of the terms, or 
‘the correlation’, is considered to be prior to the terms themselves, so there is not a 
self-subsisting subject who only subsequently encounters a world, nor a pre-
existing world which then appears to a subject; each only is in so far as it is for the 
other. Clearly it is the second claim that would provoke the most astonishment for 
the non-philosopher, for the idea that the self must always-already be related to a 
world is comparatively easy to grasp, but the notion that being itself only is so long 
as it is disclosed to consciousness is rather more incredible. As Meillassoux puts it, 
 
[One] could say that up until Kant, one of the principle problems of 
philosophy was to think substance, while ever since Kant it has consisted in 
trying to think the correlation [… To] discover what divides rival 
philosophers is no longer to ask who has grasped the true nature of 
substantiality, but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary 
correlation.
92
  
 
This correlationism pervades analytic philosophy every bit as much as the post-
phenomenological continental schools, manifesting itself in the guise of language in 
the former and consciousness in the latter. Both language and consciousness 
provide us with our only access to the outside world, while simultaneously keeping 
us at an infinite distance from it. We can get no neutral, external vantage point from 
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which to observe either ourselves or the world because we are imprisoned within 
interiority, but it is an interiority which is ‘transparent’, offering us a partial 
perspective on the outside. 
 
Philosophy has thus backed itself into an ever-shrinking corner, denying to itself 
the tools with which to think the ‘great outdoors’, as Meillassoux evocatively puts 
it.
93
 This means that any scientific truth-claim about the nature of being cannot be 
confirmed or denied through reference to its intrinsic adequation to the phenomena 
under investigation but only via the intersubjective agreement of the scientific 
community. Moreover, this correlationist circle is seemingly impossible to escape 
from and there is a watertight set of arguments designed to refute anyone who 
attempts to do so, all of which following the same lines, insisting that there is no 
way for thought to know what is when there is no thought, since it cannot escape 
itself and isolate this supposedly self-subsistent reality from the thought about it. 
All realism is characterised as ‘naïve’ and unthinking, failing to grasp the originary 
status of the correlation. But Meillassoux uncovers a devastatingly simple break in 
the circle via what he calls the problem of the ‘arche-fossil’, and the domain of 
ancestrality that such phenomena attest to. If a fossil in the usual sense of the term 
is a substance bearing traces of ancient animal and plant life, the arche-fossil points 
to a reality – ancestrality – anterior to the emergence of life itself. Such data include 
radioactive isotopes or the light emissions from distant stars, etc., which allow 
scientists to form knowledge about such events as the origin of the universe or the 
first appearance of life on earth, all of which occurred billions of years prior to the 
emergence of humankind. The philosophical significance of such scientific claims 
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becomes clear once we ask how the correlationist is to account for them. Here is 
what Kant has to say about such scientific investigation: ‘because the world does 
not exist in itself at all (i.e., independently of the regressive series of my 
presentations), it exists neither as a whole that is infinite in itself nor as a whole that 
is finite in itself. The world is to be met with only in the empirical regression of the 
series of appearances, and not at all by itself.’94 Therefore the truth of the referent 
in such a claim is not what is at issue, only what the claim purports to be about. For 
Kant we can indeed interrogate as far back as our scientific instruments allow but 
what we uncover in such investigation exists only in and for the empirical 
regression, hence not in itself, prior to its being known and merely waiting to be 
discovered. So the scientist’s claims will be valid as far as it goes, so long as he 
does not assert that such findings are true of reality in itself and independent of his 
knowing it (thus claiming to know what cannot be known.) 
 
Regardless of how much it purportedly departs from Kant, all correlationism, says 
Meillassoux, must add variants of this same caveat to scientific knowledge. For the 
correlationist, the arche-fossil cannot be the ‘givenness of a being anterior to 
givenness’, which would be nonsensical; rather, it ‘gives itself as anterior to 
givenness’.95 In accounting for such data, the scientist cannot start from the 
ancestral past but can only carry out a ‘retrojection of the past on the basis of the 
present.’96 Science does not amass objective knowledge of a world existing in itself 
but only the present indicators of a past which gives itself to consciousness as 
existing prior to consciousness and independently of it. So again, the correlationist 
does not question the veracity of the claim but only supplements this claim with a 
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subtle and seemingly innocuous qualification. The ‘basic’ level of meaning 
contained in ancestral statements – that such and such an event happened X years 
before the advent of the human species – is ‘deepened’ by the understanding that 
this is true only on the basis of the consensus of the present scientific community. 
For the correlationist, such a reality simply cannot have existed in the way science 
claims, i.e., uncorrelated to consciousness. ‘A world is meaningful only as given-to-
a-living (or thinking)-being. Yet to speak of the “emergence of life” is to evoke the 
emergence of manifestation amidst a world that pre-existed it.’97 But as 
Meillassoux notes, such a supplement does not deepen the scientific statement but 
annuls it altogether, such that ‘either this statement has a realist sense, and only a 
realist sense, or it has none at all.’98 In short, if the big bang is not an account of 
how the universe actually came about, independently of human knowledge about 
this event, then it has no meaning or use for science whatsoever. 
 
The standard supposition that the correlationist would appeal to in order to make 
such an event thinkable would be to add that had there been a witness then it would 
have been perceived to have taken place as the scientist describes. But the problem 
of ancestrality cannot be reduced to the standard Berkeleyan ‘if a tree falls and 
there is no one there to hear it…’ cliché, because the latter case is contemporaneous 
with givenness as such while the former points to a time which pre-exists 
manifestation itself. As Meillassoux puts it, ‘the ancestral does not designate an 
absence in the given, and for givenness, but rather an absence of givenness’.99 Thus, 
for Meillassoux, the emergence of the finite can be accounted for, and quite simply. 
It is merely an event that occurred with the evolution of the human species, not 
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some profound ontological schism that splits being off from itself. This, as we have 
seen, is exactly the problem that could not be accounted for from within the 
‘correlation’ – the coming into being of the correlation itself. Finitude then, or 
manifestation, is not the irreducible condition of there being a world but is an 
‘intra-worldly occurrence’,100 prior to which and alongside which, being itself 
persists in complete indifference and autonomy. 
 
In renouncing its claim to the absolute, philosophy has willingly handed it over to 
divine revelation or new age spiritualism and has denied itself the ground on which 
to challenge such beliefs on the basis of their intrinsic absurdity or irrationality. The 
inherent modesty of correlationism leads inevitably to agnosticism where religion is 
concerned, any claim about the afterlife being held to be equally valid so long as no 
pretension to positive knowledge is assumed. From this perspective atheism is a 
belief no more or less valid than theism and can make no greater claim to 
rationality. The ‘belief’ that there is no life after death is every bit as unfounded as 
the belief in a heavenly afterlife. Consider, for example, Heidegger in the ‘Letter on 
“Humanism”’, where the thought of being is said to be as little theistic as atheistic, 
‘[not], however, because of an indifferent attitude, but out of respect for the 
boundaries that have been set for thinking as such’.101 This, Meillassoux argues, 
points to the unstated fideism upon which correlationism is founded and which has 
led to ‘an exacerbated return of the religious.’102 For not only does it leave a space 
open for piety and religious fanaticism, it actually encourages it by making it all the 
more appealing since only it stakes a claim to absolute truth. 
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But there is yet another kind of absolute that must also be warded off, which 
consists in the absolutisation of the correlation itself, Hegel being the emblematic 
case. On such an account, if the ‘in itself’ is inaccessible to us this is only because 
there is nothing at all outside the correlation, the latter being held to be eternal and 
necessary. The ‘in itself’ is hereby annulled altogether, becoming merely a 
modality of the ‘for us’, a way in which it presents itself to us. The guardrail against 
this last absolute is the insistence upon the facticity, hence non-necessity, of the 
correlation. We saw how for Kant, space, time and the categories can only be 
described and never accounted for, and how for Heidegger our being-in-the-world 
is conditioned by thrownness. Both take this to be the ultimate limit of knowledge 
and the very mark of our finitude. 
 
So if Hegel took the logical next step from the Kantian system in absolutising the 
very hindrance keeping us at an infinite distance from the absolute (the correlation), 
Meillassoux then does exactly the same thing with the barrier erected against this 
latter kind of absolute – namely facticity itself. In an extraordinary piece of 
reasoning, the intricacies of which we need not go into here, Meillassoux asserts 
that facticity, far from being the mere limit beyond which our knowledge cannot 
go, constitutes positive knowledge of the absolute. The nub of the argument is that 
in thinking the non-necessity of the correlation, which is required in order to fend 
off absolute idealism, the correlationist thinks a stratum of being that is not the 
correlate of her thinking, precisely because it pertains to her own non-being, and 
hence the non-existence of the correlation. The absolute thus thought but 
unacknowledged is the ‘capacity-to-be-other as such […, the] possible transition, 
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devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever.’103 The neat 
reversal that Meillassoux performs here is to show that, in order to protect herself 
against the idealist, the correlationist must aver the necessity of the correlation’s 
contingency, but in doing so she transgresses the correlationist circle at the same 
time as she reinforces it. So while facticity in the negative sense is our inability to 
find a reason why we are or why what is is, facticity in the positive sense projects 
this absence of reason into being itself, such that the absolute is the absolute 
absence of reason or necessity for anything to be or remain the way it is. The 
crucial difference between the two is that while the former maintains a disavowed 
belief that such a reason may exist but we are unable to know it, Meillassoux 
asserts that there is no reason why we exist and we know this. 
  
The full consequences of thinking this absolute unreason (or the ‘principle of 
factiality’) are rather unsettling and counter-intuitive: if there is no reason behind 
anything, everything could change and become other at any time or even maintain a 
period of indefinite stasis. This applies to all natural laws as well as to the 
phenomena governed by such laws, all of which are susceptible to destruction or 
variation at any given time for no reason at all. Thus the absolute which 
Meillassoux claims to have uncovered is a ‘hyper-Chaos’,104 in which anything at 
all could happen from one time to the next and the only necessity is the absolute 
absence of necessity. So Meillassoux blurs the distinction between real and logical 
possibility that Kant insisted upon. For Kant, as we saw, real possibility is 
conditioned by necessary laws, and anything that we conceive of beyond these laws 
is certainly ‘possible’, since conceivable, but not in the sense of ‘could become 
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actual’. But if we no longer have faith in the necessity of laws then anything at all is 
equally possible according to reason. It is every bit as possible for the sun not to 
rise tomorrow morning as it is for it to do so. Simply because up until now it 
always has done is no argument in favour of its continuing to do so. 
 
The obvious question which forces itself upon this thesis is this: if the laws of 
nature could change at any moment and no necessity holds them in place why do 
they not constantly change? Why, when I throw a ball into the air does it always 
return back down to be caught rather than continuing up and up or even 
disappearing in a puff of smoke? Meillassoux’s deft response is that such an 
expectation, namely for the non-necessity of natural laws to entail their incessant 
change, rests on probabilistic reasoning, which derives from a confusion of 
contingency with chance. Chance, Meillassoux argues, is always – and only – 
calculable based on a totality of possible cases, so the probability of throwing 
certain dice-combinations can be calculated by taking into account the number of 
sides of the die and the amount of throws. If we kept landing on the same number 
again and again after hundreds of throws this would amount to a spectacular run of 
fortune unless we assumed that there were some necessity underlying it, namely 
that the die has been loaded. The higher the number of possible results the more 
improbable such consistency would become. Applying this reasoning based on 
chance to natural laws, the fact that out of the infinity of possible occurrences the 
ball always comes back down to earth can only lead us to the conclusion that the 
laws of gravity are necessary and unalterable, for otherwise this would be 
ludicrously improbable. 
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However, as Meillassoux has it, this is based on an unstated ontological hypothesis; 
namely, that ‘the possible’ constitutes a whole or a totality, analogous to the 
number of faces of the die. If the faces of the die could not be totalised then the fact 
that the same number or combination of numbers kept recurring could not strike us 
as odd or contrary to the laws of chance because such laws would no longer apply 
and there would be nothing against which the probability of such an occurrence 
could be measured. So if everything that could possibly happen (e.g. to the ball 
when I throw it up into the air) does not amount to a totality, then probabilistic 
reasoning would no longer hold and the contingency of the laws of nature need 
have nothing whatsoever to do with frequency of change. This is exactly the thesis 
that Meillassoux puts forward via the application of Cantorian set-theory, which 
allows us to think a multiplicity of infinities which cannot be totalised in some ‘set 
of all sets’. In Meillassoux’s own lucid description, ‘take any set, count its 
elements, then compare this number to the number of possible groupings of these 
elements […] You will always obtain the same result: the set B of possible 
groupings (or parts) of a set A is always bigger than A – even if A is infinite.’105 
Therefore, since this provides us with a scheme for at least thinking a non-
totalisable set of possibilities, it de-legitimises the probabilistic inference, leaving 
us with no valid reason to be surprised that the laws have remained the same for as 
long as they have. In spite of this, if we were still to ask why or how this stability of 
laws came about, the answer given would be ‘for no reason’, and there is no reason 
behind their persistence either. Only thus can reason overcome irrational faith in 
providence or divine harmony. 
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Meillassoux’s ultimate aim is to secure the absolute reach of mathematical 
discourse, such that the properties of a thing that can be described mathematically 
are properties belonging to the thing in itself, having no reference to thought.
106
 
This he believes he moves towards by establishing thought’s access to absolute 
contingency, and from this concluding that ‘whatever is mathematically 
conceivable is absolutely possible.’107 But the case for the absolutisation of 
mathematics is not conclusively made, since this book is only a brief introductory 
piece to what will no doubt become a fully systematic philosophical project, and the 
problem of ancestrality is never wholly reconciled with the ‘principle of factiality’. 
Its achievement, nonetheless, is that it does convincingly pave the way for 
philosophy to regain its ‘speculative’ scope by rediscovering thought’s relation to 
the absolute. 
 
However, let us interrogate this relation a little closer. If through this knowledge of 
the necessity of facticity we gain access to a purely intelligible absolute, just what 
kind of knowledge is it? Clearly it cannot be gathered through sensible intuition 
because it is exactly our senses that impose upon us the belief in the necessity of 
natural laws, through habit and superstition, while from a rational point of view 
nothing at all supports such an inference. It is here that Meillassoux, somewhat 
surprisingly, has recourse to the Kantian concept of intellectual intuition: 
                                                 
106
 In parentheses we might want to ask whether Meillassoux would consider the discourse of 
cognitive science to enable access to the mathematical ‘in itself’ of thought. If what is rendered 
mathematically holds of the object whether it is thought about or not, what if that object is thought 
itself? But as we saw with Kant (and Žižek) above, the transcendental distinction does not apply to 
the ‘trans-phenomenal’ (neither noumenal nor phenomenal) act of I think, thus we cannot even 
speak of an ‘in itself’ of thought. Reconciling the bare facts of neuronal activity with the ‘first 
person’ phenomenological experience is after all the so-called ‘hard problem’ that philosophers of 
mind and scientists alike have been grappling with for many years. This is what Žižek calls the 
‘ultimate parallax – this absolute gap between the experience of encountering somebody and the 
“nothing behind” of the open skull.’ The Parallax View, p. 163. 
107
 Meillassoux, After Finitude, p. 117. 
153 
 
 
[We] discover in our grasp of facticity the veritable intellectual intuition of 
the absolute. ‘Intuition’, because it is actually in what is that we discover a 
contingency with no limit other than itself; ‘intellectual’ because this 
contingency is neither visible nor perceptible in things and only thought is 
capable of accessing it, just as it accesses the chaos that underlies the 
apparent continuity of phenomena.
108
 
 
Evidently it is not being employed in a faithful Kantian sense, because here thought 
accesses absolute being while by no means creating it, but it is nothing less than 
noumenal insight, as described by Kant in the passage we quoted above. However, 
in a move exactly counter to Kant’s, such a knowledge does not impress upon us 
the terrifying divine majesty of all things but rather the complete absence of any 
necessity, whether divine or otherwise. Knowledge is thus radically separated from 
the senses, indeed on this point is shown to be in direct conflict with the senses. 
 
Now we are entitled to ask, as Kant did in the letter to Herz, how we are to 
guarantee the necessary reference of this intellectual intuition to the nature of being 
itself. The two alternatives Kant presents us with surely still apply: either the 
innately mathematical essence of being gives itself to thought, or thought projects 
its logical reasoning into being. However, neither option is available to 
Meillassoux, since taking the former would commit him to an untenable 
Pythagorean ontology, which he has already explicitly ruled out, and the latter, as 
we know, is intellectual intuition in the Kantian sense. This is why for Kant 
                                                 
108
 Ibid., p. 82. 
154 
 
intellectual intuition could never be receptive, because it is impossible to conceive 
of how its object would be transmitted to thought. The very bedrock of 
Meillassoux’s enterprise is the thesis that mathematics allows us access to a reality 
independent of thought, but if this is merely thought’s projection onto reality then 
we are not yet free of the correlationist circle. Ray Brassier makes a similar point, 
writing that if reality is ‘neither inherently mathematical nor necessarily 
intelligible’, why should we assume that being is susceptible to intellectual 
intuition?
109
  If this reference is itself also intuited intellectually then too much is 
conceded to thought and correlationism creeps back in.  
 
In the face of Brassier’s criticisms, Meillassoux clarified his position somewhat, 
opting instead to employ the oxymoronic term ‘dianoetic intuition’, meaning ‘the 
essential intertwining of a simple intuition and of a discursivity, a demonstration – 
both being entailed by the access to factuality.’110 As he goes on to explain, if in 
order to break out of the correlationist circle we were to merely posit an 
autonomous real axiomatically, the correlationist will always have the rejoinder that 
this supposedly autonomous real is still posited by thought. The only remaining 
strategy is the one taken by After Finitude, namely to start from within the circle of 
correlationism and demonstrate how, in order to maintain its consistency, it must 
itself appeal to an absolute – facticity: 
 
Hence, the only way to the Real, according to me, is through a proof, a 
demonstration: a demonstration unveils that facticity is not an ignorance of 
the hidden reasons of all things but a knowledge of the absolute contingency 
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of all things. The simple intuition of facticity is transmuted by a dianoia, by 
a demonstration, into an intuition of a radical exteriority […] We have a 
nous unveiled by a dianoia, an intuition unveiled by a demonstration. This 
is why I called it an intellectual intuition: not, of course, because it is an 
intuition which creates its object, as Kant defined it, but because it is an 
intuition discovered by reasoning.
111
 
 
A direct intuition could never give us access to the Real, because as the 
correlationist would remind us, we only ever intuit our own phenomenal 
presentations, but a simple logical positing of the Real from which we then draw 
conclusions will not satisfy the correlationist either. So intellectual (or dianoetic) 
intuition in Meillassoux’s sense is not an immediate, all-at-once revelation of the 
way things are but is the logical explication of a prior intuition. Through rational 
demonstration this intuition (of facticity) is shown to be not what we thought it was. 
What had seemed to be the insurmountable limit to thought and the essence of 
finitude is, through intellectual intuition, revealed to be the key to the very 
overcoming of finitude. 
 
 
Clearly we have travelled some way from where we set out, and have arrived at a 
form of intellectual intuition unrecognisable from its Kantian rendering, but 
although this may not be the overcoming of finitude that we were looking for it is 
quite compelling in the manner in which it frees thought from its self-imposed 
limits. Our first approach, following Žižek’s initial lead and faithfully recreating the 
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Kantian structure of cognition, was crucial in setting out the scope of the problem, 
but ultimately it could not enable us to reach the goal we were seeking. For if these 
technologies are to fulfil the extraordinary promise they seem to present then there 
would need to be a capacity in the mind that exceeds receptivity and finitude, even 
if this is not that of the divine intellectual intuition as Žižek holds. As we have seen, 
for Kant, and even more so for Heidegger, finitude is so core to our being that any 
desire to ‘overcome’ the finite rests on a misunderstanding; we view it as a 
restriction or constraint when in truth it is the positive condition of everything that 
makes us what we are. Thus at every turn we hit against limits that could not be 
negotiated, which made it necessary to depart from the Kantian system. So our 
recourse to Meillassoux has been primarily strategic, enabling us to move beyond 
Kant and the always-already of receptivity which provides the answer to every 
question before it has been asked. While Meillassoux’s model of intellectual 
intuition may no longer relate directly to the technologies we are considering it has 
allowed us at least to conceive of a form of subjectivity that is not enslaved to 
receptivity, and hence always closed off in advance to the possibility of a non-
receptive creativity. By enabling thought to once again exceed itself and reconnect 
with the Real, Meillassoux facilitates an important first breach of the seemingly 
incommensurable gap between mind and matter. This may provide encouragement 
to seek to undermine it still further, and attempt once more to uncover a resource in 
the mind that is not sensibly conditioned. 
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Chapter Three: Unus Mundus 
 
The meeting with oneself is, at first, the meeting with one’s own shadow. The 
shadow is a tight passage, a narrow door, whose painful constriction no one is 
spared who goes down to the deep well. But one must learn to know oneself in 
order to know who one is. For what comes after the door is, surprisingly enough, a 
boundless expanse full of unprecedented uncertainty, with apparently no inside and 
no outside, no above and no below, no here and no there, no mine and no thine, no 
good and no bad. It is the realm of water, where all life floats in suspension; where 
the realm of the sympathetic system, the soul of everything living, begins; where I 
am indivisibly this and that; where I experience the other in myself and the other-
than-myself experiences me. 
– C.G. Jung, ‘Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious’1 
 
In the first chapter of Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud addresses a facet of the 
religious experience, the absence of which from his earlier polemic The Future of 
an Illusion was drawn to his attention by his friend, the renowned French dramatist 
and novelist Romain Rolland: ‘this, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he 
himself is never without, which he finds confirmed by many others, and which he 
would like to call a sensation of “eternity”, a feeling as of something limitless, 
unbounded – as it were, “oceanic”.’2 This oceanic feeling is, according to Rolland, 
the origin of all religious sentiment – the sense that something within us escapes the 
finite, embodied limits of subjectivity. In New Age terms this is that immediate 
sensation of ‘oneness’ with the universe, of being part of something larger than 
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ourselves; in the Judaeo-Christian tradition it could be equated with the Kingdom of 
God, and in Buddhism, the annihilation of the self. Freud, the great demystifier, 
traces the origin of this affect to the all-encompassing ego of the newborn infant 
who as yet does not distinguish internal from external, only gradually learning to do 
so in the face of a lack. For while some urges can be satisfied at any time and some 
sources of excitation can be felt at any moment, others – ‘among them what he 
desires most of all, his mother’s breast’3 – escape him and are not under his 
immediate control. Desires such as these can only be brought to satisfaction by 
crying and screaming for attention. It is through this experience that the child first 
‘[sets] over against the ego an “object”, in the form of something which exists 
“outside” and which is only forced to reappear by a special action.’4 The ‘object’, 
discovered as not being a part of the child’s own ego, thus makes its first 
appearance in the upsurge of desire and the experience of a lack: a need, the 
satisfaction of which is not in the child’s power. Crying is the initial and most basic 
means of reaching out into the external world to bring about this satisfaction that 
cannot be regulated internally. 
 
So while ‘originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external 
world from itself’, leaving us with a ‘shrunken residue of a much more inclusive – 
indeed an all-embracing – feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond 
between the ego and the world about it.’5 The oceanic is thus the persistence of this 
lost unity, endowing those who are affected by it with the sense that what they now 
perceive to be their egoic self is the remainder of something more expansive, which 
most religious doctrines promise we will return to after we die. 
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Auto-Satisfaction, or, How to Bypass Reality 
 
This narrative of individuation through the ego’s severance from the external world 
is a fundamental concept in Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud proposes as a useful 
fiction the hypothesis that our highly advanced psychical apparatus developed out 
of the primitive need to minimise excitation (this is the ‘principle of constancy’ or 
the ‘Nirvana principle’6) and that the earliest stage of this apparatus had as its only 
function to ‘[keep] itself so far as possible free from stimuli; consequently its first 
structure followed the plan of a reflex apparatus, so that any sensory excitation 
impinging on it could be promptly discharged along a motor path’.7 Subsequently 
this primitive organism finds that the exigencies of life disturb and upset the 
success of this self-contained system, for needs such as hunger cause an excitation 
that cannot be removed via purely internal means: 
 
A change can only come about if in some way or other (in the case of the 
baby, through outside help) an ‘experience of satisfaction’ can be achieved 
which puts an end to the internal stimulus. An essential component of this 
experience of satisfaction is a particular perception (that of nourishment, in 
our example) the mnemic image of which remains associated thenceforward 
with the memory trace of the excitation produced by the need. As a result of 
the link that has thus been established, next time this need arises a psychical 
impulse will at once emerge which will seek to re-cathect the mnemic image 
of the perception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-
establish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is 
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what we call a wish; the reappearance of the perception is the fulfilment of 
the wish; and the shortest path to the fulfilment of the wish is a path leading 
direct from the excitation produced by the need to a complete cathexis of 
the perception. Nothing prevents us from assuming that there was a 
primitive state of the psychical apparatus in which this path was actually 
traversed, that is, in which wishing ended in hallucinating. Thus the aim of 
this first psychical activity was to produce a ‘perceptual identity’ – a 
repetition of the perception which was linked with the satisfaction of the 
need.
8
 
 
So in this primitive, self-sufficient state, when a biological need forced itself upon 
the organism it found satisfaction in the hallucinatory recall of a previous 
perception in which this need was satisfied. No sooner has the need or wish arisen 
than it is perceived to be satiated. This structure, Freud suggests, persists in dreams 
where unconscious wishes are represented in the perceptual system as fulfilled, 
albeit disguised by the various means of censorship. However, in waking life, 
‘bitter experience’ will have necessitated the evolution of this inefficient 
hallucinatory course of fulfilment into ‘a more expedient secondary one.’9 Since the 
hallucinatory satisfaction of a need such as hunger does not actually satisfy the 
biological need it developed in response to, it was found necessary to ‘seek out 
other paths which lead eventually to the desired perceptual identity being 
established from the direction of the external world.’10 Thus while this early stage 
of development is dominated entirely by the pleasure principle, its place is 
subsequently usurped by the reality principle, which leads to a supplementary 
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detour to the original satisfaction. External reality will not immediately satisfy our 
every need so we must adopt a pragmatic approach, involving what Freud calls 
‘reality-testing’: assessing whether an internal perception corresponds with external 
reality and taking the necessary steps to bring it about or modify it accordingly. But 
it all develops as a supplement to the original system which was found to be 
inadequate. This is, for Freud, technology at its purest: a tool or instrument through 
which we make the external world more accommodating to our needs, easing or 
hastening satisfaction. All subsequent technological developments are, at base, 
designed to make this process easier still. However, are we now on the cusp of 
advancing to such a stage that the external, technological, means by which we 
satisfy these needs become so efficient, so successful, that it restores us to this 
primitive state of auto-gratification? 
 
The future promised by the ‘Bluetooth in your head that translates your thoughts 
into actions’ that we encountered in the first chapter must surely, taken to its logical 
conclusion, lead to the reinstatement of the pleasure principle to its place of 
predominance at the expense of the reality principle. In an ongoing research project 
at the Fondazione Santa Lucia research hospital in Rome, a mock-up of a home 
controlled entirely by thought has been successfully piloted, in which opening and 
closing doors, activating lights, answering the telephone and controlling a small 
robot is all operated by a strip of electrodes on the head picking up brain activity 
signalling ‘interest’ in a particular action which is then sent to a computer and 
translated into the desired act.
11
 The branch of research into such thought-controlled 
environments bears the rather prosaic name ‘assistive domotics’, but its 
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implications are extraordinary. Already most of our electronic appliances – 
televisions, computers, hi-fi stereos – can be integrated and connected to each other 
wirelessly to form one hyper-functional system and it is now increasingly likely 
that at some stage within the next few decades, instead of a remote control operated 
by hand, this could all be activated merely by thought. If the subject craves 
something to eat or drink the microwave oven or the coffee machine would 
immediately start up and a robotic machine then brings it on a tray; the television 
would be correlated to his attention-span, instantly switching channel as soon as his 
interest dips; a query pops into his mind and a computer promptly finds it on a 
search engine; he thinks of a song and it downloads from the internet and starts 
playing on the stereo. But this automatic realisation of even the most fleeting 
desire, causing a veritable flood of information, could only lead to utter indolence 
to the point of paralysis, much like the eponymous film cartridge in David Foster-
Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest, which is so entertaining and addictive that whoever 
views it is reduced to a catatonic state, immobilised, and losing all interest in doing 
anything other than watching the film. 
 
For Freud, thinking is ‘an experimental kind of acting’,12 which is essentially the 
same as the definition of the scientific method described by Karl Popper (cited in 
the first chapter), whereby instead of perishing along with our false theories we let 
them ‘die in our stead.’ In the metapsychological system, the ego interposes itself 
between the desires of the id and access to motility, postponing motor discharge 
until it has satisfied the demands of thought and judgement. ‘In this way it has 
dethroned the pleasure principle which dominates the course of events in the id 
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without any restriction.’13 And so once again we touch upon the importance of this 
intervening gap between intention and deed, which these technologies seem to 
bypass. Instead of needing to adjust our goal of attaining pleasure in accordance 
with the reality principle we can actively and instantly adjust and rearrange reality 
in accordance with the pleasure principle. Unconscious repressed processes, says 
Freud, ‘disregard reality-testing; they equate reality of thought with external 
actuality, and wishes with their fulfilment – with the event – just as happens 
automatically under the ancient dominance of the pleasure principle.’14 Waking life 
would then have the pattern of dreaming, where wishes are immediately fulfilled, 
although no longer merely in the form of a hallucination. (Furthermore, we each 
know the frequency with which obscene or unsavoury thoughts and desires are 
prone to arise unbidden into one’s mind at any given moment, but at least we have 
the comfort of knowing that others cannot see what we are thinking and we have 
the self-control not to act on these impulses. However, unless we were to establish 
some manner of filter such as parents of young children put in place on the Internet 
there would be nothing to prevent such momentary thoughts from gaining an outlet 
and being exhibited for others to see. It would be somewhat ironic if we were 
compelled to develop a supplementary technological system of censorship to 
replace the self-restraint that these very devices would apparently override.) 
 
If we think of the state governed by the pleasure principle as an autopoietic system 
with a break in the circuit where reality intervenes, the ‘Bluetooth in your head’ 
would be inserted into the system as if to close the loop, and the exigencies of 
‘reality testing’, and of modifying and subordinating our instincts towards 
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satisfaction in accord with objective reality would be bypassed or overcome. What 
we wish for or crave would find immediate gratification with no delay and no effort 
expended. However, a subject immersed in this system could surely have no 
experience of an event; for when the field of the possible, of what-may-come, is 
saturated in advance by need or by desire – in short, by the subject’s own projection 
onto the future – there would be no opening for the unexpected to occur, or for 
anything truly to happen to the subject, unless it were on the order of a disaster 
(such as death, or a power cut.) And where there is no relation of stimulus to 
response, but instead a pure immediacy, there would be no notion even of temporal 
succession: past and future would merge into an indistinct plateau. It is clear that 
we would no longer even be speaking of a subject but rather a wholly passive, 
pacified and de-subjectivised organism. Such a development would seem to bear 
out Freud’s gambit in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that all techno-cultural 
advances are essentially regressive, constituting a ‘new path’ to an ‘ancient goal’ – 
the goal of inertia.
15
 
 
So if the reality principle is that which comes to modify and domesticate the 
pleasure principle, it seems that what we would be dealing with here would amount 
to the immediate self-perpetuating presence of pleasure: auto-satisfaction. 
However, this obviously would be to simplify matters somewhat, implying that the 
reality principle is secondary and a merely provisional delay or deviation and 
disregarding the extent to which this economic detour of reality structures and 
constitutes pleasure itself.
16
 As Derrida has put it, ‘[pure] pleasure and pure reality 
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are ideal limits, which is as much as to say fictions’, each deriving from a common 
‘necessarily impure’ root: namely, différance.17 It is something of a truism that 
pleasure is very often found more in the postponement of satisfaction than in the 
satisfaction itself, and that satisfaction in fact frequently leaves us unsatisfied and 
deflated; so the instant gratification of any and every wish would surely lead rather 
to extreme lethargy than to some orgiastic overdose of enjoyment. As Freud 
himself writes, ‘[when] any situation that is desired by the pleasure principle is 
prolonged, it only produces a feeling of mild contentment.’18 The injunction to 
attain to a state of ‘pure pleasure’ commanded by the pleasure principle, then, is 
one that is impossible to fulfil but equally impossible to take leave of. So everyone 
takes his or her own path towards this limit but none ever reaches the final 
destination: 
 
It is a question of how much real satisfaction [a man] can expect to get from 
the external world, how far he is led to make himself independent of it, and, 
finally, how much strength he feels he has for altering the world to suit his 
wishes.
19
 
 
However, neuroprosthetic technologies would act as a great leveller, endowing 
every man with an equal capacity for altering the external world in accordance with 
his wishes (assuming of course – a very big if – that such technologies were 
                                                                                                                                        
tension.’ (‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’, 1924, Standard Ed. 19, p. 160.) With the 
introduction of the death drive and its opposition to the libidinal (life) drives, the problem was 
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indiscriminately available to all.) Due to man’s essential constitution, however, this 
latest contrivance would simply lead to yet another inexorable detour. 
 
Materialised Memory 
 
This circuitous system of computers and electronic appliances all functioning 
towards our satisfaction and minimising effort presents us with something like a 
fallen, mechanised descendent of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ structure that 
organises our being-in-the-world. Dasein’s world would, in the name of comfort 
and efficiency, shrink to the particular network of electronic devices contained in 
the home. Thus familiar warnings about the dehumanising or alienating effects of 
technology would seem to be borne out by our being reduced to this primordial 
state of which Freud speaks. What is more, the standard paranoid question 
concerning our relationship to technology – ‘who is controlling whom’ – is 
intensified here. It all works for the satisfaction of our needs, but only by plugging 
us into the network and making us, as it were, the mainframe of the system. To 
indulge in a touch of hyperbolic fantasy, it seems almost like a step on the way to 
the predicament in which the human race finds itself in the 1999 film The Matrix, 
where they are merely the organic resources for a vast machine. This is the same 
shifting of coordinates in the advancement of new technology that we touched upon 
in the first chapter, and which Žižek equates to the Hegelian negation of negation, 
but pushed to the limit: technology, whose sole basic purpose is to make our lives 
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easier, becomes the end rather than the means, such that it is we who are ensuring 
the smooth running of the system to which we are now the slaves.
20
 
 
Furthermore, ready access to neuroimaging technology would seem to remodel 
subjectivity and the human mind according to the template of a computer harddrive. 
At the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, at University College London, a 
number of trials have taken place using functional magnetic resonance imaging to 
access the memories of test subjects. In one such test in 2009,
21
 volunteers wore 
virtual reality headsets and then were told to make their way through a specially 
constructed virtual environment, while having their brain activity monitored. They 
were subsequently scanned as they were asked to recollect a random location in the 
environment and the scientists were able to accurately predict the spatial position 
that the subject was picturing. In another test in 2010,
22
 ten subjects were asked to 
watch three film clips each lasting seven seconds, and each showing an actress 
performing a different activity. Once again the subjects’ brains were scanned as 
they recollected as vividly as possible a specific film clip and the computer 
program was able to identify the brain activity corresponding to each of the three 
films, which, somewhat surprisingly, was almost identical in each test subject. 
Although all such research is still at a very early stage, as it develops in accuracy it 
could transform the very act of recollection so that it becomes more and more like 
searching through a computer database. So not only would I no longer need to 
physically leave my station to change the television channel or pour myself a drink, 
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I would not even need to ‘manually’ bring to mind facts, names, or other items of 
knowledge. It would all be stored in the brain and merely the intention to summon 
up a memory would be enough to prompt the computer to search through my 
psychical archive. Thus, just as the internet has been able to quickly settle disputes 
over facts and trivia, perhaps at some point we will be able to scroll through our 
subjective store of memories to put an end to disagreements in recollection between 
friends or relatives over personal matters that concerned only those involved.
23
 
 
Freud repeatedly insists that once something has been registered in the unconscious 
those traces are ‘indestructible’ and that ‘in the unconscious nothing can be brought 
to an end, nothing is past or forgotten.’24 Forgetting or falsification is therefore due 
to repression, whether the forgotten event itself is too distressing or unpalatable or, 
in itself perfectly innocent and mundane, it has come to be associated with some 
aspect of ourselves that has been disavowed. The trace of the original trauma, 
however, is permanently registered in the unconscious and may seek to find 
expression in a dream, but to do so it must disguise itself. In the case of the 
forgetting or distortion of dreams upon waking, this is an extension of the stage of 
censorship Freud calls ‘secondary revision’, the process that re-works the dream’s 
content into a more acceptable form. There is therefore nothing arbitrary or 
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happenstance about it and the psychoanalyst aims to trace the chain of associations 
back from the misshapen form in which it is remembered to the actual dream 
material, and eventually from there to the latent dream thoughts of which the 
manifest form is a cipher. However, this process of reconstruction would be 
rendered redundant by a dream-imaging mechanism that could simply display the 
dream as it occurred. This shift would be equivalent to that which has taken place in 
police work with the increasing ubiquity of CCTV cameras replacing the previous 
reliance on the memories of eye-witnesses. These psychical surveillance cameras 
would allow the thoughts to escape the subsequent revision, putting us in the 
uncanny situation of viewing an objective recording of something that took place 
inside our own mind, but of which we have no recollection. This would be a digital 
return of the repressed, the re-appearance of a traumatic excess we believed we had 
been cleansed of. We are straying into rather fanciful, speculative territory here, but 
the fundamental point to bear in mind is that the limitations of our own flawed, 
unreliable memory are perhaps on the verge of being supplemented by a 
technological system of total recall. 
 
In the ‘Note Upon the “Mystic Writing-Pad”’, Freud describes a written reminder, 
such as a note in a diary or a shopping list, as ‘a materialised portion of my mnemic 
apparatus, which I otherwise carry about with me invisible.’25 As he goes on to 
write, 
 
All the forms of auxiliary apparatus which we have invented for the 
improvement or intensification of our sensory functions are built on the 
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same model as the sense organs themselves or portions of them: for 
instance, spectacles, photographic cameras, ear-trumpets. Measured by this 
standard, devices to aid our memory seem particularly imperfect.
26
 
 
The occasion for this remark, and for the essay itself, is the then-recent appearance 
on the market of a child’s writing toy which corresponds markedly with Freud’s 
account of the structure of the perceptual function of the psychical apparatus: the 
‘Mystic Writing-Pad’ (or Wunderblock) of the title. This is an early version of 
something like an ‘Etch-A-Sketch’ or ‘Magna Doodle’, where one writes with a 
stylus on a plastic sheet, which is registered beneath on a piece of waxed paper 
adhering to a slab of soft brown resin. The marks are erased by raising the sheet of 
paper from the layer beneath, but since the resin retains all of the previous traces 
even while they are not visible on the piece of paper, Freud sees in this a fitting 
representation of the way mnemic traces are permanently registered in the 
unconscious. The outer plastic sheet, meanwhile, is the receptive perceptual system, 
which acts as a protective cover for the layer that actually receives the stimuli: the 
paper on which the writing appears. It is on this layer that consciousness takes place 
and the fixing of the paper to the resin and then its peeling away corresponds to the 
sending out and withdrawal of cathectic innervations to the perceptual stimuli. So 
instead of the external stimulus making the impressions, as is the case with the 
stylus on the writing-pad, it is the internal cathectic energy which ‘writes’ what it 
receives. 
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It goes without saying that had Freud had access to current technology his choice of 
illustration of the perceptual and mnemic apparatus would have been very different; 
instead of the Mystic Pad it would perhaps have been the iPad. The interactive 
touch-screen surface is equivalent to the protective external shield against stimuli, 
the processor interpreting the information would be the receptive layer which 
actually receives and registers the input, and the opening and closing of files would 
be the arising and passing away of consciousness from the mnemic traces. And of 
course the ‘unconscious’ storage capacity of computers now exceeds even that of 
the human mind, and unlike the impressions left in the layer of resin, they can be 
brought back unaltered to ‘consciousness’ at any time. As Freud puts it, ‘once the 
writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot “reproduce” it from within; it would 
be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that.’27 To push the 
analogy a step further: even when we think we have permanently deleted files from 
the harddrive they are still traceable and able to be recovered by an expert, just as 
wholly forgotten, repressed memories can supposedly be retrieved by the 
psychoanalyst. The pertinent question, to which we will return, is whether such an 
advance in sophistication of the external representational model would actually 
alter not only the theory – psychoanalysis – but in fact the very ‘object’ of that 
theory – the psyche itself.28 
 
Freud suggests that the primary function of cultural and technological development 
is to cultivate and customise the natural world such that it is more serviceable to our 
needs. The first acts of civilisation, according to Freud, were the fashioning and 
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manipulation of tools, the mastery of fire, and the building of dwellings. These 
‘opened up paths which man has followed ever since, and the stimulus to which is 
easily guessed. With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or 
sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning.’29 Freud proceeds to list a 
series of cultural acquisitions in order to demonstrate their role as prosthesis to 
biological functions: motor or hydraulic power is modelled after man’s muscles, 
new forms of transportation extend his movements over land, sea and air, telephony 
allows for the voice to traverse great distances, home building is a substitute for the 
mother’s womb, telescopic and microscopic lenses allow us to surpass the limits of 
our retinal structure, and the photograph and phonograph retain fleeting visual and 
auditory impressions, both being ‘at bottom materialisations of the power he 
possesses of recollection, his memory.’30 We could of course add many things to 
this list that were unknown to Freud, but the point is that all of these developments 
essentially arise in response to finitude and their implicit aim is that of bringing us 
closer towards the perfection that we attribute to the supreme being: 
 
Long ago [man] formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and 
omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed 
everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to 
him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. Today he 
has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a 
god himself. […] Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. 
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those 
organs have not grown on him and they still give him much trouble at times. 
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[…] Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great 
advances in this field of civilisation and will increase man’s likeness to God 
still more.
31
 
 
We saw at length in the previous chapter how brain-computer interfacing and 
neuroimaging systems are implicitly modelled after the divine ideal of intellectual 
intuition, whether or not this is actually attainable. But if indeed the unconscious 
mind retains every impression it receives, and that as fMRI brain scanning 
technology develops there will be the capacity to retrieve even unconscious 
memories, would we consequently find ourselves with a derived faculty of total 
recall? Would a technology that had access to all of our deepest thoughts and 
memories supplement the lack in the functioning of our own memory such as to add 
one more organ to the prosthetic God that man is fast in the process of becoming? 
 
However, as Derrida contends in his earliest encounter with Freud and his famed 
Wunderblock, this question concerning the ‘status of the “materialised” supplement 
which is necessary to the alleged spontaneity of memory’32 is never examined by 
Freud. Derrida reminds us that one should not disregard the materiality of the 
interface, as if it were a vanishing mediator, nor should we forget its supplementary 
status, ‘which, moreover, could not act on a perfectly spontaneous memory’,33 
coming to complicate the distinction between ‘live’ internal memory and the ‘dead’ 
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external memory aid. Rather than death distinct from and opposed to life, it is an 
economy of death within life, within the psychical system.
34
 
 
The notion of an external hypomnemic device enabling us to ‘overcome’ the 
finitude of our memory is, for Derrida, intrinsically contradictory. The very fact 
that these devices are needed, called for, or conceivable at all merely bears witness 
to our essential finitude. If our memory were not finite then the notion of external 
memory aids, storage devices, cognitive imaging, would be entirely redundant. 
‘Prosthetic god’, therefore, is an oxymoron, since supplementarity is finitude itself. 
Even if we were to suppose that, as Freud says, nothing is ever forgotten in the 
unconscious (a claim to which we shall return), and even if these processes were 
conceivably to advance to such a stage that any thought whatever could be accessed 
as digital information and nothing would ever be lost, it would still have no 
meaning for the subject concerned. This would not be my memory; if it is plucked 
from the recesses of my brain but I have no conscious recollection of it, it would 
merely be one more fact like any other. It would have the exact same status as a 
photograph of a childhood scene of which I have no recollection: evidence, surely, 
of its having taken place, but no meaningful associations would accompany it.
35
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Suggesting that a technological device could fulfil or perfect our system of memory 
would be to tacitly assume that, in itself, that system is complete and undivided, 
although scattered and dispersed across different psychical localities. According to 
this assumption, the device would gather together all those parts to reconstruct the 
‘original’ image, effacing itself in the process. But this return does not take place, 
cannot take place, without a certain loss; it would always be the laying of a new 
mnemic trace which could never just follow the same path as the ‘first’ one. The 
past that we experience in memory is a production, a rewriting, not the 
straightforward recurrence of a past present; memory ‘produces the present past.’36 
There was nothing before the reconstruction, for even what we would want to call 
the ‘original’ perception itself is reconstituted, and ‘may only be read in the past, 
beneath perception and after it.’37 Freud insists on the frequency with which a 
powerfully vivid memory from early childhood was only understood and 
configured as a traumatic event in retrospect, long after it took place (the 
phenomenon known as Nachträglichkeit or deferred action.) If, like the famous 
case of the ‘Wolf-Man’ for instance, a patient remembers witnessing sexual 
intercourse between his parents as a very young child, that event may only have 
come to acquire significance in subsequent years, when the subject reaches sexual 
maturity, thus rewriting the past.
38
 The chain of causality is thereby complicated, 
for it is not the original event that triggers the later neurotic episode, rather it is 
subsequent events which retroactively constitute this early memory as the cause of 
a later complex. Perception, then, will always have happened, in the past. As 
Derrida puts it, ‘pure perception does not exist: we are written only as we write, by 
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the agency within us which always already keeps watch over perception, be it 
internal or external.’39 
 
Freud asserts that the formation of memory traces has nothing at all to do with the 
quality of consciousness, ‘indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring 
when the process which left them behind was one which never entered 
consciousness.’40 Consequently we can be left with powerful unconscious 
memories of events that were never consciously experienced in the first instance. 
There is thus a resultant blurring of the distinction between memory and 
unconscious fantasy, with no clear means of determining one from the other, since 
fantasies have a reality of their own. This ‘reality’ may only be psychical as 
opposed to physical but it is precisely the psychical which holds more weight here. 
A fantasmatic invention can be so powerful and convincing as to carry exactly the 
same psychical consequences as an ‘actual’ memory. 
 
The unconscious, as Derrida reads it, is not some ‘other place’, an indestructible 
repository of memory, like a basement where things are stored that are not suitable 
to appear in the open but which make their presence felt and occasionally rise to the 
surface. This would be to treat it as if it were a virtual or latent consciousness, 
which just happens to be concealed and hidden out of sight. Rather, on Derrida’s 
interpretation, it is that forever escaping loss which cannot be captured or mastered 
and which divides and thwarts in advance the presence to self of consciousness.
41
 
The technological supplement, therefore, no matter how advanced it may become, 
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however deep it may probe, will never saturate the whole scene. There will always 
be a face that is turned away and this face is the unconscious according to Derrida. 
The logic of supplementarity means that another supplement is always required; the 
sequence is never complete. 
 
These considerations demand that we revisit our earlier discussion of Croce’s 
model of artistic creation and re-raise the question of the status of the art object 
within this system. There we saw that ‘the aesthetic stage is completely over and 
done with’ when an internal intuition has been formulated, when an image, turn of 
phrase or melody has been conceived; ‘there is no need for anything else’ [my 
emphasis.] And the fact that the artist does subsequently paint, sing, write, play that 
which has already found expression within, so that it can take on physical existence 
and be encountered by others, ‘all this is something additional.’ To repeat: 
 
[It] is customary to distinguish between the work of art which exists inside 
us and that which exists in the outside world: this way of speaking seems 
infelicitous to us, since the work of art (the aesthetic work) is always 
internal; and what is called the external work is no longer the work of art. 
 
In Derrida’s terminology, then, Croce sees the artwork as a hypomnemic 
supplement to an already full and self-sufficient intuition. This secondary accessory 
is merely there to enable the full return, on the part of the viewer, to this prior 
intuition. However, we need only take a citation from Croce himself in order to 
undermine this simple distinction between internal intuition and external memory-
aid. Once again, it is one that we have already examined, where Croce addresses 
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potential objections to his theory of physical beauty as mere aid to the reproduction 
of internal beauty. Here he concedes that artists sometimes start to work before 
completely conceiving the piece, in which case they will ‘make brushstrokes, not to 
externalise their expressions (which do not then exist), but as if to try out and to 
have a simple point of support for their internal meditations and contemplations.’ 
But this ever-present possibility for the external act of painting to influence and 
support the purely ‘internal meditations’ already compromises and corrupts the 
purity that Croce is concerned to maintain, introducing an economy of forces to the 
ostensibly autonomous intuition. 
  
As we saw, expression is not external or subsequent to the ‘idea’, coming later to 
transmit a fully worked out thought. The idea is itself embodied and expression is 
involved from the outset. So if, as Raymond Scott suggested, technology will 
eventually allow the artistic process to evolve into thought transference from artist 
to receiver, we would not be dealing with a completely distilled but otherwise 
unchanged artistic expression – the same essence more expediently communicated. 
This new mode of transmission would already have come to modify the 
transmissible content. In plain terms, if a composer/musician no longer needed to 
work through his or her ideas on an instrument but could simply ‘think’ it, the 
‘musical thought’ itself would be transformed.  
 
As Derrida writes in his Archive Fever,  
 
[The] technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the 
structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence 
179 
 
and in its relationship to the future. The archivisation produces as much as it 
records the event.
42
 
 
For example, the vast increases in storage capacity granted by computing 
technology does not only affect the way we store the material, enabling us to store 
more and more to the point that nothing at all need be discarded, but this very shift 
in attitudes affects the material itself. Much has been made in the music press over 
the last three decades of the seismic shifts in the production and reception of music 
accompanying changes of media. In the CD era the average length of a recorded 
album became significantly increased due to the CD format allowing for almost 
double the length of a vinyl LP. And now, due to the ubiquity of MP3 players, the 
full-length album itself is threatened, as listening habits incline more and more 
towards individual songs. As a result of the vast data capacities of MP3 players, 
music becomes more disposable and attention spans shorten. Thus the medium 
dictates the content, or, in the name of a recent book by J. Hillis Miller, the medium 
is the maker. All of these media are of course artificial constructs which became 
naturalised over time, but the sheer speed of change over the last twenty years is 
what has focused attention more than ever onto the medium and its effects on the 
material we listen to and the way we listen to it. As Derrida again puts it, 
 
[The] said archival technology no longer determines, will never have 
determined, merely the moment of the conservational recording, but rather 
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the very institution of the archivable event. [… What] is no longer archived 
in the same way is no longer lived in the same way.
43
 
 
Above we raised the question as to whether subsequent technological advances, 
light-years beyond the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’, would have transformed not merely 
Freud’s choice of representational model, indeed not only the development of the 
theory that the model was employed to illustrate, but the very psychical apparatus 
that theory itself systematises. As Derrida asks, 
 
Is the psychic apparatus better represented or is it affected differently by all 
the technical mechanisms for archivisation and for reproduction, for 
prostheses of so-called live memory, for simulacrums of living things which 
already are, and will increasingly be, more refined, complicated, powerful 
than the ‘mystic pad’ (microcomputing, electronisation, computerisation, 
etc.)? 
Neither of these hypotheses can be reduced to the other. Because if 
the upheavals in progress affected the very structures of the psychic 
apparatus, for example in their spatial architecture and in their economy of 
speed, in their processing of spacing and of temporalisation, it would be a 
question no longer of simple continuous progress in representation, in the 
representative value of the model, but rather of an entirely different logic.
44
 
 
Due to the cornucopia of internet enabled portable digital devices, we need no 
longer rely on our fallible memory to the same extent, nor need we use mental 
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arithmetic or know how to spell, since it is all done automatically. So in terms of 
personal organisers for example, using a tablet computer is not merely more 
efficient than writing in a diary or notebook, with added features, but otherwise 
exactly the same in principle. This increased efficiency – practically unlimited 
storage, copy and paste functions, the setting of alarmed reminders, Internet access, 
etc. – actually affects the way our memory operates.45 Similarly, sending an email 
or SMS text message is not simply the same as writing a letter but quicker, 
instantaneous in fact; this would be to ignore the effect that instantaneity has on the 
content of the message, on the way we communicate. As J. Hillis Miller in the 
above-mentioned book puts it, ‘[a] given medium is not the passive carrier of 
information. A medium actively changes what can be said and done by its means.’46 
 
Our very perceptual apparatus, the way we experience time and negotiate space is 
affected by these changes in archival technology. In the case of the former, the 
passage of time has exponentially accelerated such that we become ever more 
intolerant of activities that require our patience. The rate at which digital 
technology is rendered obsolete and radically new capabilities become naturalised 
and commonplace (to the extent that it almost instantly becomes impossible to 
recall how we previously coped without them), has caused the space of a few years 
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to seem more like decades.
47
 In the case of the latter, perhaps the most obvious 
example is the use of satellite navigational systems in mobile devices, allowing us 
to follow on-screen our own progress towards a desired location as if seeing 
ourselves from above. However, these are not necessarily mere superficial, habitual 
changes of thought patterns. According to some cognitive neuroscientists and 
writers, whom Derrida anticipates by more than a decade, new media, and 
overwhelmingly the Internet, is actually in the process of rewiring our neural 
circuitry.
48
 Our brains have an extraordinary plasticity and capacity for adaptation, 
and since the neuronal structure of an illiterate person’s brain is demonstrably 
different from that of someone who can read, it is reasonable to assume that 
changes in patterns of consumption lead to real changes in the parts of the brain that 
process such information, increasing in efficiency while perhaps lowering our 
capacity for extended periods of concentration.
49
 
 
It is yet to be seen what effect, if any, neurotechnologies – where the same 
cognitive functions which previously only think of an action actually produce that 
action, and where our thoughts or phenomenological experiences can be instantly 
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externalised – will have on the functioning of our brain, but to return to a theme we 
discussed earlier, our capacity to carry out reality testing, to distinguish between an 
internal presentation and a real object, is surely compromised. As Freud describes 
it, 
 
The other sort of decision made by the function of judgement – as to the real 
existence of something of which there is a presentation (reality-testing) – is 
a concern of the definitive reality-ego, which develops out of the initial 
pleasure-ego. It is now no longer a question of whether what has been 
perceived (a thing) shall be taken into the ego or not, but of whether 
something which is in the ego as a presentation can be rediscovered in 
perception (reality) as well. It is, we see, once more a question of external 
and internal. What is unreal, merely a presentation and subjective, is only 
internal; what is real is also there outside.
50
 
 
Evidently these distinctions between what is real as opposed to unreal, subjective as 
opposed to objective, and internal as opposed to external, are now more than ever 
problematised and rendered unclear. This is the same question as was addressed in 
the previous chapter under the rubric of possibility (corresponding to thought) and 
actuality (corresponding to material existence), although there we were concerned 
only with whether the blurring of this distinction constituted an overcoming of 
finitude; here it is more a question of the impact it would have on our psyche and 
even the functioning of our brains. What would the physical manifestation of a 
thought do to that thought and the one who bore it? For is not the immediate 
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fulfilment of wishes one of the chief examples Freud gives of the feeling of das 
Unheimliche?
51
 Whenever an unlikely state of affairs that we wish or hope for 
actually comes about we are left with a sense of uneasiness rather than pleasure, as 
if strange, sinister forces are at work. The reason for this, Freud tells us, is that it 
recalls to us our childhood belief, since repudiated, in ‘the omnipotence of 
thoughts’.52 The ‘unrestricted narcissism’53 of this early stage of development, in 
which the reach of our mental processes is greatly overvalued, is subsequently 
displaced by reality. However, once again it appears that the increased potency 
granted to us by these technologies, rather than advancing the human race to some 
higher stage of development, would actually lead to a form of regression – in this 
case to a state of uninhibited primal narcissism. 
 
Furthermore, what bearing would this have on the texture of our reality when ‘[our] 
whole relation to the external world, to reality, depends on our ability to distinguish 
[perceptions from ideas.]?’54 A dream is described by Freud as being, among other 
things, ‘an externalisation of an internal process’,55 so these processes may put at 
risk our ability to distinguish reality from dreaming, or hallucination. There is a 
name for the psychical disorder which leads to precisely this confusion; it is called 
‘amentia’. Amentia is the withdrawal from reality in the face of some loss or 
bereavement which the ego must deny since it finds it insupportable. ‘With this 
turning away from reality, reality-testing is got rid of, the (unrepressed, completely 
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conscious) wishful phantasies are able to press forward into the system, and they 
are there regarded as a better reality.’56 But just as a reversion to the state entirely in 
thrall to the pleasure principle paradoxically spells the end of pleasure, if the 
psychical floodgates are opened not only to such unrepressed intentional fantasies 
as we would consciously wish for, but to unconscious ones as well, those that we 
are not even aware that we hold, we may find this ‘better reality’ becoming more 
like a nightmare. 
 
The Id-Machine 
 
In Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1979 film Stalker there is a prohibited, cordoned off 
landscape called the Zone, in which most of the film’s action takes place, which has 
been affected by some unspecified event or occurrence, possibly a meteorite or 
extraterrestrial visitation, that has left it with strange, miraculous properties. Deep 
within this Zone is a room that is said to grant the deepest wishes of whoever enters 
it. The eponymous Stalker is an otherworldly guide who grants safe passage 
through the hazardous Zone, his two clients for the present trip referred to only as 
‘the writer’ and ‘the professor’. The writer is burned out, plagued by self-doubt and 
desperate to find out what he is really worth as an artist, visiting the Zone in the 
hope of finding inspiration and fulfilment. The professor, as we learn only towards 
the end of the film, has taken with him an explosive device, intending to destroy the 
room, for the greater good of mankind, fearing the outcome if the wrong person 
were to enter there and have their wishes fulfilled. The Stalker himself can never 
enter the room, only facilitate the entrance of others, for the Zone is said to punish 
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those who go there with ulterior motives. As a cautionary tale we are told of a 
previous Stalker named Porcupine who did step inside, leading his brother to his 
death on the way. He was made rich as a result but killed himself shortly after, 
supposedly out of guilt. 
 
Near the end of the film, after their long, perilous expedition has reached its goal, 
both men find that they are unable to carry out what they journeyed there to do. The 
professor dismantles his device and the writer refuses to go inside. The latter refers 
to the story of Porcupine: 
 
Why do you think Porcupine hanged himself? Why didn’t he come here 
again, not for money, but for his brother? In way of repenting. Because he 
realised that not just any wish comes true here, but only your innermost 
wish. Not what you would holler at the top of your voice. Coming true here 
is only what’s in line with your nature, with your essence, of which you 
know nothing. But it’s there, in you, directing you all your life […] It 
wasn’t greed that had done Porcupine in, he was crawling in this puddle, 
begging to bring his brother back. But what he got was only money, and he 
couldn’t get anything else, because render unto Porcupine the things that are 
Porcupine’s! And things like conscience, anguish, they are just inventions. 
He realised that and hanged himself. I’m not going to your room. I have no 
wish to pour my filth over somebody’s head. And then to put my neck into 
the noose, like Porcupine. 
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Having travelled all that way and standing on the threshold of gaining everything 
he ever wanted, the writer is afraid of just what will be revealed to him upon 
entering: what he really desires without knowing it, thus bringing him face to face 
with his ownmost truth. He understands that the Stalker Porcupine killed himself 
not out of guilt but through being unable to bear the knowledge of what was 
revealed to him about himself. Devastated over the death of his brother he would 
have entered the room wishing for him to be resurrected, only to be made 
fabulously rich instead, thus revealing himself to himself in his naked self-interest 
and avarice. Effectively what Porcupine wanted to want was to restore his brother 
to life, but what he truly wanted deep in his innermost psyche was riches. ‘You 
dream of one thing but you get quite another’, the writer says, because we are not 
who we think we are. The distressing conclusion is that we are ultimately selfish 
and callous and although we aspire to such ideals as compassion and conscience, 
we disavow it in our deepest thoughts; thoughts so deep that they are hidden even 
from ourselves. What effect would it have on our lives were we to have to face up 
to these unpalatable tendencies within ourselves, which our conscious self would 
find abhorrent but which is nevertheless ‘there, in you, directing you all your life’? 
 
In Freud’s Fragment of a Case of Hysteria, his young patient Dora is revealed to 
harbour powerful unconscious erotic feelings for her father’s friend Herr K. but on 
the occasions when he makes sexual advances towards her she reacts violently and 
runs away. Why, Freud asks, would she fiercely reject that which she longs for the 
most? ‘Neurotics are dominated by the opposition between reality and phantasy. If 
what they long for the most intensely in their phantasies is presented to them in 
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reality they none the less flee from it.’57 (But as Freud says frequently, what goes 
for the neurotic goes for the healthy psyche as well; indeed ‘we are all ill’,58 it is 
just a matter of degrees of intensity.) So that which we most desire is hidden from 
us, repressed, because we are simultaneously repelled by it, and its direct 
assumption would reveal too much about ourselves that we would prefer to keep 
hidden. Freud elsewhere states that we cannot subsist on reality alone and must rely 
also on ‘auxiliary constructions’.59 Fantasy supplements reality, in the process 
becoming so woven into its fabric that it is inextricable from it. To put the same 
point in Lacanian terms, fantasy structures our relation to reality, but we never have 
access to those fantasies for that very reason; doing so would tear the fabric of the 
reality that we have constructed. For Lacan it is not the case that we weave 
fantasies in order to escape from ‘harsh reality’, rather it is reality that allows us to 
escape the traumatic real of our deepest fantasies.
60
 
 
To take a very familiar example by way of illustration, there are a number of free 
association psychological tests that aim to detect suppressed racial prejudice in the 
participants, even in those who consciously would find such thoughts repugnant; 
but the methodology of such tests can easily be queried and their results can hardly 
be said to be definitive. We could challenge the approach of such a ‘one size fits 
all’ psychological test much as we would criticize the inherent flaws in an I.Q. test 
and quite comfortably refuse to accept the verdict if it presents us with something 
disagreeable. However, it would be much harder to quarrel with the results of a 
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specifically targeted brain scan. In a much-discussed study, the results of which 
were published in the journal Nature Neuroscience in late 2003,
61
 scientists 
purported to identify subjects harbouring racial prejudice based on surges of neural 
activity in certain regions of the brain when looking at images of black faces. As 
with many such studies, the scientific community is not unanimous, and some have 
questioned the interpretation put on the results, but if we were just to take the 
principle of the research and accept that there were notionally a way of immediately 
and accurately identifying prejudicial attitudes through the activity of the brain, 
there would surely be no way for the subject to argue with the outcome. Matters 
become rather more categorical when we are dealing with objective neural 
processes, and no amount of insistence on the basis of having friends who are black 
would change the results. This would be the real of one’s own attitudes towards 
racial difference. 
 
Presuming that the subject was genuinely unaware that such attitudes were 
unconsciously harboured, this knowledge could not fail but have a profound effect 
on one’s sense of self and one’s intersubjective relations with people from different 
ethnic groups. But how are we to categorise these hidden, unconscious attitudes 
which we hold even against our better judgement and principles? It could not, 
strictly speaking, be called subjective, as in how something appears to the subject 
independently of how they really are, since the point is precisely that they do not 
appear to the subject this way, at least not knowingly. Even less is it objective, for it 
tells us nothing about how African-Caribbean people ‘really’ are independently of 
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the knowing subject. Rather, they belong to ‘that bizarre category’ that Žižek, 
borrowing a phrase from Daniel Dennett, calls ‘objectively subjective’: 
 
When, for example, we claim that someone who is consciously well-
disposed towards Jews nonetheless harbours profound anti-Semitic 
prejudices of which he is not consciously aware, are we not claiming that 
(insofar as these prejudices do not reflect the way Jews really are, but the 
way they appear to him) he is not aware of how Jews really seem to him? 
Or, to put the same paradox in a different way, the fundamental fantasy is 
constitutive of (our approach to) reality […] yet for that very reason, its 
direct assuming or actualisation cannot fail to give rise to catastrophic 
consequences […] As the common wisdom puts it, a nightmare is a dream 
come true.
62
 
 
So the rupture brought about by the brain sciences delving into the neuronal activity 
behind the scenes of our conscious behaviour not only pertains to the standard 
materialist one between how things appear to us and how they ‘really are’ (what is 
known as the ‘explanatory gap’ – the impossibility of reconciling the phenomenal 
world with that described by physics.) It also relates to the even more radical, 
uncanny schism between the way things seem to appear to me and ‘the way things 
“truly seem to me”, although I never actually experience them in this way’.63 For in 
the face of an eliminative materialism that purports to explain and demystify such 
‘ineffable’ qualities as love or happiness, even consciousness itself, by showing the 
biochemical or neuronal processes responsible for them, I can always cling to my 
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subjective experience of it. The standard criticism of scientifico-philosophical 
attempts at providing a full account of consciousness is that the ‘third-person’ 
perspective of science can never account for or get to grips with my ‘first-person’ 
conscious experience. As a result it is never truly viewed as a threat to this 
experience, because no matter how much knowledge we acquire about the brain it 
can in no way be incorporated into our understanding of ourselves or subjectivised. 
 
So in finding refuge against materialism in the realm of intimate subjective 
experience, we hold fast to the truth of what we feel as opposed to what we are told 
about the unknown neurobiological processes governing our behaviour. This latter 
has no more of an impact on how we experience ourselves than the knowledge that 
colour is ‘really’ electromagnetic radiation affects how we view a Mark Rothko 
painting. Even the strictest materialist, who denies the existence of consciousness 
as we know and understand it, nevertheless disavows this attitude in her everyday 
self-relating activity. So although in her work the philosopher may tirelessly 
endeavour to exorcise the spectre of the ‘Cartesian theatre’ (in Daniel Dennett’s 
well-known phrase), unbeknownst to her perhaps that is precisely how 
consciousness really seems to her and must seem to her when she is not thinking 
about it and just going about her normal life. Similarly, many Christians believe 
that even the most militant atheist does not, could not, really believe that the soul 
will not persist after death, even if he thinks he does; in his everyday activity he 
betrays his unconscious fantasmatic belief that death is not really the end.
 64
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Thus what is at stake here is more radical because it specifically does threaten our 
fundamental subjective experience or sense of self. Once again, it is not simply a 
question of uncovering the objective chemical processes and physical structures 
lying behind what we experience, but rather one of revealing what we really think, 
see, experience as opposed to what we think we think, see, experience. Hence our 
sense of who we are, our feelings for and about our loved ones, our opinions and 
tastes are put in doubt. Indeed this is precisely what is at stake in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, according to Žižek, in which ‘I am deprived of even my most 
intimate “subjective” experience, the way things “really seem to me,” that of the 
fundamental fantasy that constitutes and guarantees the kernel of my being, since I 
can never consciously experience it and assume it.’65 This, for Žižek, is the status of 
the Freudian unconscious: the paradoxical notion of an ‘inaccessible phenomenon, 
not the objective mechanism which regulates my phenomenal experience’.66 This 
decentring ‘opens up a new domain of weird “asubjective phenomena,” of 
appearances with no subject to whom they can appear: it is only here that the 
subject is “no longer a master in his own house” – in the house of his (self-) 
appearances themselves.’67 
 
The prospect we are faced with as cognitive imaging technologies develop is that of 
the real-world existence of what Žižek calls the Id-Machine,68 a familiar science-
fiction device involving an alien intelligence or technology that gives substantial 
reality to our deepest unacknowledged desires and fantasies. Perhaps the finest 
                                                 
65
 Ibid., p. 157. 
66
 Ibid., p. 158. 
67
 Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 172. 
68
 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999) p. 
301. 
193 
 
example of this in cinema is Tarkovsky’s earlier science-fiction film, Solaris 
(1972), which takes place almost entirely on a space-station orbiting the planet of 
the film’s title. Due to the strange powers that the planet exercises over the crew 
members, their inner thoughts, desires and wishes are materialised as solid entities. 
However, rather than bringing them joy or happiness, there is something horrifying 
and monstrous about these apparitions, sending all of the crew into emotional 
crises. In the case of the main character, a psychologist, his dead wife appears, 
manifesting his guilt-feelings over her suicide. Another filmic example of the Id-
Machine, referred to by Žižek, appears in the 1997 Hollywood film Sphere, 
directed by Barry Levinson. It follows a group of scientists after the discovery of an 
enormous spaceship a thousand feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean, 
containing a mysterious, perfectly formed metal sphere that can reach into one’s 
mind and manifest all one’s worst fears and nightmares. As Žižek puts it, ‘the 
Sphere is nothing in itself – a pure medium, a perfect mirror that does not 
mirror/materialise reality but only the real of the subject’s fundamental fantasies.’69 
 
According to Žižek, there is a fundamental irreconcilability between our true desire 
and its articulation in a definite demand or plea, and so that which we truly desire is 
never actually announced in the explicit wish we were able to express. 
Consequently ‘we never truly desire what we wish for or will – for that reason, 
there is nothing more horrible – more undesirable, precisely – than a Thing that 
inexorably actualises our true desire.’70 As the Writer describes it in Stalker, this 
innermost desire or wish is ‘not what you would holler at the top of your voice’ but 
what would actually make you recoil with horror if it were presented to you. To use 
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a rather well-worn example, it is like Dorian Gray confronting his hideously aged, 
decayed picture in the attic, like a mirror that reflects the truth of ourselves as 
opposed to who we like to think we are. But we would fail to recognise ourselves in 
this distorted reflection: 
 
Communication with the Thing [that otherness within ourselves that is 
ourselves] thus fails not because it is too alien, the harbinger of an Intellect 
infinitely surpassing our limited abilities, playing some perverse games with 
us whose rationale remains forever outside our grasp, but because it brings 
us too close to what, in ourselves, must remain at a distance if we are to 
sustain the consistency of our symbolic universe.
71
 
 
The recognition or incorporation of this unbearable Thing could only come at the 
expense of our psychic well-being, our sense of who we are. 
 
We must be careful, however, not to fall into the trap of suggesting that such 
repressed desires, tendencies and instincts that form the underside to consciousness 
constitute one’s ‘true self’ as of the properties of some enduring essence – who we 
secretly are. If, to return to the earlier example, one was revealed by fMRI brain 
scan to bear hidden racial prejudices, this does not negate the efforts of what for 
simplicity’s sake might be called one’s ‘moral self’ to restrain and inhibit such 
feelings. Instincts or urges become repressed when there is a conflict of interest 
with other instincts, such that its satisfaction would ‘cause pleasure in one place and 
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unpleasure in another.’72 What Freud calls primal repression is the first phase, 
‘which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being 
denied entrance into the conscious.’73 This establishes a fixation, and the repressed 
ideational content ‘persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains 
attached to it.’74 The second phase of repression affects all those processes and 
trains of thought that derive from or have developed an association with the object 
of this primal repression. In describing this process Freud’s prose seems 
deliberately to flirt with the gothic imagery of novels such as Wilde’s, for the 
primally repressed instinct is said to develop... 
 
with less interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by repression 
from conscious influence. It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on 
extreme forms of expression, which when they are translated and presented 
to the neurotic are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by 
giving him the picture of an extraordinary and dangerous strength of 
instinct. This deceptive strength of instinct is the result of an uninhibited 
development in phantasy and of the damming-up consequent on frustrated 
satisfaction.
75
 
 
While it is seemingly safely hidden away, and as far as our conscious self is 
concerned has been dealt with and forgotten, it continues to grow in strength in the 
unconscious, drawing more and more thoughts and associations into its orbit. These 
can be violent sexual urges or hostile or libidinous feelings towards loved ones and 
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parents, or other unpalatable emotions or desires. The systems set up to disguise 
and protect us from these repressed thoughts conspire to make them seem doubly 
alien to us, for as a result of this repression those hostile feelings can be turned 
around into compensatory feelings of love and devotion. So it can sometimes be the 
case that those we love or care for the most, for that very reason, are those towards 
whom we harbour the strongest feelings of hostility. While unsavoury revelations 
such as these are the central currency of psychoanalysis, it could be said that those 
who enter into analysis already feel some psychical conflict, and all the work of the 
analyst in overcoming resistance prepares them for what will be disclosed. The Id-
Machine, however, would catch us unawares and unprepared, lacking the necessary 
tools to come to terms with it. 
 
The difference, Freud suggests, between an unconscious and a conscious 
presentation is not that they are registered in different areas of the psyche, or 
different neural regions of the brain. Rather, it is that… 
 
the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the 
presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation 
is the presentation of the thing alone. The system Ucs. [Unconscious] 
contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-cathexes; 
the system Pcs. [Preconscious] comes about by this thing-presentation being 
hypercathected through being linked with the word-presentations 
corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring 
about a higher psychical organisation and make it possible for the primary 
process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the 
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Pcs. Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that 
repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neuroses: 
what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall 
remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or 
a psychical act which is not hypercathected, remains thereafter in the Ucs. in 
state of repression.
76
 
 
It is these word-presentations that bring under control and domesticate unbearable 
thing-presentations, keeping them at a safe distance. As the totalitarian regime in 
Orwell’s 1984 understood, when the word is withdrawn from a concept, we cannot 
think it. In cognitive science terms, it is generally thought to be the left hemisphere 
(LH) of the brain that is responsible for language functions – the right hemisphere 
(RH) can receive and act on information, but it takes LH to provide a conscious 
explanation of it. In split-brain patients, where the left and right hemispheres of the 
patient’s brain have been severed from each other so that there is no 
communication between them, if information is given only to RH (through the left 
ear), for example ‘raise your arm’, the patient will carry it out but will not 
consciously know why, much like in hypnosis. If the patient’s LH is then asked 
why he has done this he will invent an excuse to explain it, as much to himself as to 
the questioner: ‘I was just… stretching my arm.’77 Language thus makes sense of 
the world and of our own thoughts and actions, structuring our reality. 
 
Unconscious processes never rise directly into consciousness; they are always 
mediated by the preconscious interposition of word-presentations. The work of 
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psychoanalysis purports to aid the activity of the preconscious by supplying 
intermediate links. Neuroimaging technologies, however, would possibly have the 
capability to summon up – directly – the unpresentable Thing itself, immediately 
presenting it like the Sphere or the sentient ocean on Solaris. Faced with this 
primally repressed presentation, but without either the work of analysis to prepare 
us for it or the word-presentations which have been denied it, we would lack the 
framework with which to understand and integrate it into our symbolic matrix. As 
Žižek suggests, it would potentially shatter our fantasmatic consistency – the 
narrative fictions we implicitly construct for ourselves in order to regulate our 
reality and to understand and keep in check our experiences and feelings, keeping at 
bay overly powerful stimuli. Žižek reads the attacking of the birds in the Hitchcock 
film as such a tear in the fabric of reality due to overly intense maternal incestuous 
energy.
78
 The birds themselves are a symptom, materialisations of the mother’s 
overbearing love for her son, Mitch, and her rage at the disturbance of their family 
unit by the arrival in the town of Melanie, Mitch’s love interest. The symptom is 
always an unwelcome intrusion, caused by overly strong libidinal cathexis that can 
find no other outlet since its discharge has been blocked by the preconscious 
censor. So it is a substitute satisfaction, experienced as suffering, which alerts the 
ego to the presence of overly charged repressed contents. The Id-Machine would 
present us with mechanical symptomatic manifestations, but rather than a surrogate 
satisfaction, which still conceals that which it announces, it would perhaps bring to 
light the repressed material itself. 
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The Timeless Unconscious 
 
Due to the withdrawal of language from unconscious processes, the latter are not 
only unpresentable but also on principle unknowable, since it is only through 
translation into consciousness, and consequent connection to word-presentations, 
that we can know them. And of course, as soon as it undergoes this transition and 
becomes known to our conscious self it is no longer what it was when it was 
unconscious (no longer carrying the same force or meaning.) Thus, like the 
Epicurean adage about the paradox of death, we will only be in a position to know 
it when we are no longer in a position to know it. Consciousness is for Freud a 
‘sense-organ for the perception of psychical qualities’,79 and as in Kant’s system 
sensible intuition is constitutively incapable of acquainting us with things as they 
are in themselves, so for Freud this applies also to internal perception: 
 
Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are 
subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is 
perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate 
perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental 
processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not 
necessarily in reality what it appears to be.
80
 
 
Freud elsewhere calls the ego a ‘frontier-creature’, whose role is ‘to mediate 
between the world and the id, to make the id pliable to the world and, by means of 
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its muscular activity, to make the world fall in line with the wishes of the id.’81 So 
this frontier is effectively the limit point between two unknowables;
82
 but this is 
also the case for the trans-phenomenal I of pure apperception. The difference 
between internal and external for Kant is merely the difference between two ways 
of appearing: one of which we call inner sense, the other outer sense. Beyond this 
we can say nothing at all about what mind or matter may be in themselves and 
whether they are irreconcilable substances or two aspects of one substance as in 
Spinoza. So although this psychoanalytic finding is presented as an original 
contribution and an expansion on the Kantian system it still seems in truth to be 
within that system it purports to supplement. 
 
Where Freud does in fact depart from Kant is in his somewhat puzzling assertion 
that the unconscious, like the thing in itself, is not only unknowable but is also 
timeless. References to this timelessness, that Freud calls ‘a subject which would 
merit the most exhaustive treatment’83 are scattered across his works, but without 
ever being given this exhaustive treatment it apparently demands. The earliest 
explicit reference occurs in 1901, in a footnote to the Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life: 
 
When traces of memory are repressed they can be shown to have undergone 
no change over quite a long period. The unconscious is timeless anyway. 
The outstanding and most surprising character of psychic fixation is that all 
impressions are retained just as they were absorbed, and moreover are 
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retained in all the forms they assumed in further developments, a 
relationship which cannot be explained by any comparison from another 
sphere. According to this theory, therefore, every earlier stage of any 
material contained in the memory would be available for recollection, even 
if its elements have all long since changed their original connotations for 
later ones.
84
 
 
At this early stage it is essentially an expansion upon the thesis of the 
indestructibility of psychical traces that Freud announced one year earlier in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, and which we touched upon above. There the 
unconscious effectively acts as a cryogenic vault, preserving and sustaining 
impressions, so that ‘a humiliation that was experienced thirty years ago acts 
exactly like a fresh one’.85 Rather than the problematic term ‘timeless’, a better 
word would perhaps be ‘ageless’, meaning the passage of time will neither erode 
nor alter the impressions. However here there is a significant addition: it is not only 
the original impression and the emotions that accompanied it that are retained but 
‘all the forms they assumed in further developments’. So every subsequent 
recollection of this humiliation, along with every new association or retroactive 
alteration that it later underwent is preserved alongside it, such that we can no 
longer speak of an ‘original’ impression. 
 
Another significant reference occurs in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, nineteen 
years after The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, where Freud elucidates the 
                                                 
84
 The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, trans. Anthea Bell (London: Penguin, 2002) p. 265n. 
85
 Interpretation of Dreams, p. 578. 
202 
 
thesis slightly, apologising for the obscurity of his remarks, but once again 
declining to explicate further: 
 
As a result of certain psychoanalytic discoveries, we are today in a position 
to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are 
‘necessary forms of thought’. We have learnt that unconscious mental 
processes are in themselves ‘timeless’. This means in the first place that 
they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way 
and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them. These are negative 
characteristics which can only be clearly understood if a comparison is 
made with conscious mental processes. On the other hand, our abstract idea 
of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the 
system Pcpt.-Cs. And to correspond to a perception on its own part of that 
method of working. This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute 
another way of providing a shield against stimuli. I know that these remarks 
must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints.
86
 
 
So, as is touched upon here and later expanded upon slightly in the ‘Note Upon the 
“Mystic Writing-Pad”’, time, as we commonly know it, is a product of the 
perceptual system; it is a result of the periodic sending forth and withdrawal of 
cathectic innervations, likened by Freud to a sending out of ‘feelers’ towards the 
external world which withdraw as soon as they have felt or tasted the excitations 
that are there. As soon as this cathexis withdraws, consciousness withdraws along 
with it. The periodic fluctuations in the current of innervations, akin to a continuous 
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writing and raising of the sheet on the Mystic Pad, is, according to Freud, the origin 
of our concept of time and temporal succession. However, what does Freud mean 
by suggesting that time itself acts as a further shield against stimuli? In The Ego 
and the Id the process of temporalisation is said to coincide with reality testing, so 
bestowing a temporal order upon an internal perception belongs to the same 
perceptual function as the assessment as to whether or not it is real.
87
 Thus at the 
same time as we check whether a psychical image corresponds with objective 
reality we also assign it a place in time: if it no longer confronts us from the 
outside, it therefore belongs to the past and we can perhaps distance ourselves from 
it. Freud addresses this process by which we consign impressions to the past in 
‘The Dissection of the Psychical Personality’ from the New Introductory Lectures 
on Psychoanalysis, where he gives perhaps his most extensive treatment of the 
subject of timelessness, but once again accompanied by the regret that ‘too little 
theoretical use’ has been made of it: 
 
[We] perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem that 
space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts. There is nothing in 
the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the 
passage of time, and – a thing that is most remarkable and awaits 
consideration in philosophical thought – no alteration in its mental processes 
is produced by the passage of time. Wishful impulses which have never 
passed beyond the id, but impressions too, which have been sunk into the id 
by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they 
behave as though they have just occurred. They can only be recognised as 
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belonging to the past, can only lose their importance and be deprived of 
their cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious by the work 
of analysis[...] Again and again I have had the impression that we have 
made too little theoretical use of this fact[.]
88
 
 
So it is only by determining something as past – whether this be an impression or a 
wishful fantasy that has been registered but never acted upon – that it can be 
defused and its impact softened; otherwise it will continue to insist itself upon us. 
This corresponds with very interesting experimental clinical treatments for sufferers 
of post-traumatic stress disorder. In such cases the psychical imprint of a distressful 
event was so strong that the memory refuses to fade as time goes on, remaining 
exactly as potent as on the day it occurred. The treatment consists, over a course of 
weeks, of the patient being medicated with beta-blockers while mentally reliving 
the traumatic event. The drugs inhibit proteins in the connections between brain 
cells which reinforce the memory trace as it is recalled, inducing a toning down of 
the emotional colouring of the memory so that it is not forgotten altogether but 
allowed to become less intense, effectively consigning it to the past rather than 
constantly living it in the present.
89
 In Freud’s terms this deprives the memory of its 
cathexis of energy, but the result is chemically induced rather than analytically. 
This ability to edit our own past experiences, like an early prototype of the 
memory-erasing agency in Charlie Kaufman and Michel Gondry’s Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), is yet another example of the brain sciences’ 
increasing resemblance to science fiction. 
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Both of the last two cited passages begin with a reference to Kant and the 
psychoanalytic discovery of an exception to the a priori conditions of sensibility, 
but is this really an exception to Kant’s system and not rather a strange addition? 
Freud misrepresents Kant slightly in stating that time is a necessary form, first of 
‘thought’ and then of our ‘mental acts’. Rather, as we saw previously, time, for 
Kant, is the pure form of inner intuition and the condition of all that appears to us. 
For anything at all to appear, whether that be an external object or an internal 
process, it must take place upon this horizon. Furthermore we have just seen how 
Freud himself insists that as soon as the unconscious traces are made conscious 
they are assigned a place in time, for in order for us actually to perceive these 
processes they must be placed in some form of personal chronology. So for Freud 
too perception necessarily takes place under temporal conditions. And what is 
more, he also seems close to Kant in his assertion that time is a projection of the 
mental apparatus onto the things we perceive. Freud’s addition is that psychical 
processes that are not being perceived are still active in the mind, and that time has 
no jurisdiction over them. We can have no possible notion of what form they may 
take while existing in this lawless, atemporal state because as soon as we are able to 
think them they are wrested out of it. Furthermore, all forms of description must 
rely on the notion of simultaneity, which itself is of course a temporal modality. 
 
Where Freud further differs from Kant is that the activity of the perceptual 
apparatus is responsible not for time as such (transcendental ideality), but for our 
abstract idea of time, no doubt what Heidegger would call the vulgar concept of 
time: the calculation of divisible moments of some abstract time ‘in which’ events 
take place according to the linear succession of past – present – future, and centred 
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around the primacy of the now. In this sense perhaps as Derrida suggests we should 
read Freud the way Heidegger read Kant, and that ‘the unconscious is no doubt 
timeless only from a certain vulgar conception of time.’90 On such a reading the 
unconscious would not be outside of time, but rather outside of what Heidegger 
calls ‘within-time-ness’. Derrida proposes that the question surrounding this 
supposed timelessness of the unconscious should be posed in relation to the 
aforementioned malleability of mnemic traces, exemplified by the potential for a 
previously innocuous event to take on traumatic proportions some years later. 
Because what we think of as ‘the past’ is not set, hard-coded into our psychic 
apparatus but forever being produced, altered and rewritten the time sequence is 
infinitely fluid and flexible. It would therefore be a mistake, based on metaphysical 
presumptions, to ask in what form such ‘timeless’ traces exist when they are outside 
consciousness.
91
 
 
So Freud’s thesis of the timelessness of the unconscious should perhaps not be seen 
as an exception to Kant’s transcendental conditions of experience, and certainly not 
the site of something like an overcoming of the finite limits of subjectivity. For one 
thing Freud often insists that, like in Kant’s account of the productive imagination, 
all the material that makes up the ‘contents’ of the unconscious is derived from 
experience, and so, in the eyes of a Kantian, still can be traced back to a sense 
impression which was subject to the transcendental conditions. This reliance on 
receptivity is precisely the impasse of finitude that we repeatedly encountered 
previously. However, in his later work Freud seems to violate this rule as he comes 
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to hold the view that traces remain in our psyche which cannot have been derived 
from a personal memory but are rather archaic vestiges which have expressed 
themselves in fantasy: 
 
I believe these primal fantasies, as I should like to call them […] are a 
phylogenetic endowment. In them the individual reaches beyond his own 
experience into primeval experience at points where his own experience has 
been too rudimentary. It seems to me quite possible that all the things that 
are told to us today in analysis as phantasy – the seduction of children, the 
inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental intercourse, the threat 
of castration (or rather castration itself) – were once real occurrences in the 
primeval times of the human family, and that children in their phantasies are 
simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth.
92
 
 
This notion of psychic inheritance complicates matters somewhat, suggesting that 
in addition to the ‘timeless’ store of individual memories the unconscious also 
contains fantasmatic enactments of primordial experiences. So one’s genetic 
memory stretches back far beyond the period of one’s own life and the psyche is 
not the tabula rasa that we had assumed it to be. This would be a pre-personal 
experience that must by nature be distributed across all psyches since we all share 
the same ancestry. These ‘primal fantasies’ that Freud is compelled to assume, as 
he himself admits,
93
 bear a striking, somewhat surprising, resemblance to the theory 
of the archetypes of the collective unconscious as propounded by Freud’s most 
famous disciple turned apostate Carl Gustav Jung. 
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The existence of a faculty of innate primordial images in every individual is a 
necessary presupposition, according to Jung, in order to account for the recurrence 
of myths, legends and religious symbolism in practically identical forms all over 
the world and throughout history. So when such images and symbols appear in 
fantasies and dreams we are no longer dealing with personal memories or 
experiences but with ‘the deeper layer of the unconscious where the primordial 
images common to humanity lie sleeping.’94 These ideas, motifs or symbols are 
given the name archetypes and this ‘deeper layer’ of the psyche is what Jung calls 
the collective unconscious. Jung thus distinguishes between the personal 
unconscious, which may indeed correspond to the Freudian (or Adlerian) 
descriptions, containing forgotten or repressed memories, traumas, fantasies and 
impulses which are unique to each subject, and the impersonal or transpersonal 
unconscious which is ‘detached from anything personal and is entirely universal’ 
and its ‘contents can be found everywhere’.95 This universal psychical substrate 
contains ‘not only the residues of archaic, specifically human modes of functioning, 
but also the residues of functions from man’s animal ancestry, whose duration in 
time was infinitely greater than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human 
existence.’96 In which case our psychical archive is akin to geological 
sedimentation, and upon excavating our cognitive activity we could perhaps be 
uncovering a treasure trove of ideas, memories and behavioural patterns stretching 
back millennia. 
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So here we are faced with a model of the mind which, in contradistinction to that of 
Kant, seems to be made up of contents which transcend one’s own personal 
experiences, presenting us with the possibility of a form of true spontaneous 
creation which is not solely reliant upon sensibly given data: 
 
Every creative man knows that spontaneity is the very essence of creative 
thought. Because the unconscious is not just a reactive mirror-reflection, but 
an independent, productive activity, its realm of experience is a self-
contained world, having its own reality, of which we can say that it affects 
us as we affect it – precisely what we say about our experience of the 
external world.
97
 
 
This appears to be a more romanticist account of creativity, with the artist as 
visionary, tapped into an eternal, universal truth and able to present it for us all to 
see and experience. Because this psychic substrate is common to the whole of 
humanity, sensitive viewers of the work immediately recognise it as if it offered 
some truth about themselves. 
 
Jung sees the unconscious as essentially compensatory, developing as 
counterbalance to the ego out of neglected aspects of one’s own personality. If, for 
example, we are excessively rational in our day to day lives, neglecting the 
irrational, passionate side of ourselves, this latter will not be quashed and 
conquered but will proliferate, becoming more and more autonomous the more it is 
neglected, leading to an imbalanced psyche which will eventually reach an impasse. 
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It is at these moments, Jung says, that archetypal images most commonly force 
themselves upon the subject, offering a potential line of advance or release that she 
would never have conceived consciously. The first archetype to be encountered in 
every case is that which Jung calls the ‘shadow’. This is how the other side to one’s 
conscious self appears at first sight: dark, menacing and mysterious. It is only after 
a reckoning with this threshold figure that one passes on to further, deeper-lying 
archetypal experiences, although the specific nature of which – anima/animus, the 
wise old man, the trickster, etc. – need not concern us here. An encounter with the 
collective psyche is, says Jung, responsible for every variety of religious or spiritual 
conversion or vision, as well as abrupt mid-life changes of career or lifestyle. The 
archetypes are specially charged with psychic energy and their emergence in 
consciousness brings with it an overwhelming numinous affective resonance, 
inhibiting all other contents of consciousness. Initially, says Jung, 
 
[This] always feels like the end of the world, as though everything had 
tumbled back into original chaos. One feels delivered up, disoriented, like a 
rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. So at least it 
seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective 
unconscious, which now takes over the leadership.
98
 
 
Not every such encounter leads to this rewarding recalibration of one’s life, 
however. In some cases it leads to a ruinous collapse and there is no way back to 
one’s prior stability. Such events would perhaps be called a nervous breakdown or 
mid life crisis. 
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Nevertheless, in spite of its potential dangers it is only after a reckoning with the 
collective unconscious that we approach wholeness or ‘come to selfhood’, for the 
‘self’ in Jung’s terminology is the outcome of a struggle or an ongoing dialogue, 
not a given. What we are as a ‘self’ is superordinate to the conscious ego and it... 
 
transcends our powers of imagination to form a clear picture of [it], for in 
this operation the part would have to comprehend the whole. There is little 
hope of our ever being able to reach even approximate consciousness of the 
self, since however much we may make conscious there will always exist an 
indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious material which 
belongs to the totality of the self.
99
 
 
So in itself and in principle, the self is total and complete, but we will never 
consciously attain to this whole, since it infinitely exceeds our powers of reaching 
it. 
 
This, then, could be said to be the nub of the subtle but crucial difference between 
the Freudian and Jungian models of the psyche, aside from more readily apparent 
factors such as the former’s emphasis on the Oedipus complex and the latter’s on 
the archetypes. We saw how on Derrida’s reading the Freudian unconscious can 
never be exhausted because it is that which forever escapes our attempts at self-
mastery, dividing one from oneself and precluding immediate presence to self. For 
Jung on the other hand the unconscious will never be exhausted because it carries 
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within it unfathomable depths which are essentially beyond our comprehension. So 
while with Freud the subject is barred from wholeness because of an irreducible 
subtraction or fissure, for Jung we are likewise denied wholeness because of an 
inexhaustible excess or overflow. Perhaps this would be the difference between a 
finite and an infinite model of the psyche. 
 
We can obviously see from all of this that Jung would give a very different answer 
from Freud to the question of the ‘oceanic’. Instead of being a remnant and 
intimation of the all-encompassing ego of early childhood this feeling of 
limitlessness would instead be the result of an encounter with the collective 
unconscious and an experience of the exponential surplus of the self over the ego. 
Everyone, no matter how well they know themselves, is capable of wider 
consciousness, since ‘it is highly probable that we are still a long way from the 
summit of absolute consciousness.’100 The Hegelian flavour of this latter passage is 
clear, but the sentiment is actually rather more Kantian, for Jung elsewhere says 
that ‘no mortal mind can plumb the depths’ of the collective unconscious. The most 
we can do is proceed according to ‘the hypothetical “as if”’,101 which is an 
unmistakably Kantian formulation: an infinite striving towards a regulative ideal we 
know to be unattainable, nevertheless proceeding as if the sequence was complete 
in itself.  
 
In spite of occasional terminological inconsistencies, which can lead to confusion, 
Jung draws a clear and unequivocal distinction between the archetypal ideas and 
the archetypes themselves, a distinction in fact corresponding very closely to the 
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Kantian division between phenomena and noumena. The term archetype applies 
exclusively to ‘those psychic contents which have not yet been submitted to 
conscious elaboration and are therefore an immediate datum of psychic 
experience.’102 The archetypes stricto sensu are hypothetical and irrepresentable 
and we must only assume their existence from their effects and the way they are 
expressed in fantasmatic forms. Therefore the name archetype does not designate 
the myths, fables, fairytales or religious stories that are their conscious derivatives, 
and which already bear the trace of critical evaluation and distance. Nor does it 
refer to their ‘immediate manifestation, as we encounter it in dreams and visions’, 
which ‘is much more individual, less understandable and more naïve than in 
myths’.103 Their appearance in dreams, hallucinations or fantasy is a truer 
representation than in myths and religious stories, which have become hardened 
into dogma over time, but they are still manifestations, and as such not the 
archetypes themselves. ‘The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is 
altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from 
the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear.’104 The archetypes in 
themselves are the same in every subject but the form or manner in which they 
appear is constituted and shaped by the personal history and circumstances of the 
subject, although generally proceeding according to familiar patterns. 
 
There is thus a clear, although implicit, correspondence between the archetypes and 
the Kantian rational ideas, which govern our moral behaviour. As we saw in our 
previous chapter, these ideas of reason are not subject to temporal conditions, but 
are fixed and unchanging; all that is variable are the particular circumstances in 
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which they make their appearance. They determine our actions only indirectly, via 
the categorical imperative, since immediate, direct access is constitutively denied to 
us. Likewise, the archetypes are timeless, inborn and sensuously unconditioned, 
however unlike the ideas of reason they are dynamic rather than fixed and non-
rational. However, just as we have practical but not theoretical proof of freedom 
and the other supersensible ideas, so we have pragmatic proof of the archetypes 
without our being able to encounter them directly. Indeed were we to do so the 
consequences would no doubt be as catastrophic for our psyche as immediate 
access to the noumenal dimension was said to be. Gazing straight into this abyss 
would overwhelm and engulf our individual ego, obliterating us as a result. 
 
Perhaps an even closer Kantian parallel is with the early parodical work Dreams of 
a Spirit-Seer, in which Kant allows himself, in an ironic fashion, to speculate upon 
that which is beyond the bounds of human experience and knowledge. Here, 
through a satirical reading of the work of Swedish mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg 
(more of whom later), Kant posits in addition to the material world an immaterial, 
or spirit world, which is a whole self-subsisting realm, ‘its parts in mutual 
conjunction and intercourse without the instrumentality of anything corporeal.’105 
The human soul is said to be conjoined in the two worlds at the same time, but so 
long as it is incarnated in a body it only clearly perceives the material world, having 
but a hazy intimation of the other side. As soon as the material body dies this link 
between the two territories is severed but the soul continues to exist in the spirit 
realm, unencumbered by materiality.  
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This spirit world bears an obvious resemblance to the collective unconscious, which 
we likewise inhabit alongside our personal psyche without being clearly aware of it. 
Furthermore, Kant (still in a satirical register) suggests that there can be 
communion between the two worlds and spiritual ideas can...  
 
pass over into the personal consciousness of man, indeed, not immediately, 
but still in such a way that, according to the law of the association of ideas, 
they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake analogous 
ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions 
themselves, but yet their symbols.
106
  
 
What else is the archetypal idea other than a mediated, ‘analogous idea of the 
senses’ that acts as a symbol for the archetype itself? 
 
We can now perhaps see that Jung’s account of the artistic imagination, above, is 
closer to Kant’s than it initially seemed. For, since these archetypes cannot be 
presented immediately by the artist but only indirectly evoked, this corresponds 
very closely with the Kantian model of aesthetic ideas, which allow the imagination 
to transgress the limits of all possible experience and present what it finds within a 
sensuous form. They evoke something universal and absolute, while manifesting it 
in an original and singular expression. Perhaps, then, between an archetypal idea 
and an aesthetic idea there is not such a disparity. 
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Not only is the collective unconscious ‘the repository of man’s experience’ but ‘at 
the same time the prior condition of this experience’.107 So archetypes are not 
merely the effect and deposits of ancestral events but at the same time they are 
significant determinants of such events. They are therefore both cause and effect, 
the snake eating its own tail. As we mentioned above, the constellating of 
archetypal ideas in the unconscious takes place as compensation for neglected parts 
of the subject’s psyche, so that when they build up an irresistible force they impose 
themselves on the life of the subject, forcing them in a certain direction so as to 
reorient their psychic balance. ‘Perhaps – who knows? – these eternal images are 
what we mean by fate.’108 
 
However, if no mortal mind can communicate with the archetypes immediately, 
could they hypothetically be accessed by computational neuroimaging 
technologies? Could we conceivably uncover these archetypal traces in their real, 
untouched form, bypassing the individual colouring given to them by the particular 
subject, and in doing so access an absolute truth? But as Jung repeatedly insists in 
the face of a recurring criticism, these archetypes are not inborn ideas, sitting 
within our collective psyche and waiting to be uncovered, since ‘[it] is not a 
question of inherited ideas, but of inherited thought-patterns.’109 They are deep-
structure psychic patterns leading to certain types of universal mental experience, 
and not innate ready-made seraphic visions of gods and harpies. We each have the 
same fundamental phylogenetic psychic inheritance, which is that which makes us 
human beings. The archetypes then are not just images lying deep within the 
unconscious of every person, in which case they could perhaps, speculatively 
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speaking, be accessed by brain scan. Rather they are patterns of behaviour making 
their appearance ‘only in the course of amplification’.110 The therapeutic process 
Jung calls active imagination is the forcing or helping on its way of this course of 
amplification. In a manner very reminiscent of the lucid dreaming of the magician 
in Borges’ The Circular Ruins, the subject delves into the unconscious psyche by 
way of active, spontaneous fantasy. On following these fantasmatic inventions 
where they lead of their own volition they invariably follow certain ‘grooves’ or 
psychic imprints, where archaic or mythological figures and motifs appear which 
betray their archetypal character. So they are not so much inborn, inherited ideas 
but rather the predisposition or propensity towards those ideas. 
 
Synchronicity and the Unus Mundus 
 
Jung equates the irrepresentable nature of the archetypes with the smallest particles 
that physics deals with, whose nature can only be known by their effects. In both 
cases the physicist or psychologist is attempting to define an objective order of 
nature whose behaviour is altered by the fact of its being observed and can at best 
build up a probable model/construction of how these quantities behave based on 
their observable effects. Now, in a situation where we have two entities or 
properties whose existence must be assumed but which cannot be represented or 
shown in person, ‘there is’, says Jung, ‘always the possibility – which we tend to 
overlook – that it may not be a question of two or more factors but of one only’: 
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The identity or non-identity of two irrepresentable quantities is something 
that cannot be proved. […] Since psyche and matter are contained in one 
and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one 
another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is 
not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two 
different aspects of one and the same thing.
111
  
 
Jung uses the term ‘psychoid’ (always as an adjective, never a substantive) to 
describe these irrepresentable psychophysical processes and this ‘one and the same 
thing’ which is neither psychic nor material in nature but prior to both, antecedent 
to their differentiation, is named, using the terminology of alchemy and Medieval 
philosophy, unus mundus, meaning ‘one unitary world’. Jung felt this hypothesis to 
be far from the obscure mysticism it can appear to be at first sight, but to be a 
legitimate response to empirical data, informed by developments in particle 
physics. Indeed Jung developed this concept in collaboration with the Nobel Prize 
winning physicist and quantum pioneer Wolfgang Pauli (a relationship generally 
passed over in silence in physics circles, or excused as the individual eccentricities 
of a great man that has no bearing on his work.) 
 
For Jung there are certain privileged events or experiences which manifest this 
irrepresentable unity of psyche and world and which carry profound and far-
reaching implications. Such events are those statistical anomalies attributed to 
chance or coincidence which seem to fall outside of any known causality and so 
elude rational explanation. A classic example is the well-documented case of the 
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above-mentioned spiritualist Emanuel Swedenborg’s dramatic vision of the great 
fire of Stockholm in 1759 while he was dining in Gothenburg, 250 miles away. It 
was only two days later that reports from Stockholm confirming Swedenborg’s 
vision, down to the smallest detail, reached them in Gothenburg. Another famous 
example is one of Jung’s own, from his analytic experience. A young patient of his 
was describing a dream she had had in which she was given a golden scarab. In the 
middle of her account Jung noticed a tapping against the window of his practice and 
opened the window, through which flew a rose-chafer beetle, ‘the nearest analogy 
to a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes […], which contrary to its usual 
habits had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at this particular 
moment.’112 
 
Although the two cases are very different in nature – for one thing the patient was 
not presenting her dream as if it were a prophetic vision – both are examples of the 
phenomenon Jung calls Synchronicity, defined as the ‘coincidence of a psychic 
state with a corresponding objective process’.113 More everyday, commonly 
experienced instances are unlikely meaningful coincidences, such as thinking of a 
friend from whom one has not heard in a long time immediately before receiving a 
telephone call from that same friend, or successions of chance events such as a 
number or word recurring again and again throughout the course of a day or 
number of days (a phenomenon Freud addresses in The Uncanny.) 
 
Jung does not try to explain away such occurrences with rational accounts, which 
we are all well versed in providing, but takes them at face value, wishing to account 
                                                 
112
 Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (Collected Works, 8) p. 438. 
113
 Ibid., p. 480. 
220 
 
for them on their own merits. However, since these are singular, anomalous 
occurrences they are on principle incapable of being premeditated and examined in 
controlled conditions, for the experimental method by nature aims at establishing 
regular, repeatable events and thus ruling out of consideration the unique or rare 
results which are put down to chance deviations. Causality, says Jung, is a 
statistical truth, not an absolute truth, and is only generally valid, when operating 
on the macrocosmic scale. ‘In the realm of very small quantities prediction 
becomes uncertain, if not impossible, because very small quantities no longer 
behave in accordance with the known natural laws.’114 So broadly speaking the 
course of nature can be unfailingly expected to follow the laws of causality, but 
when we are dealing with particular events on a micro scale we can never predict 
the outcome with complete certainty. Jung asserts, repeating an often-voiced 
limitation of the scientific procedure, that the answers given by nature in 
experimental practices are influenced by the questions asked, thus giving only a 
partial, statistical or average view of the natural world. So far, so relatively 
uncontroversial, but Jung draws from this the contentious conclusion that since 
causality is not a universal truth there must be connections of events which are 
acausal, and thus demanding another connecting principle to account for them. 
 
However, discovering such a principle poses considerable problems, for how can 
one base a theory on ‘[absolutely] unique or ephemeral events whose existence we 
have no means of either denying or proving’?115 We can only rely on anecdotal 
evidence, which is inherently unreliable. Furthermore, how are we to distinguish 
genuinely synchronistic or acausal events from mere chance? Much of Jung’s 
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evidential foundations rest on J.B. Rhine’s famous parapsychic experiments which 
involve the experimenter turning up a series of cards with different geometrical 
patterns on them while the subject, who is separated by a screen, guesses the sign as 
each card is turned. In a significant number of cases the quantity of correct guesses 
exceeded to a highly improbable degree that which would be expected by chance. 
After the first set of experiments the distance between experimenter and subject 
was increased, even up to hundreds of miles, and much the same results were 
achieved. Yet more tests were done in which the subjects were told to predict the 
series of shapes in a set of cards that were only to be turned over in the future, and 
still the amount of correct guesses exceeded chance probability. Since evidently 
neither time nor space is an inhibitory factor over the results, Jung asserts that such 
phenomena can have nothing to do with the transmission of force, as the distance to 
be overcome would diminish its effects. What it points to in fact, Jung suggests, is a 
psychic relativity of time and space, and a ‘psychic function or psychic 
condition’116 that is capable of abolishing the time factor and the spatial factor. 
 
What these experiments, as well as the events referred to above, demonstrate 
according to Jung, is that ‘there are events which are related to one another […] 
meaningfully, without there being any possibility of proving that this relation is a 
causal one.’117 So we are not dealing with a relation of cause and effect, but rather a 
‘falling together in time, a kind of simultaneity. Because of this factor of 
simultaneity, I have picked on the term “synchronicity” to designate a hypothetical 
factor equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation.’118 It is important to 
note the term hypothetical, and the sense that synchronicity does not constitute a 
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positive addition to knowledge but rather a regulative model to help guide an 
explanation of seemingly unaccountable phenomena. 
 
Like Freud, Jung refers to Kant’s conditions of sensibility and suggests, albeit in a 
very different way to Freud, that these conditions do not hold in the unconscious. 
They are ‘postulated’ by the conscious mind, only becoming fixed concepts ‘in the 
course of [man’s] mental development, thanks largely to the introduction of 
measurement.’ This, once again, strongly recalls Heidegger’s account of the genesis 
of our vulgar concepts of time and space, and the covering over of our primordial 
existential experience: 
 
They [time and space] are hypostatised concepts born of the discriminating 
activity of the conscious mind, and they form the indispensable coordinates 
for describing the behaviour of bodies in motion. They are, therefore, 
essentially psychic in origin, which is probably the reason that impelled 
Kant to regard them as a priori categories. But if space and time are only 
apparently properties of bodies in motion and are created by the intellectual 
needs of the observer, then their relativisation by psychic conditions is no 
longer a matter for astonishment but is brought within the bounds of 
possibility. This possibility presents itself when the psyche observes, not 
external bodies, but itself.
119
 
 
In the case of the parapsychic experiments, the subjects do not ‘see’ the shapes on 
the cards through some magical power of clairvoyance, for the information does not 
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reach them from the outside but from the inside. Thus for Jung the distinction 
between inner and outer is not as clear-cut as it was for Freud and ‘reality testing’ is 
not such a straightforward matter. These inner processes can become drawn to the 
subject’s attention by the seeming ‘impossibility’ of the task, for as we saw above, 
archetypal contents emerge in a state of impasse or hopelessness and it is generally 
with the archetypes that we are dealing in synchronistic phenomena. The dream of 
the golden scarab, for instance, occurred at a critical moment of deadlock in the 
patient’s treatment, and the scarab is supposedly a familiar archetypal symbol of 
rebirth. Since the collective unconscious is universal and unlocalisable, and by 
nature the same across every case, there is the ever-present possibility that what is 
taking place at any one time in the collective psyche of an individual is ‘also 
happening in other individuals or organisms or things or situations.’120 This is what 
apparently seems to have occurred in the scarab dream; it was a conscious 
representation deriving from the causally inexplicable unconscious knowledge of 
the events of the following day’s session with her doctor. 
 
What this bears witness to, according to Jung, is a form of ‘“knowledge”, or 
“immediacy” of psychic images’121 which does not derive from sense perception. 
The conscious interpretation of this unconscious knowledge comes upon the subject 
like any other spontaneous thought and can only be verified as a synchronistic 
occurrence after the physical event has been noted. This suggests that there may be 
many such examples of this inexplicable knowledge which are never recognised as 
such because the physical event with which it corresponds is not witnessed by the 
person to whom it has appeared. Many of us must have experienced at some time or 
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another that uneasy sensation of ominous precognition, and there are numerous 
stories, an example of which is given by Jung, where a person claims to have 
‘sensed’ or known when a loved one has died. What happens in such cases ‘is a 
kind of creatio ex nihilo, an act of creation that is not causally explicable’,122 
something we ruled out as inconceivable in our previous chapter. The two 
impediments to such a notion were, firstly, that every psychical image or 
impression derives from sensibly given material and secondly, that the necessary 
consistency of the time-series precludes it. Both objections are overcome in the 
light of synchronistic phenomena, the first by the inexplicable non-sensible 
knowledge such experiences exhibit and the second by the ‘psychic relativity’ of 
time and its abolition in the unconscious. 
 
So what Jung is ‘finally compelled to assume’ is that ‘there is in the unconscious 
something like an a priori knowledge or immediate presence of events which lacks 
any causal basis.’123 If such events were a case of causality then either the dream or 
vision which foresees a future or simultaneous event, ‘caused’ the event to take 
place in some telekinetic way, or the physical event ‘caused’ the psychical process, 
retroactively positing itself somehow. ‘In either case’, says Jung, ‘we come up 
against the unanswerable question of transmission’.124 This question of 
transmission is none other than that of the two possible relationships explaining the 
correspondence between object and representation that Kant gives in the letter to 
Marcus Herz. For Kant, as we know, in finite intuition the object is the cause of the 
representation while in the divine intuition it is the other way around. What Jung 
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does, however, is to displace the terms of the question by presenting a third 
alternative that Kant did not, and indeed could not, have considered. 
 
This third alternative relies on the unus mundus hypothesis, suggesting that the two 
related terms – the psychical experience and the physical event – take place on 
another plane prior to their differentiation, and both the knowledge and the event 
itself could be said to be its respective manifestations. In other words, ‘the same 
living reality [is] expressing itself in the psychic state as in the physical.’125 So with 
regard to the two alternatives Kant poses, this would be neither a receptive nor a 
productive intuition, but still nevertheless a form of intelligible correspondence 
between thought and being, one that is not mediated through the senses. As such the 
problem of transmission is overcome, but what exactly forms the correspondence 
between the two states if it is not a case of causation? Jung’s answer to this question 
postulates an a priori ‘meaning’ or equivalence, which exists independently of the 
psyche: 
 
If – and it seems plausible – the meaningful coincidence or ‘cross-
connection’ of events cannot be explained causally, then the connecting 
principle must lie in the equal significance of parallel events; in other 
words, their tertium comparationis is meaning. We are so accustomed to 
regard meaning as a psychic process or content that it never enters our heads 
to suppose that it could also exist outside the psyche. But we do know at 
least enough about the psyche not to attribute to it any magical power, and 
still less can we attribute any magical power to the conscious mind. If, 
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therefore, we entertain the hypothesis that one and the same (transcendental) 
meaning might manifest itself simultaneously in the human psyche and in 
the arrangement of an external and independent event, we at once come into 
conflict with the conventional scientific and epistemological views.
126
 
 
So for Jung this is the least mystical, most scientifically rigorous explanation that 
does justice to the empirical data without ascribing to the psyche ‘a power that far 
exceeds its empirical range of action’, namely intellectual intuition. However, by 
avoiding attributing this particular supernatural power to the psyche, Jung risks 
ascribing to it another, equally extravagant faculty. For when the threshold of 
consciousness is sufficiently lowered so that unconscious, archetypal contents can 
penetrate into our conscious mind this can grant us access to what Jung calls, in 
quotation marks for caution, ‘“absolute knowledge”’, pointing to ‘the presence in 
the microcosm of macrocosmic events.’127 The microcosm here, which like the 
Leibnizian monad reflects the whole of reality, is the collective unconscious. 
 
This is speculative language which must necessarily sound somewhat far-fetched 
because it aims to render intelligible to consciousness something which is 
essentially inconceivable to it. So in the case of Swedenborg’s prophetic vision, for 
instance, we are not dealing with paranormal foreknowledge, or still less 
psychokinesis, but with two distinct manifestations of the same event that are 
connected by ‘meaning’ or significance. Since in the unconscious psyche time and 
space no longer apply and ‘knowledge finds itself in a space-time continuum in 
which space is no longer space, nor time time’, then if the unconscious should 
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‘develop or maintain a potential in the direction of consciousness, it is then possible 
for parallel events to be perceived or “known.”’128 Such knowledge cannot be 
deliberately utilised since such events are by their nature rare and incapable of 
being premeditated, but, to return to our theme, as science probes deeper into the 
workings of cognition it could eventually be in a position to definitively test Jung’s 
hypothesis and possibly uncover such a parallelism between irrepresentable psychic 
and physical processes. More to the point, if the collective unconscious is indeed a 
repository of ‘absolute knowledge’ perhaps this could conceivably be harnessed 
and exploited, overcoming the reservations of our previous chapter and, in the 
words of Žižek, render this faculty ‘potentially available to all of us’. 
 
However, just as it was with the archetypes, such a notion is precluded in principle. 
For Jung, the psyche is not exclusively localised to cognitive activity, it rests also 
on ‘a nervous substrate like the sympathetic system, which is absolutely different 
from the cerebrospinal system in point of origin and function, [and which] can 
evidently produce thoughts and perceptions just as easily as the latter.’129 Jung 
illustrates this with anecdotal accounts of people in comas ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ 
what is going on around them and giving detailed reports of what they saw upon 
regaining consciousness, as well as the behaviour of lower organisms such as bees, 
which in their much-discussed communicative movements (or dances) display 
‘transcerebral thought and perception.’130 What is more, the kind of knowledge 
displayed in synchronistic events ‘has nothing to do with brain activity’,131 which 
categorically limits the reach of cognitive imaging technologies when it comes to 
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attaining ‘absolute knowledge’. Nonetheless, even if this particular psychical 
reservoir cannot be accessed via brain scan, Jung at least provides us with a model 
for rethinking the terms of our inquiry. Just as in Jung’s analytic treatment the 
archetypes are constellated at a point of impasse to disclose a hitherto unthinkable 
means of escape, so Jung himself shows us a line of advance out of the impasse of 
finitude. This non-cerebral, bodily form of knowledge is, for Jung, an exemplar of 
the psychoid property inherent in matter so that ‘thought’, broadly conceived, is not 
confined to the human mind but pervades that which is its ‘object’. Yet this is not a 
simple panpsychism, suggesting that water, plants or rocks possess a rudimentary 
form of conscious perception, although it is undoubtedly redolent of it. For such a 
notion could still be considered a dualism, extending the capacity for thought to 
inanimate objects while upholding its exceptional status.
132
 Rather, Jung’s ontology 
levels down the disjunction between ‘mere thought’ and positive being, since it is 
only for a system which strictly upholds such a distinction that the synchronicity 
phenomena remain inconceivable. These latter do not form a miraculous bridge 
establishing a momentary sympathetic connection between two isolated properties, 
but point to a way of re-conceiving the relationship itself, appearing to show ‘that 
there is some possibility of getting rid of the incommensurability between the 
observed and the observer. The result, in that case would be a unity of being which 
would have to be expressed in terms of a new conceptual language – “neutral 
language,” as W. Pauli once called it.’133 Neutral because it does not distinguish or 
discriminate between what is inner and what is outer, the knower and the known. 
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We have covered much ground in this chapter so let us restate in summary some of 
the main points and attempt to draw them together more clearly. The ready 
availability of brain-computer interfacing technology and its easily foreseeable 
integration into the electronic appliances, entertainment systems and computers in 
the home was seen as the fulfilment of technology’s promise to ease and hasten the 
satisfaction of needs and desires. This would allow us, in Freud’s terms, to bypass 
reality and restore the pleasure principle to its place of unimpeded governance. 
Once again we were concerned with the gap between a thought, intention or wish 
and its actuality or realisation. We envisaged an autopoietic state of instant 
gratification, where one’s desires and needs are immediately satisfied, such that 
instead of adjusting our pleasure goals in the face of reality it is reality itself that 
will be adjusted in the face of our demands. But this hyper-convenience would, 
taken to its extreme, immerse the user in an eternal indistinct present with no 
experience of anticipation, excitement or, indeed, pleasure. For, since pleasure is an 
economy, a play of heightening and lowering intensities, this state would not be a 
liberating ecstasy of enjoyment but rather a profound catatonic lethargy. 
 
We then examined the possibility of supplementing our flawed, finite system of 
memory with a technological prosthesis, possibly allowing us to scroll through our 
mnemic archive the way we would a computer database. Moreover, since Freud 
often insists on the indestructibility of unconscious memory traces we were there 
ostensibly presented with the possibility of retaining every experience and sensation 
that has ever impressed upon us. It was, in the words of Freud, ‘once more a 
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question of external and internal’:134 the external support coming to enhance and 
fulfil the internal, ‘live’ memory. After our brief reading of Derrida, however, we 
saw that this distinction was complicated and undermined by the very necessity of 
that external aid to memory and by the very real effects such supposedly derivative 
devices have on the actual functioning of our memory and the brain. This 
convenient distinction is further problematised by the potential impairment done by 
neuroimaging technologies to our ability to carry out ‘reality testing’, which, along 
with the auto-satisfaction of needs and desires, would put at risk our ability to 
distinguish waking life from dreaming.  
 
Returning to the question of automatic wish fulfilment, we addressed the 
consequences for our intersubjective relationships and sense of self of being 
compelled via fMRI brain scanning technology to face up to those repressed 
fantasies which configure our reality while remaining structurally hidden from 
consciousness. This brought us to the paradoxical category of the ‘objectively 
subjective’, which effectively deprives us of our ownmost intimate subjective 
experience. 
 
We were drawn to examine the strange status of these unpalatable unconscious 
processes, which are, according to Freud, withdrawn from the regime of language, 
and hence unknowable, but also, rather more problematically, timeless. Upon 
examining this latter property within the Kantian terms of our previous chapter, it 
was shown to be less a departure from the transcendental conditions than it appears 
at first sight, and perhaps how it appeared to Freud himself. However, within that 
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timeless reservoir are not only the traces of sensibly given experiences but also 
primordial, pre-personal remnants, which in spite of Freud’s intentions, open the 
door for Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious. However, once again, on a 
first approach at least, we found that Jung’s archetypes can still be made to be 
consistent with Kant’s transcendental architectonic, due to the fact that we are 
forever barred access to the archetypes in themselves. Through the synchronicity 
phenomena, however, we were brought into the orbit of a potential route away from 
the shore of finitude: this was the speculative thesis of unus mundus, and the 
concomitant possibility of a psychical store of ‘absolute knowledge’. 
 
As long as thought is considered as an ontological exception, no technological 
contrivance can present itself to us as truly radical in this regard. What is more, 
thought itself is ill-served by what Alain Badiou calls ‘the omnipresent motif of 
finitude’: the ‘discrete form via which thought yields in advance, accepting the 
modest role it is enjoined to play’.135 The postulate of psychophysical 
synchronisation, then, simultaneously accomplishes two seemingly contradictory 
demands: firstly, by redrawing the ontological lines of demarcation it abolishes the 
special status of thought, bringing it down from its lonely tower and is thus 
consistent with cognitive science’s insistence on treating consciousness as 
fundamentally no different from any other physical phenomenon. Secondly, in 
doing so, thought is not reduced but greatly enhanced and set free from finite limits 
and its enslavement to receptivity. It may not be intellectual intuition, but, as 
Meillassoux discovered, one cannot escape from the Kantian system using the tools 
found within it. It is necessary, nevertheless, to remain consistent with Kant in 
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order to avoid charges of indulging in groundless metaphysical speculation, and this 
Jung does, despite the many accusations of mysticism, breaking with the refrain of 
finitude to re-imagine the subject-object relation.
136
 
 
An obvious objection presents itself here in the light of this reference to our earlier 
discussion of Quentin Meillassoux: is unus mundus not simply an elaborate 
variation on the procedure Meillassoux calls ‘absolutising the correlation’?137 Paul 
Bishop, in his book Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition in Kant, Swedenborg 
and Jung, contends as much, arguing that Jung succumbs to a mystic metaphysics 
in which mind and world form an absolute unity.
138
 However, a more careful, 
sympathetic reading of Jung than Bishop seems willing to give reveals a rather 
more nuanced thinking to be at work. Far from an absolutised reciprocity of thought 
and being, this psychoid absolute, as I have tried to insist, takes place prior to the 
correlation and names a stratum of being antecedent to the differentiation into 
subject and object, thought and the given. Neither side of the relationship can be 
conceived in such terms; thought is not yet thought, being is not yet given to 
thought. This is why a new ‘neutral language’ is required. 
 
So to return to those two founding moments of Meillassoux’s discourse – the 
immanent point of departure and the subsequent transgression through logical 
reasoning (dianoetic intuition) – it can be seen that this procedure could be quite 
comfortably mapped onto that of Jung. As we have seen, Jung too recognises the 
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necessity of remaining consistent with Kantian limits, while breaking free of them 
to allow thought to exceed itself and access an absolute independent of and prior to 
thought. Or in Meillassoux’s terms, Jung escapes the correlationist circle from 
within rather than merely positing an autonomous real. Secondly, just as 
Meillassoux proceeds to access a primary absolute via the logical explication of an 
intuition (of facticity), so Jung’s absolute is approached via rational demonstration 
following the intuition of causally inexplicable phenomena. Rather than attempting 
to erect a bridge which connects thought and being while forever keeping them 
separated by an irreducible chasm, Jung instead offers us a way of escaping the 
problem. For a bridge would merely be a means of passage or communication 
between two isolated territories, and this correspondence can only be conceived 
according to the relation of causality (Kant’s letter to Herz again). So approaching 
this relationship as a gap precisely thwarts in advance every attempt to close it. 
 
We have thus finally accomplished what we set out to do at the conclusion of our 
previous chapter and elsewhere, and compellingly undermined the gap between 
thought and objective reality by re-thinking the relationship altogether. Space 
constraints forbid us from following all the implications of such a seemingly 
outlandish thesis, but in passing we could perhaps propose a different way of 
conceptualising the creative process of the artist, in which it is conceived according 
to the synchronicity model; the relationship between the motivating idea or thought 
and the resulting object would then need to be reconsidered. Perhaps those rare 
moments of inspiration or ‘eureka!’ are not the subjective, albeit unconscious, 
creations of the individual mind but examples of acausal psychophysical 
correspondence. To simplify somewhat, perhaps the composer who ‘hears’ a 
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melody in a sudden inspiration, before transcribing it for an instrument to realise, 
experiences the inexplicable ‘knowledge’ or ‘immediate presence’ of that melody 
as a transpersonal process in much the same way as Swedenborg was ‘visited’ by 
the fire in Stockholm. To be an artist then, to create, would thus mean having a 
form of ecstatic knowledge; it would mean being privy to something (some 
‘inspiration’ or ‘idea’) that has positive existence outside of oneself. Much the same 
could be said for those moments of absolute clarity experienced by the scientist, 
mathematician or philosopher, when one feels at last to have understood something 
in a flash of insight. 
 
Such a proposal undoubtedly leaves us open to accusations of tying truth to the 
irrational, and of suggesting that all access to truth is necessarily on the order of 
revelation or enthusiasm. To such a charge we would reply that any scientific 
breakthrough, philosophical insight, artistic inspiration, or solving of a 
mathematical problem cannot be the result of simple rule-following, logical 
inference or calculation. There must be a moment of understanding in which all 
becomes clear – an essentially unjustifiable gap as Adorno has it – which is not 
merely the inevitable outcome of an implemented programme or formula, otherwise 
it would in principle be known already. It is this moment of insight or 
understanding that we are – tentatively – suggesting could be thought according to 
the model of Synchronicity. (However, it will no doubt not have escaped attention 
through this referral back to our earlier reading of Adorno that here the same point 
is being made but for precisely the opposite reason. Formerly, this gap or leap that 
constitutes insight was held to be proof of the irreducible separation of thought 
from being, while here it is being seen as evidence of their coincidence.) 
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The final question that faces us is this: if the subject-object dyad can be rethought 
as a neutral unity what implications does this have for intersubjectivity? Does it 
follow from the unus mundus hypothesis that the gap of unknowability between 
subjects can likewise be overcome, enabling some form of telepathic 
correspondence? This, inspired once again by advances in neurotechnology, will be 
the concern of our concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Telepathy and the Other 
 
Telepathy, then: the inner monologues of all the so-called teeming millions, of 
masses and classes alike, jostled for space within my head. In the beginning, when I 
was content to be an audience – before I began to act – there was a language 
problem. The voices babbled in everything from Malayalam to Naga dialects, from 
the purity of Lucknow Urdu to the Southern slurrings of Tamil. I understood only a 
fraction of the things being said within the walls of my skull. Only later, when I 
began to probe, did I learn that below the surface transmission – the front of mind 
stuff which is what I’d originally been picking up – language faded away, and was 
replaced by universally intelligible thought-forms which far transcended words. 
– Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children1 
 
The problem of telepathy, thought-transference, or extra-sensory communication, is 
one that is generally given a wide berth in serious philosophical or scientific 
discourse, and relegated to the obscure domains of pseudo-science, mysticism and 
new-age quackery.
2
 It is somewhat incongruous then that Freud, so concerned to 
establish the scientific credentials of psychoanalysis, should have devoted so much 
attention to the subject. Indeed the spectre of telepathy seems to have haunted him, 
particularly in later life, evidenced by the three papers he devoted to the subject, 
entitled ‘Psychoanalysis and Telepathy’, written in 1921 but only posthumously 
                                                 
1
 Midnight’s Children, (London: Vintage, 2006) pp. 232-3. 
2
 It has, however, figured in recent literary theory and cultural studies discourses, due in large part to 
the work of Nicholas Royle, both in his capacity as English translator of Derrida’s essay ‘Telepathy’ 
(to which we will return), and also through his own writings, in particular Telepathy and Literature: 
Essays on the Reading Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), the essay ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis 
(i): Telepathy’, in After Derrida (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), and the chapter 
on ‘The Telepathy Effect’ in The Uncanny: An Introduction (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002.) See also J. Hillis Miller’s very entertaining book The Medium is the Maker: Browning, 
Freud, Derrida and the New Telepathic Ecotechnologies, to which we have already referred. 
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published, ‘Dreams and Telepathy’, published in 1922, and ‘Dreams and 
Occultism’ from the New Introductory Lectures of 1933.3 But even as early as the 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life we find a description of an incident that could 
quite easily be interpreted as containing a telepathic element in all but name, and 
which already perhaps paves the way for Freud’s later stated ‘conversion’ to 
telepathy.
4
 It is an example of a collective failure of memory, in which a young 
woman forgets the name of the book Ben Hur, which, as very often happens, 
spreads like a contagion and spurs those around her to forget it also. In the course 
of analysis the reason for the woman’s initial forgetting was attributed to its 
similarity to the phrase ‘Ich bin Hure’, meaning ‘I am a whore’. Unconsciously her 
modesty prevailed and she spared herself this potential embarrassment by failing to 
bring the title to mind. But this does not account for the forgetfulness of the young 
men around her, unless we are to suppose that this was likewise the result of 
unconscious processes: 
 
Their unconscious minds picked up the real reason why the woman forgot 
the title and, as it were, interpreted it so that that their own forgetting it 
shows deference to her attitude of repudiation. It is as if, through her sudden 
lapse of memory, their interlocutor had given them a clear signal, which 
they unconsciously understood very well.
5
 
 
                                                 
3
 ‘Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy’, 1944[1921] (Standard Ed. 18) pp. 177-93; ‘Dreams and 
Telepathy’, 1922 (Standard Ed. 18) pp. 197-220; ‘Dreams and Occultism’, New Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1933 (Standard Ed. 22) pp. 31-56. There is also a short section in 
‘Some additional Notes on Dream Interpretation as a Whole’, 1925 (Standard Ed. 19) devoted to 
‘The Occult Significance of Dreams’, pp. 135-8. 
4
 This ‘conversion’ is declared in a letter to Ernest Jones, c1926, reproduced in Ernest Jones, 
Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, vol. 3, (London: Hogarth, 1957) pp. 423-4. 
5
 Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p.43. 
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Here we have a queer form of communication in which both sender and recipient(s) 
are unaware of any communication actually having taken place. Both the content 
and the event of the delivery itself remain hidden to each of the correspondents, but 
it nevertheless has noticeable effects on their conduct. We could compare it to other 
occasions when we unconsciously pick up on certain ‘signals’, whether of 
annoyance or attraction, etc. Again, we might say that the sender is not fully aware 
they are sending out such signals, nor is the addressee necessarily aware that they 
are detecting them but nevertheless a certain communion takes place. In the case of 
flirtation for instance, it may not initially be an explicit recognition, but each 
person’s behaviour is adjusted in accordance with the other’s. 
 
The case cited by Freud, however, is a far more complex kind of exchange than 
mere flirtation, the latter being more easily ascribed to implicit bodily 
communication rather than any extra-sensory connection. For if we are to give 
credence to the analytic interpretation, then each person in the group knows the 
name of the book the woman means to refer to, understands the reason for her 
temporary amnesia and tactfully follows suit, all of this taking place in a matter of 
seconds and entirely outside of their conscious knowledge. Through her failure to 
communicate the title of the book she succeeds in communicating her discomfort. 
As Freud writes some years later, ‘[it] is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs. of 
one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the Cs.’6 
Both of these last two citations occur before Freud’s ‘conversion’, but how are we 
to characterise such communication or ‘reaction’ if not as one of thought 
transference?  
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In the later, post-‘conversion’, work ‘Dreams and Occultism’, Freud even suggests 
that ‘psychical transference’ may have been the ‘original, archaic method of 
communication between individuals’7 only later evolving into more advanced 
forms of communication involving the sense organs. As an example of such a 
phenomenon he cites the seemingly inexplicable common purpose demonstrated by 
insect communities, much in the way that Jung refers to the communicative dances 
of the bees to demonstrate the possibility of trans-cerebral thought and 
communication. 
 
However, as has been frequently noted by various commentators, Freud’s feelings 
on the subject of telepathy are markedly inconsistent and characterised by 
considerable bad faith, due to his unease and trepidation about the potential 
consequences. Across the three ‘telepathy papers’ mentioned previously, and even 
within them, his position shifts between outright scepticism, calculated indifference 
and finally tentative acceptance. The possibility of telepathy, and the ‘occult’ in 
general, is viewed as a grave threat to his young science, due in the main perhaps to 
the popular suspicion that psychoanalysis itself is a form of obscure mysticism, and 
its terrain, the unconscious, regarded as a shadowy region of strange forces and 
impulses. Because of Freud’s reticence and his concern to shield the science he 
founded from the perils of occultism, he is extremely reluctant to say anything 
conclusive on the subject, or set out a position for psychoanalysis to take towards it, 
for the fear is that as soon as the door to occultism is opened, everything they have 
worked for would be lost; all the advances made in understanding the psyche 
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 ‘Dreams and Occultism’, p. 55. 
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through empirical observation would be washed away by faith, superstition and 
obscurantism. There will be no further scope to develop their scientific knowledge, 
for as soon as one paranormal power or capacity has been granted there is no longer 
any defence against attributing anything at all to the psyche. So there is a regular 
reiteration of such statements as ‘[my] personal attitude […] remains unenthusiastic 
and ambivalent’8 and ‘I have no opinion on the matter and know nothing about it’.9 
 
Yet in spite of this stated indifference Freud cannot simply pass over it in silence, 
and is concerned enough about it to ensure that even if there is such a thing as 
telepathy, although ‘you will not even gather whether I believe in [its existence] or 
not’,10 it will in no way present a threat to psychoanalytical doctrine, in particular 
those concerning the dream. For, even if it were demonstrated beyond any doubt 
that a person had received a telepathic message while sleeping, this message ‘will 
be treated as a portion of the material that goes to the formation of a dream, like any 
other external or internal stimulus, like a disturbing noise in the street or an 
insistent organic sensation in the sleeper’s own body.’11 So just as a buzzing fly 
would be incorporated into the dream-work, the inexplicable receipt of a telepathic 
message would likewise function merely as one element among others. Above all it 
must in no way lead the analytic community to reconsider or even add to the 
normative theory of dreams they have developed, for ‘telepathy has nothing to do 
with the nature of dreams.’12 After all, if the dream-work did not take place and a 
piece of telepathically communicated information were to appear in one’s sleep 
unaltered and undisguised ‘[ought] we to call such a telepathic experience a 
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 ‘Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy’, p. 181. 
9
 ‘Dreams and Telepathy’, p. 220. 
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“dream” at all?’13 For Freud we should rather call it ‘a telepathic experience in a 
state of sleep. A dream without condensation, distortion, dramatisation, above all, 
without wish-fulfilment, surely does not deserve the name.’14 
  
So telepathy, if such a thing can be demonstrated to exist, can contribute nothing at 
all to psychoanalytic theory or practice. The threat is thus annulled or even engulfed 
in advance. Once this is so, Freud can then soften his attitude toward the possibility 
of its existence, even to the point of outright affirmation; for when faced with what 
he considers to be irrefutable evidence, he goes as far as to say ‘we must draw the 
inference that there is such a thing as thought-transference.’15 And, furthermore, 
when analysis is applied to such instances it does not dissolve the phenomenon, by 
providing a rational explanation, but actually deepens its significance: 
 
It [analysis] teaches us that what has been communicated by this means of 
induction from one person to another is not merely a chance piece of 
indifferent knowledge. It shows that an extraordinarily powerful wish 
harboured by one person and standing in a special relation to his 
consciousness has succeeded, with the help of a second person, in finding 
conscious expression in a slightly disguised form[.]
16
 
 
Apparently then, thought-transference can definitively be seen to have taken place 
only when one person harbouring a particularly powerful unconscious wish 
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transmits it, along with ‘the thoughts and knowledge relating to it’,17 to another 
person. This appeal to wish fulfilment firmly incorporates telepathic phenomena 
within a psychopathological symptomatology, akin to the structure of dreaming. 
Where in the dream such wishes force their way through to consciousness but only 
in a disguised form, here the wish is able to find expression only after taking a 
further detour through the mind of the other. There has, however, been a subtle shift 
in the form of unconscious communication that is in evidence here from that which 
takes place in the Ben Hur incident. For in the earlier account the event takes place 
without taking place and there is no active telepathic agent as such, rather a 
mysterious shared understanding. Here, however, telepathy is something that can be 
deliberately employed by the sender’s unconscious. The question as to whether 
telepathy should be conceived as something shared and inexplicable or as an 
exploitable power with a definite sender and receiver is one that will underlie much 
of what follows in this chapter. 
 
In more than one of the cases given by Freud there appears a fortune-teller who 
offers a prediction that, while failing to come true, is nevertheless embraced by the 
recipient because it gives voice to an unconscious wish in disguised form. One such 
example is of a young man who is told by a clairvoyant that his sister’s husband 
will die of shellfish poisoning. The prediction was unfulfilled, and so ostensibly 
proved false, but after analysis has been applied it was shown to be an expression of 
the man’s unconscious death-wish towards his brother-in-law (who had earlier had 
an attack of crayfish poisoning) based on his incestuous feelings of jealousy over 
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his marriage to his sister.
18
 We can see here a further reason why Freud has cause to 
be fearful of telepathy and desirous to master and control it: for is not the fortune-
teller in such cases in an analogous position to the analyst? He or she reveals to the 
client their own intimate, repressed wishes, much like what takes place in analysis. 
The seer could thus render the psychoanalyst’s services redundant, were it not for 
the fact that there is something the former cannot do and only the analyst can: that 
is, disclose the meaning of the wish through interpretation.
19
 The medium can 
merely report its distorted appearance, only with the help of analysis can its 
significance be revealed and can telepathy be demonstrated to have taken place. 
Without this work of analysis it is simply an erroneous prophecy. 
 
So not only is telepathy no longer seen as a threat to be feared by psychoanalysis, 
the latter can actually enlighten and further our understanding of telepathy, ‘in so 
far as, by the help of its interpretations, many of the puzzling characteristics of 
telepathic phenomena may be rendered more intelligible to us; or other, still 
doubtful, phenomena may for the first time be definitely ascertained to be of a 
telepathic nature.’20 All of the examples provided by Freud are cases in which 
psychoanalysis ‘comes to the aid of telepathy in a remarkable way’;21 meaning, 
only after the work of analysis has taken place can they be shown to be telepathic 
occurrences. Indeed analysis ‘may actually be said to have created the occult 
fact.’22 Telepathy is thus comfortably assimilated into the psychoanalytical canon, 
for ‘if [it] is only an activity of the unconscious mind, then of course, no fresh 
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problem lies before us. The laws of unconscious mental life may then be taken for 
granted as applying to telepathy.’23 
 
Freud’s paranoid, initially grudging approach to such ‘occult’ phenomena is 
diametrically opposed to that of Jung, as can be seen from our previous 
considerations. For while the latter uses such seemingly unaccountable occurrences 
as the basis for a new theoretical framework, Freud’s concern is merely to smother 
and contain them. As Derrida puts it, (Freudian) psychoanalysis ‘resembles an 
adventure of modern rationality set on swallowing and simultaneously rejecting the 
foreign body named Telepathy, assimilating it and vomiting it up without being 
able to make up its mind to do one or the other.’24 
 
However, I would suggest that the problem of telepathy cannot be so easily dealt 
with, and poses further-reaching questions for any consideration of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity than Freud would have us believe. For if such communication 
takes place outside consciousness how am I to know which thoughts are ‘my own’ 
and which are the alien bodies which have been telepathically implanted? Any 
unconscious desire or impulse that determines my behaviour may not in fact be my 
desire but the desire of the other. The situation is much like when someone has 
been conditioned under hypnosis to respond in a certain way to some trigger; the 
mental impulse to respond no doubt forces itself upon the person as if it were his 
own when in reality it has been planted there by an outside agent. But then, to what 
extent can any thought be said to be ‘my own’; that is, truly mine and nobody 
else’s? What precisely is it that individuates me as separate and distinct from any 
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other subject and does the possibility of telepathy threaten to overcome or abolish 
this distinction altogether? 
 
Without wishing to echo Freud’s careful reticence, it should be made clear that the 
question at issue for us here is not one of the ‘existence’ or otherwise of telepathy 
as a (super-)natural phenomenon. It is rather that of the mere conceptual possibility 
of thought-communication; that is, how it is to be conceived and what it may mean 
for intersubjectivity. Our real concern is to interrogate the gap between one mind 
and another and once more consider whether any form of technological 
enhancement could enable us to freely surmount it, or at least re-think it. After all, 
telepathy seems to be the inevitable outcome of the fMRI cognitive imaging 
experiments we have already considered, through which a subject’s ‘inner-space’ 
becomes externalised for the other to access directly.
25
 Furthermore, there is 
research under development at the University of Southampton specifically into the 
possibility of ‘brain to brain communication’.26 It uses the same principle as the 
BCI devices already discussed, however, instead of the neural information being 
transmitted to a machine in order to execute a command it is transmitted to the 
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brain of another person. The first person – the sender – transmits a series of binary 
digits via the Internet to the second person, the latter’s computer receiving the digits 
and transmitting them to the subject’s brain by flashing an LED lamp. This pattern 
of flashes is too subtle to be picked up consciously, but it is detected by electrodes 
measuring the visual cortex of the receiver. The information is then extracted from 
the subject’s brain activity and decoded by the computer software. So, much like in 
Freud’s accounts, the communication here takes place unconsciously, effectively 
travelling through the brain of the second person without his or her conscious 
knowledge. The receiver only learns about what has taken place through reading it 
from the computer screen. 
 
A number of questions are inevitable, such as why go to all this trouble when the 
receiver’s computer could simply display the information without taking the extra 
detour through the imperceptible flashing lights and the subject’s brain activity. Is it 
truly ‘brain to brain communication’ when the sense organs are still involved? Is 
not all communication thus ‘brain to brain’? But, again, the issue for us is not the 
success or failure of any particular experiment, or the efficacy or potentiality of any 
given technological procedure. Essentially it is a question of mediation, of whether 
and how one mind could be immediately present to another through a technological 
conduit. 
 
 
In Douglas Adams’s Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy there is an episode involving 
a race of aliens who incurred the ire of an intergalactic tribunal for some 
transgression or other and were given the power of telepathy as punishment. To 
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prevent their every embarrassing or incriminating thought from being broadcast 
they all took to chattering ceaselessly about the weather and other trivialities to 
drown out and block such thoughts from forming. Thus, the frivolity of the example 
notwithstanding, as was the case with the faculty of intellectual intuition it may be 
that we should not see such an ability as necessarily a beneficial enhancement of 
our finite capabilities, and that here too that ‘inscrutable wisdom through which we 
exist’ may be no less deserving of our appreciation ‘in what it has refused us than in 
what it has allotted us.’ 
 
But there is of course much more at stake here than the possibility of finding out 
things we didn’t want to know, such as what our friends ‘really’ think of us, or the 
embarrassment caused by having our own innermost thoughts and desires 
transmitted for all to see, and we have already begun to outline the scope of the 
problem we will be addressing. To bring it into clear sight we can once again turn 
to a short, undeveloped point of Žižek’s that will furnish us with our starting point. 
In addressing what is called in philosophical discourse ‘the problem of other 
minds’, namely whether and in what respects we can have conclusive knowledge of 
the minds of others and how we may know for certain that that those around us are 
not automata or ‘zombies’, Žižek writes that this question ‘misses the point:’ 
 
[If] I were to ‘really know’ the mind of my interlocutor, intersubjectivity 
proper would disappear; he would lose his subjective status and turn – for 
me – into a transparent machine. In other words, not-being-knowable-to-
others is a crucial feature of subjectivity, of what we mean when we impute 
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to our interlocutors a ‘mind’: you ‘truly have a mind’ only insofar as this is 
opaque to me.
27
 
 
This would seem to suggest that the potential of telepathic communion would carry 
dangerous consequences with regards to the very otherness of the other and our 
intersubjective relationships with those around us. For if I were to gain access to the 
most intimate thoughts of the other would this not substitute a perfect transparency 
for the opacity supposedly constitutive of intersubjectivity? Would she become 
knowable in a way that presently escapes me? However, what Žižek leaves 
unaddressed but which from our perspective seems to be of fundamental import is 
how, exactly, we are to imagine ‘really knowing’ the other’s mind. At first glance it 
seems intuitively straightforward: to really know someone’s mind in this absolute 
sense would mean to be given access to their every private thought, desire, 
sensation, hope, etc., to the point at which nothing is held back in reserve. It would 
mean having a complete insight into the workings of their consciousness such that 
they are no longer other at all but known in their entirety. But how is this 
‘knowledge’ to be communicated or manifested? What form is it to take, and can it 
ever truly annul the other’s primordial otherness? Furthermore, as Derrida puts it, 
where telepathy is concerned ‘is it even a question here of knowing?’28 
 
Žižek’s point echoes something Kant says in the second Critique: 
 
Hence one can grant that if it were possible to have so deep an insight into a 
human being’s way of thinking – as this manifests itself through internal as 
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well as external actions – that we would become acquainted with every 
incentive to actions, even with the slightest, and likewise with all external 
promptings affecting these incentives, then we could calculate a human 
being’s conduct for the future with certainty, just like any lunar or solar 
eclipse[.] 
 
Again, the consequences of gaining this power of insight into the mind of another 
would be that they come to be seen as a ‘transparent machine’, whose every 
thought and action would be as predictable as a wind-up toy. They could never 
surprise us, lie to us or keep a secret from us. But we have illicitly interrupted this 
quotation from Kant mid-sentence in order to highlight the initial parallel with 
Žižek but also to bring out more clearly the difference between the two statements. 
For having said that through gaining this absolute insight we could calculate the 
other’s conduct as surely as any lunar or solar eclipse, Kant goes on to say that ‘we 
could nonetheless assert that the human being is free’: 
 
For if we were capable also of another view (a view which, to be sure, has 
not been bestowed upon us at all, but in place of which we have only the 
rational concept), viz., an intellectual intuition of the same subject, then we 
would nonetheless become aware that this entire chain of appearances 
depends, with regard to whatever can be of concern to the moral law, on the 
spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself – a spontaneity for the 
determination of which no physical explanation can be given at all.
29
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The first thing to note is that this faculty of telepathy is a further aspect of 
intellectual intuition not considered in our second chapter, and so it is once more a 
question of finitude that is at issue. Secondly, more importantly, is the assertion that 
even though this intellectual intuition into the mind of the other would make his 
thoughts and actions exhaustively knowable and predictable, something would still 
be held back which is not reducible to this collection of information and that is 
precisely his spontaneity, upon which the ‘entire chain of appearances depends’. 
We can know everything that a man will think and do from his birth up until his 
death and yet on some level he will always escape us and remain outside of our 
knowing because he is a free, spontaneous being. Every one of these actions and 
thoughts, calculable and knowable in advance as they may be, thus has their source 
outside of ourselves. This freedom is that which ensures that it remains his life, not 
mine, no matter how much knowledge I may have of his thoughts and intentions. In 
the words of Levinas, ‘The strangeness of the Other, his very freedom!’30 
 
To be sure this is not strictly speaking the point that Kant wishes to make here, 
rather he is concerned with showing (as we discussed in Chapter Two) that, while 
our behaviour is subject to causal determinants, we are still free, autonomous 
beings. Knowing all possible constituent factors influencing a person’s behaviour 
still does not abrogate that person of his or her responsibility, and each subject can 
only – and must – take that responsibility for themselves. The point is that all our 
behaviour can conceivably be ascribed to causal factors – whether external, such as 
our upbringing or our environment, or internal, such as our genes or our inherited 
behavioural patterns – and yet this does not tell the whole story; something will 
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always remain left over in such an account, something indivisible. The upshot is 
that having complete, comprehensive knowledge of the other’s existence, including 
his interior life, will still not get hold of the ‘person’ himself, ‘refractory to every 
typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification’,31 as 
Levinas puts it. That which constitutes him as a subject is his spontaneity, and this 
is precisely what can never be made into the object of a grasping knowledge or 
placed under the power of my spontaneity. Put slightly differently, I could know 
what someone thinks or does, as well as why they think or act as they do, but that 
they do it is what escapes me. Hypnotic manipulation (à la Doctor Mabuse, for 
example) might be the closest we could get to this power over the ‘that’ of his 
experience, but at the very moment when I gain this power over his spontaneity he 
has already eluded me. That which we desire to access (‘his very freedom!’) will 
have been lost the moment his actions become my actions, thus as Levinas says of 
murder, this would be at once power and impotency.
32
 
 
However, we are jumping ahead of ourselves and anticipating what has yet to be 
argued. And once again we have failed to address the question of exactly how this 
knowledge or insight into the other’s mind could be manifested to us, or how this 
communication is to take place. Is it a case of having ‘learned’ it, in which case it 
would be presented as an ‘outside’ piece of knowledge as it were and essentially no 
different to having heard or read it. Or does it somehow ‘emerge’ in one’s mind; as 
in, the thought X just occurs to you? The terminology we have been using to 
differentiate the sender from the receiver (one thinks, the other knows what that 
person thinks) presupposes an active role and a passive role and a respective 
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difference in manifestation. When I talk to a neighbour we are each aware that one 
is speaking while the other is listening. But if this communication were to take 
place through thought alone perhaps those roles would become confused. If a 
thought just occurs to both of us, how would we know for sure which of us is the 
source of that content, or even if we just happen to be thinking the same thing? 
 
In television and film the power of telepathy is routinely portrayed as the ability to 
‘hear’ somebody’s thoughts as if eavesdropping on their interior monologue. This is 
a useful fictional device but it surely cannot be considered as a serious possibility 
because it pictures conscious experience as the constant narration of one’s every 
thought and experience in full grammatical sentences. A particularly ridiculous 
example of this was in the science fiction television series Heroes, about a group of 
ordinary people who begin to exhibit supernatural powers, one of whom was 
endowed with the faculty of telepathy. This ability was thwarted in one absurd 
scene by the villain starting to ‘think’ in Japanese to disguise his thoughts. 
However, as incredible as this clearly is, could there conceivably be any other form 
of telepathic communication, which, as it were, penetrated ‘below’ language to 
access some ‘universally intelligible thought-forms’ that exceeded or transcended 
words, as in the above passage from Midnight’s Children? Would this not 
unavoidably envisage a model of conscious life equally as simplistic as that of 
continuous internal soliloquy: namely, one of an inner space prior to language that 
‘translates’ its thoughts into words? Is there any form of thought without language, 
and consequently is language the only way in which a thought or experience could 
conceivably be communicated from one subject to another, even if that language 
were unspoken? 
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Alternately we could perhaps picture another form of telepathic communion, 
something along the lines of another familiar Science Fiction trope that we might 
call a ‘Mind-Merge’. In other words, supposing through a technological 
intermediary I were able to directly experience the thoughts of someone else as if 
they were my own; to experience and think them exactly as they do as they are 
thinking them. Would this then be a more immediate or direct form of 
communication, something like the immediate presence of one mind to another, 
without the supplement of language? These two models, that of eavesdropping on 
another person’s internal monologue and the merging of one mind with another to 
experience their phenomenological inner space first hand, will direct our approach 
towards the problem of telepathy. 
 
The Language of Thought: Wittgenstein and Nietzsche on Public and Private 
Language 
 
We felt intuitively that we needed to reject the picture of telepathic communication 
provided by Heroes (as well as numerous other examples we might cite) because it 
struck us as preposterously crude and simplistic. If I really were able to access the 
private thoughts of another, it surely would not be so simple as hearing an ‘inner 
voice’. Moreover, if this indeed were the only form that telepathic communication 
could conceivably take, while it would undoubtedly be radically intrusive, would it 
truly enable this absolute knowledge of the other that would divest them of their 
otherness? Would it allow me to really get at or to the other herself, or would I still 
remain at an insurmountable distance? For in the words of Kierkegaard, ‘[the] 
254 
 
moment I speak I express the universal’,33 so ‘[seen] as an immediate, no more than 
sensate and psychic being, the individual is concealed.’34 As Derrida puts it, in a 
reading of Kierkegaard, ‘[once] I speak I am never and no longer myself, alone and 
unique.’35 Now transposing this to the question of telepathy, surely a merely 
‘internal’, i.e. unspoken, thought that is expressed in the medium of language is 
governed by the same structure as a spoken utterance. If I were to think to myself ‘I 
must remember to renew my library books’ and someone were to access that 
thought it would in essence be no different to having said it aloud; I would still 
have ‘expressed the universal’ rather than my own irreplaceable individuality, even 
in mere thought. No sooner have I formed such a thought than I have already 
entered the universal. Prior to its linguistic expression it is not yet accessible to me 
but as soon as it becomes accessible to me it is no longer my thought but a general 
one. 
  
It would of course be ridiculous to suggest that all of our everyday cognitive 
activity takes such a form, as if speaking to oneself internally, but does this mean 
that thought then outstrips language, and is hence antecedent to linguistic 
expression? Much of Derrida’s critique of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena 
centres around the latter’s belief in ‘the existence of a pre-expressive and 
prelinguistic stratum of sense, which the [phenomenological] reduction must 
sometimes disclose by excluding the stratum of language.’36 Such an assumption, 
as Derrida elsewhere puts it, ‘supposes that, prior to the sign and outside it, 
excluding any trace and any différance, something like consciousness is possible. 
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And that consciousness, before distributing its signs in space and in the world, can 
gather itself into its presence.’37 So what Derrida critiques here under the rubric of a 
metaphysics of presence is the same supposition later given the name of the 
‘bureaucratic’ model of speech generation by Dennett, which we covered in the 
first chapter. This, once again, is the image of a pre-linguistic presence to self who 
formulates a thought and then subsequently finds words to express that thought, as 
if fulfilling a prior intention. Language is here seen as an accessory to thought, or a 
mere vehicle, necessary to make ourselves understood to others but not intrinsic to 
the act of thinking itself. On this model it makes sense to imagine that something 
would be ‘lost in translation’ and that the words chosen are always a form of 
bricolage, perhaps not ‘fitting’ the thought exactly but approximating to it as best 
we can with the limited vocabulary available to us. But as we were previously led 
to assert following our reading of Croce, there surely is no thought in any real sense 
that has not been ‘expressed’, and language is simply the form that this expression 
takes. Such an expressed thought that could be communicated from one person to 
another by whatever means, sensory or non-sensory, must be distinguished from 
habitual, instinctive behavioural patterns that take place, as we say, ‘without 
thinking’.38 
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However, we can here pick up on a point also raised in our first chapter, regarding 
what takes place when this expression fails us and we have to settle for a word or 
phrase that seems inappropriate or inadequate. Is this not demonstrative of the 
noncoincidence of language and thought, and indeed evidence of a prelinguistic 
stratum of thought that is formed in advance and awaiting expression? We 
suggested previously that it would be absurd to imagine a computer program giving 
expression to such a ‘thought’ that we ourselves cannot articulate, but if another 
subject were to gain telepathic insight into my conscious life would there be any 
sense in suggesting that they could feel what I mean in such a case? And would 
they in fact gain a purer understanding of my thought here than if I had managed to 
put it into words, since it has not yet been diluted by the universal? As Wittgenstein 
puts it, 
 
What happens when we make an effort – say in writing a letter – to find the right 
expression for our thoughts? – This phrase compares the process to one of 
translating or describing: the thoughts are already there (perhaps were there in 
advance) and we merely look for their expression. This picture is more or less 
appropriate in different cases. – But can’t all sorts of things happen here? – I 
surrender to a mood and the expression comes. Or a picture occurs to me and I 
try to describe it. Or an English expression occurs to me and I try to hit on the 
corresponding German one. Or I make a gesture, and ask myself: What words 
correspond to this gesture? And so on. 
                                                                                                                                        
so, since thought rests on beliefs, there cannot be thought without language, or ‘a creature cannot 
have thoughts unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another.’ p. 157. 
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Now if it were asked: ‘Do you have the thought before finding the 
expression?’ what would one have to reply? And what, to the question: 
‘What did the thought consist in, as it existed before its expression?’39 
 
The answer must surely be that there is the intention-to-say something (internally to 
ourselves, or externally to others), but this would not be a thought that could for 
instance be harnessed technologically and passed on to another mind who may 
perhaps understand it in a more profound way than if it were to take the detour 
through the generality of language. For, ‘[an] intention is embedded in its 
situation’, and so the intention-to-speak or even intention-to-think before we find 
the suitable words for the expression cannot be abstracted from the language that 
we speak: ‘In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is 
made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question.’40 This is 
precisely the same point raised in our first chapter with regards to musical 
composition. There we asked whether it made sense to imagine that the BCI 
technology would enable somebody without any prior musical training to compose 
a piece of music, but we suggested that this naively conceives of musical ability as 
something that could be learned subsequently in order to translate an ‘idea’ that 
otherwise would be inhibited. However, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘one can only say 
something if one has learned to talk. Therefore in order to want to say something 
one must also have mastered a language’.41 The word that refuses to come to mind 
is merely the result of a lapse of memory, akin to the failure to remember a person’s 
name. It is by no means evidence of a thought that has taken shape before its 
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descent into language. Until I have managed to find expression for my thought even 
I myself do not ‘know’ what I mean, for it makes no sense to speak of ‘meaning’ 
here at all. 
 
So the idea of accessing a stratum of consciousness – whether our own or that of 
the other via telepathy – beneath language, a layer that is fully constituted, present 
to itself and prior to the ‘external’ recourse to language, would seem to be a 
metaphysical one. Consequently, since, once again, language expresses the 
universal or the general we come no closer to the other in their singularity by means 
of telepathy than via any other form of communication. Telepathy would thus be no 
more radical than speech. However, this still assumes that there is a unique 
singularity that belongs to the other and which language seemingly misses and 
cannot get hold of. We have suggested that since language still ‘stands in the way’ 
between myself and the other, even when we communicate telepathically, then her 
otherness, which is the very condition of intersubjectivity, still remains ‘intact’. 
But, to reiterate once more, if there is no silent, prelinguistic self, and if language is 
inherently general, then what exactly is there within me that escapes language and 
is truly my own? It seems we cannot have it both ways: either the other is already 
intrinsically knowable, because we speak the same language, or there is something 
specific to her beyond and outside of language and which will always remain 
outside of my grasp. The question as to what exactly constitutes this singularity of 
the other in her otherness is one to which we will have cause to return. 
 
But if we are to accept for now that language is always-already implicated in 
thought, and is hence the only conceivable way in which telepathic communication 
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could take place, we may want to ask whether we might conceivably be able to 
jettison the general language of others in order to construct a wholly personal 
vocabulary of invented words and phrases, and thus generate a language of thought 
that might be truer to our intimate experience. That is to say, as Wittgenstein 
famously puts it, would it be possible to imagine ‘a language in which a person 
could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feelings, 
moods, and the rest – for his private use?’ That is, a language in which the 
‘individual words […] are to refer to what can only be known to the person 
speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand 
the language.’42 This would be a language in which I coin personal names for 
thoughts, feelings and sensations which cannot be pointed at or explained to 
another person since they are purely internal phenomena. For if I were to decide to 
use the word ‘hammock’ instead of ‘table’ and then ask to book a hammock at a 
restaurant, after some initial confusion I could eventually point to or describe the 
object designated and say, this! This is what I call a hammock! My confused 
interlocutor would then of course tell me that I am mistaken and that it is in fact 
called a table. But if these fabricated names refer only to private, interior sensations 
and are intended only for my ‘personal use’, could I not be said to have developed a 
‘private language’ that only I understand and that as such fits my thoughts, feelings 
and sensations more accurately and truly than the universal language which I must 
learn from others and which is not personal to me? For, in using a common word to 
name or describe a sensation that seems completely unique to my own experience I 
betray that sensation and lose it in its particularity. However, if I myself invent the 
name, rather than having to learn it, perhaps the sensation can remain ‘mine’ alone 
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and as such I can do it greater justice. The sense is that if we all were to invent such 
private languages for our own private experiences we would do greater justice to 
our uniqueness as individuals. 
 
However, even if I were to invent a name for such a private sensation, as 
Wittgenstein reminds us, ‘one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the 
language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense.’43 This ‘stage-
setting’ is the background or foundation upon which this ostensibly private 
language is built, namely the ready-made structure of an already existing common 
language. Any so-called ‘private language’ would thus necessarily be parasitic 
upon a common, non-private language. For if one gives a name to a particular 
sensation, it must be remembered that ‘“sensation” is a word in our common 
language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of the word stands in need 
of a justification which everybody understands.’44 Even if I then invent a word to 
replace ‘sensation’, this in turn will rest on something else within the common 
language, and outside of this background context there would be no traction for this 
language to gain a footing. If we finally dispense altogether with the word 
‘sensation’ and resort to something as vague as ‘when he writes “S” [his invented 
word], he has something’ we forget that ‘“Has” and “something” also belong to our 
common language.’45 Such a private language could therefore only ever be a 
useless adjunct to an already constituted – and shared – language. 
 
And this last point of its being useless is also key, for if I were to say ‘I have a 
chronic X’ and someone asks me what this means and I say ‘I mean that it hurts in 
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here’ and point to my head, she will then reply ‘so you mean you have a 
headache?’ I might want to say ‘no, “headache” doesn’t quite capture it, and it’s not 
quite a migraine either, it’s something else and I have decided to call it X.’ The 
following question would of course be why? What purpose does it serve? The only 
reason for naming it in the first place would be in order to communicate it to 
somebody else, and if X gives no information then it is worthless. All that I could 
say in order to make myself understood is that X is a species of what we generally 
call a headache, but then the word headache captures sufficiently what I am trying 
to say. But aside from my being unable to communicate this sensation X to others 
without recourse to additional words from our common language that they might 
understand, am I nevertheless able to bestow a sense upon it privately, so that it 
does actually carry signification, but only for myself? As Wittgenstein writes, 
 
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the 
recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ 
and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. 
– I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. 
– But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. – How? Can I 
point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the 
sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation 
– and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this ceremony for? 
for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the 
meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my 
attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the 
sign and the sensation. – But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this 
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process brings it about that I can remember the connection right in the 
future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would 
like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only 
means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.46 
 
The point is, without a stable, external ‘criterion of correctness’, in what sense does 
this private definition carry any meaning at all? The first such criterion as to 
whether I am using a word in its correct sense would be the physical world – I 
appeal to the object itself, confident of course that this object will remain the same 
object each time I encounter it, for if it were subject to aleatory transformation the 
name would have no sense. But in the case of a private sensation there is no such 
criterion of stability and it may in fact be a different sensation each time, for all I 
have to refer to is my memory of it. 
 
The other external criterion by which we measure its correctness is the linguistic 
community, that is, we appeal to the shared language guaranteed by a community 
of speaking subjects. This means that in cases of uncertainty there will be an arbiter 
to whom I can appeal as to whether I am right or wrong in my use of this particular 
word: whether a dictionary or another person who speaks the same language as I 
do. Obviously, however, the whole purpose of inventing a private language is that I 
myself am the only judge, since it is I alone who am capable of understanding it 
and I alone who can guarantee its rightness and wrongness. In the absence of both 
of these criteria, the only authority to which I can appeal is whether it seems right to 
me, but then it makes no difference at all whether I misrecognise the sensation or 
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remember it the same each time, since I am the only one to whom it matters. This, 
as Wittgenstein points out, simply means that we are unable to talk about rightness 
and wrongness in such a case, and if there is no possibility for me to be right or 
wrong about my definition then such a word is meaningless. I may still hold fast to 
my belief that it nonetheless holds meaning for me but such a gesture, as 
Wittgenstein humorously puts it, would be like my right hand writing a cheque to 
my left hand; a completely arbitrary and inconsequential ceremony. 
 
So language is a social phenomenon and not something that could be dreamed up 
privately. Even if I do invent a new language from the ground up, only if there is 
the possibility for shared agreement and understanding of definitions is it a 
functional language. As such it is no longer a ‘private’ language at all but a public 
one, even though I myself am its originator. This is not to say that someone who 
lived their whole life in complete isolation – like the story of Kaspar Hauser for 
example – and never encountered another human being or learned a language, 
would be necessarily excluded from language and unable to invent his own. The 
only way such a language could be a language at all, however, is if it could in 
principle be measured against the two external criteria. More to the point, if I were 
to remain in perfect isolation my entire life then why would I even think to 
construct a language at all, since I would have nobody to communicate or converse 
with? If I were to do so, merely for my own amusement say, without the potential 
for the agreement of others it is not a language at all. If I wished to ensure that I did 
not keep forgetting and inadvertently reinventing this language of mine – still for 
the benefit of myself alone – and so wrote some form of primitive dictionary, then 
as soon as I establish this external criterion to which I can appeal it is already a de 
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jure universal language, even if I remain its de facto only speaker. If it could in 
principle be learned by another then it is as general and public as any other 
language. 
 
The innately social and non-private essence of language is also insisted upon by 
Nietzsche in a remarkable passage in The Gay Science titled ‘On the “genius of the 
species.”’47 In fact, here it is even suggested that consciousness itself is 
intersubjective in its origin and nature, which comes to shed an interesting new 
light upon the supposed inseparability of thought and language. Nietzsche’s 
contention is that man’s conscious self-experience developed out of his sociality 
and his need to communicate. For, on its own account, consciousness is 
‘superfluous’, and ‘[the] whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing 
itself in a mirror.’ This is true not only of our primal needs and urges, but also of 
our ‘thinking, feeling, and willing life, however offensive this may sound to older 
philosophers’:48 
 
Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human 
beings; it is only as such that it needed to develop; a solitary human being 
who lived like a beast of prey would not have needed it. That our actions, 
thoughts, feelings, and movements enter our own consciousness – at least a 
part of them – that is the result of a “must” that for a terribly long time 
lorded it over man. As the most endangered animal, he needed help and 
protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn to express his distress and to 
make himself understood; and for all of this he needed ‘consciousness’ first 
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of all, he needed to ‘know’ himself what distressed him, he needed to 
‘know’ how he felt, he needed to ‘know’ what he thought. For, to say it 
once more: Man, like every living being, thinks continually without 
knowing it; the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part 
of this – the most superficial and worst part – for only this conscious 
thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, 
and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness.
49
 
 
Thus, since man is a social animal and not an entirely self-sufficient one, he is 
continually dependent upon the assistance of others. If, for example, I needed to 
communicate that I was hungry, or that I had injured my arm, I first of all need to 
formulate this requirement to myself and become conscious of what my needs are 
before I can then communicate them to another who might be in a position to help 
me. So, one could say that one ‘communicates’ with oneself, i.e., is conscious and 
self-reflexive, solely out of the need to communicate to others. Therefore, in 
Nietzsche’s account, not only would a Kaspar Hauser figure have no need of 
language, but as a result he would not even develop conscious experience of 
himself, because he would have no need of it. This, however, does not mean that he 
would act entirely on instinctual impulses and bodily drives and have no intellectual 
activity. For, again, it is not only our biological urges and needs that are essentially 
unconscious but also thought itself. And, once again, since consciousness is 
language, and language is universal or social, conscious experience does not truly 
belong to ‘man’s individual existence, but rather to his social or herd nature’.50 As a 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., pp. 298-9. 
50
 Ibid., p. 299. 
266 
 
result, since the ‘language’ through which we know ourselves (consciousness) 
belongs to the herd and not to ourselves alone, 
 
[Given] the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as 
possible, “to know ourselves,” each of us will always succeed in becoming 
conscious only of what is not individual but “average.” […] Fundamentally, 
all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely 
individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into 
consciousness they no longer seem to be.
51
 
 
 So what is most our own takes place without the knowledge of our conscious self, 
and thus without our being able to ‘experience’ it. Our only access to ourselves 
comes via the indirect route of the herd and hence even in our own intimate 
conscious experience we fail to truly know ourselves. If we try to sneak up on 
ourselves unawares and arrive at our true essence, no sooner have we done so than 
we have already lost it and are left grasping at its shadow. This bears a clear 
resemblance to Derrida’s critique of Husserl: there is no immediate reflexive self-
experience that does not pass through a certain externality and hence commonality. 
Where Nietzsche departs from Derrida is in his subsequent assertion of the 
existence of a pre-conscious or unconscious self, which is the true, unique 
individual. So conscious thought is still inseparable from language, but this is only 
a secondary, derived phenomenon. True thought that is mine and mine alone is 
structurally inaccessible to me. 
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We should not avoid remarking upon the obvious here, which is the proto-Freudian 
character of this passage. Much of this section could be re-written using the 
language of psychoanalysis, for the ego is similarly a surface phenomenon, which is 
encompassed by the more primordial and essential id. Likewise the ego develops 
out of the id as a result of our contact with the external world and in particular our 
relationships with others. However, while in Nietzsche’s account every aspect of 
our conscious lives, including reason, functions more originally on an unconscious 
level, with only its most superficial aspect entering consciousness, for Freud, reason 
and common sense are contributed by the ego alone, and the id is the repository 
only of the passions.
52
 But what interests us here is this relationship between 
consciousness and language, for we saw in our previous chapter how for Freud as 
well as Nietzsche, word-presentations are that which make the difference between a 
conscious and an unconscious process, and thus our conscious knowledge of this 
primal side of ourselves will always be mediated and indirect. By the interposition 
of word-presentations, ‘internal thought-processes are made into perceptions’,53 and 
by so making them into perceptions we set ourselves at a distance from them and 
confront them as if they came from outside. In Nietzsche’s terms they become no 
longer our thought processes at all but the merely general thoughts of the herd. 
Therefore, in order to make a thought communicable – to ourselves as well as 
others – we rob it of its truth and betray our innermost selves. 
 
Things become even more interesting when we recall that for Freud communication 
also takes place between one unconscious and another, and that this was even our 
primordial means of communication, before gestural and spoken language (and so 
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before the advent of consciousness according to Nietzsche.) But as we have seen, 
the moment we introduce this complicating factor it means that we can no longer be 
certain whether an unconscious thought or desire is indeed our own or that of the 
other. And if communication can indeed take place without being rerouted through 
consciousness, if there is even a minimum of communicability to unconscious 
thoughts and desires, then they must exist in the form of a common or shared 
‘language’, otherwise this would be inconceivable. If, then, we are to say with 
Nietzsche that when a thought becomes conscious is it is translated into ‘the 
perspective of the herd’, following Freud this would in fact be nothing more than 
the translation of one general form into another. For if even our most primordial, 
unconscious thoughts and desires are marked by commonality and subject to the 
infiltration of the other then no matter how far back we regress it seems we will 
never reach this kernel of individuality or singularity that belongs to me alone and 
which is not touched by the trace of ‘the herd’. Were our innermost thoughts 
‘incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual’ as Nietzsche contends, 
how could even the smallest part be transposed into a heterogeneous stratum that is 
common to all? Either the separation between our conscious selves and our ‘true’, 
unique (unconscious) selves is absolute, making translation from one into the other 
impossible, or there is already a latent or inherent communicability and universality 
common to each person’s ‘individual existence’. 
 
So despite unconscious processes being deprived of the word-presentations 
corresponding to them, which ostensibly withdraws them from language, if 
communication is to take place (either between one unconscious and another or 
between the id and its ego) this must still take the form of language, otherwise there 
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could be no common measure across the different territories, and hence no 
communicability (or perhaps nothing but communicability, meaning this would be 
prior to individuation or ipseity.) We are therefore still some way from describing a 
form of telepathic communication radical enough to overcome the gap between one 
subject and another. Nor have we isolated or pinned down what exactly it is that 
constitutes the other in his or her otherness and so what it is, outside of language, 
that we suppose telepathy may enable us to get hold of. Intersubjectivity seems 
always to be one step ahead of individual subjectivity. But there still nevertheless 
seems to be something that language cannot quite capture, something about our 
innermost psyche that, as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard believe, is either betrayed, 
sacrificed or at least concealed by language. The answer may lie in our immediate 
sensuous experience, in how the world seems to each of us. 
 
‘Behold her with my eyes and she will appear a goddess to you.’54 
 
Even if we are exceptionally articulate, language can often fail us when it comes to 
expressing our most personal feelings and experiences. Here the inadequacies of 
language confront us head on and its noncoincidence with our intimate, private 
existence is laid bare. We feel perhaps that such experiences are irreconcilable with 
the generality of words, an obvious case being how people in love very often feel 
that they are unable to communicate how they feel to their loved one(s) and that the 
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word ‘love’, dulled through overuse, does not even approach that which they wish 
they could say. ‘How much do you love me?’ is a question that it is impossible to 
answer. So there does seem to be a structural inarticulacy to many of our most 
intimate, private feelings, and since, as we have already seen, we cannot construct a 
private language to express them we might feel that we want to just show the 
person how it feels – look this is how I feel about you, this is how much I love you. 
 
David Foster Wallace, in his poignant short story Good Old Neon, addresses this 
seeming inadequacy of language to get at the true heart of our experience, 
describing the inexpressible manner in which an apparently infinite richness of 
thoughts and associations rushes through one’s head in an instant. This is a feeling 
that... 
 
bears so little relation to the sort of linear, one-word-after-another-word 
English we all communicate with each other with that it could easily take a 
whole lifetime just to spell out the contents of one split-second’s flash of 
thoughts and connections, etc…What goes on inside is just too fast and too 
huge and all interconnected for words to do more than barely sketch the 
outlines of at most one tiny little part of it at any given instant.
55
  
 
But again, if language cannot penetrate the seemingly infinite depths of our 
experience, what if we could exhibit this instantaneous ‘flash’ just how it comes 
upon us, and transmit it to another mind, so that all the flood of meanings and 
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associations that we could never begin to outline in words were made immediately 
known to the other? 
 
In the science-fiction film Brainstorm (Dir. Douglas Trumbull, 1983), a group of 
scientists are working on a technology that can do precisely what we are describing 
here: that is, communicate a first person experience to a third person via virtual 
reality headsets. Their earliest prototype enables the receiver to see what the other 
person sees, as if experiencing by proxy, or inhabiting the other’s body. But a 
subsequent breakthrough allows the user to actually transmit the feelings, thoughts 
and emotions that accompany and colour that experience, so that rather than merely 
seeing through their eyes we can, as it were, see into their head. One of the lead 
scientists on the project, played by Christopher Walken, has become emotionally 
estranged from his wife over a number of years and communication between the 
two has completely broken down. As they are on the verge of divorce he ‘uploads’ 
a series of happy memories of their marriage, along with the emotions that are 
stirred up by them, and presents it to her as a parting gift. After this seemingly 
impossible communication takes place they both re-experience their former love for 
each other and are reunited. The distance between the two is thus short-circuited 
and everything that they feel but cannot say to each other can now be directly 
shown. 
 
It takes no great leap of the imagination to envisage the cognitive imaging 
technologies to which we have been continually returning being utilised in a 
manner comparable to this. Indeed the possibility of extracting something like a 
‘mental picture’ of what one is seeing or thinking and importing it into the brain of 
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another is perhaps not as implausible as it sounds, given the astonishing 
technological advances we have already outlined. What we are really touching on, 
this ‘feeling’ or ‘picture’ that we could perhaps transmit through technological 
means is what in the philosophy of mind is termed qualia: the ineffable, seemingly 
irreducible, ‘what-it-is-like-ness’ of experience, which is incommensurable with 
mere information such as biological or chemical processes. We can describe all the 
physical properties of a bar of chocolate, as well as the neurochemical reactions that 
account for our pleasure in eating it, but this can not explain or do away with the 
quale: how it feels right now to be eating it. This is something that language is 
apparently incapable of expressing or describing, since I can only communicate the 
common words, not the unique raw sensation that I experience. 
 
However, is this truly the case? As Wittgenstein puts it, 
 
Describe the aroma of coffee. – Why can’t it be done? Do we lack the 
words? And for what are words lacking? – But how do we get the idea that 
such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of 
such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not 
succeeded?
56
 
 
The point is, if we each know what coffee smells like, and we each know the 
meaning of the English word ‘coffee’ then my interlocutor will know what I am 
talking about when I describe or refer to it and there is no failure of communication. 
There might be subtle variations in smell which a coffee connoisseur would detect 
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and be able to articulate while a less discriminating palate would not, and there 
might be a particular aromatic note that we discern but cannot quite describe, but 
this is a mere deficiency in knowledge and not a fundamentally incommunicable 
quality. If we could identify it then we could describe or name it. But nevertheless 
we still feel that there is something more, something beyond these mere words, 
such as ‘coffee’ and its accompanying adjectives – sweet, bitter, nutty – that we 
experience but which necessarily escapes expression. And this ‘something more’ is 
precisely the sensation that this coffee smell incites within us, so that it is not the 
‘outward’ smell that we wish to describe, its objective properties, but its ‘inward’ 
manifestation to consciousness. This is the point at which we believe language 
breaks down, for it seems that all description must end somewhere, after which all 
we can do is ‘point’ to the sensation itself. So when Wittgenstein asks, ‘for what are 
words lacking?’ we can reply: the quale, the smell-sensation for me. 
 
So if when I speak about the smell of coffee I can only communicate its ‘outward’ 
properties, what I keep within myself is how the smell of coffee is for me, which 
may be bound up with a unique network of memories and associations connected 
with it. But how it is for me is of course the only possible acquaintance I can have 
with the aroma itself, I can never know how the other may experience it or how it 
may be outside of any subjective perception whatever. So when I describe the smell 
of coffee perhaps we can say that what I actually refer to is a private, 
incommunicable sensation but what I say is the general. When the other hears this 
‘general’ word he translates it into his private sensation and the concomitant 
associations that are stirred up. So we each have a private, incomparable sensation 
but communication nevertheless takes place because we each invest these words 
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with significance and know in our own case to which inward sensations they refer. 
The situation is somewhat akin to Croce’s account of the art object, which is an 
external vehicle required only to trigger an internal intuition, effacing itself in the 
process. 
 
What this kind of thinking presupposes, as Wittgenstein puts it, is that a word 
‘means something known to everyone; and in addition, for each person, it means 
something known only to him[.] (Or perhaps rather: it refers to something known 
only to him.)’57 So when I say ‘the smell of coffee’ I might be led into thinking that 
it has an outward meaning that can be communicated, as well as a private, 
inexpressible meaning, due to the fact that each person may experience that smell 
differently and it is only of my own case that I can speak. It suggests a strict 
dichotomous relationship between the outer words that I use in order to make 
myself understood to others and my inner private experience, and when I say a 
word ‘I cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order to say to 
myself: I know all right what I mean by it.’58 On this way of thinking we can never 
be sure that the other, for example, sees colours in the same way we do, but we rely 
on a certain pragmatism in so far as we have all agreed to call this particular colour 
‘red’, regardless of the possible variations in individual experience. So perhaps 
each person’s experience really is incomparably unique but language divests us of 
that uniqueness. We each (perhaps) see red differently, and so the word ‘red’ means 
something different, private, to all of us in addition to its common, universal 
meaning. 
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However, Wittgenstein compares the vacuity of declaring ‘I know how red looks to 
me’, or ‘I know how coffee smells to me’, to someone saying ‘“But I know how tall 
I am!” and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it.’59 Knowing how tall I am 
has meaning only if I can refer to a stable measuring criteria, which is not to say 
that in the absence of such measuring devices I am heightless, or I have no idea 
where the top of my head stops, but only that for the concept of height to mean 
anything there must be an external standard of comparison. Likewise when I use the 
concept ‘red’, or ‘coffee’, I direct the other to the object itself rather than to a 
private sensation: 
 
Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself ‘How blue the sky is!’ – 
When you do it spontaneously – without philosophical intentions – the idea 
never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you. 
And you have no hesitation in exclaiming that to someone else. And if you 
point at anything as you say the words you point at the sky. I am saying: 
you have not the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 
‘naming the sensation’ when one is thinking about ‘private language’.60 
 
So again, just as we cannot construct a private language, so we cannot imbue 
common words with ‘private’ meaning, and the notion of there being a fundamental 
incommensurability across different experiential perspectives is a philosophical 
fiction, according to Wittgenstein. 
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Husserl too insists upon this implicit intersubjective agreement in our experience of 
the external world, believing that this is the only way to guarantee objective 
knowledge. For unless I assume that the other’s way of experiencing the world is 
the same as my own, not only are we unable to find common ground on which to 
communicate but we are each left in a state of Cartesian doubt with no way of 
ascertaining whether the external world as it seems to us is actually a hallucination. 
This is not to say that there are not ‘abnormalities’ or discrepancies across different 
subjective experiences but these are merely variations viewed against the 
background of a certain common range. In the words of Husserl, ‘the constituting 
of abnormality is possible only on the basis of an intrinsically antecedent 
normality.’61 Synesthesia, agnosia, even colour-blindness, all to varying degrees 
constitute different phenomenological experiences but such unusual cases cannot 
lead us to generalise the abnormal and wonder whether such a radical incongruity is 
in fact the norm. And if this is the case then this singular otherness of the other that 
we are orbiting around cannot be located at the level of how the world appears to 
him. For since intersubjectivity is only possible at all so long as we assume a 
certain commonality of experience, the possibility of ‘seeing what the other sees’ 
could not lead to the ‘disappearance’ of intersubjectivity that Žižek describes. This 
would only be the case if we assumed that each of us ‘sees the world’ 
fundamentally differently, but then once again there would be no intersubjective 
relation to overcome. It is possible to imagine, purely hypothetically, that through 
the administration of hallucinogenic drugs or some form of perceptual distortion we 
could experience what-it-is-like for someone with a different perceptual apparatus 
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than ourselves, and the fact that such a possibility can be conceived at all 
demonstrates that this is not a radical or insurmountable difference. 
 
Yet nevertheless there are certain cases in our everyday experience, especially so in 
the feeling of romantic love touched upon above, where we do maintain that 
although we may each use the same word (‘love’), each person may mean or refer 
to something private and incomparable by it that others could not understand (and 
not just because it is a peculiarly indefinable abstract term). This inarticulacy is not 
a mere empirical lack; it feels constitutive to the feeling love that we are unable 
adequately to communicate it. So could we conceive of transmitting this 
inarticulable feeling to someone else? Could we imagine communicating it to 
someone who did not feel the love that we do towards a particular person? Could 
we show them by making them see the loved one as we do, see them in their 
lovableness as it were? However, would this not assume that it was an isolable 
datum that could conceivably be detached and conveyed to another person? Is there 
one characteristic unit of sensation corresponding to this experience that could be 
expressed in an instant, or is it not rather an ongoing, mutable network of 
associations and memories that have developed into this indefinable feeling to 
which we give the name ‘love’? 
 
Of course this could be said not only of a feeling as singular and profound as love, 
but to a greater or lesser extent of every thought, sensation or feeling. For, as the 
above passage from the David Foster-Wallace story describes, even our most banal 
and commonplace experiences are intimately bound up with a whole network of our 
previous associations, without their being consciously dwelt upon. This is their 
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horizon or background and one could not detach the thing itself (the momentary 
thought or feeling) from this context without making of it a different experience. As 
Wittgenstein asks, ‘[could] one have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space 
of one second – no matter what preceded or followed this second? – What is 
happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The surroundings give it 
its importance.’62 Just as a fifty pound note has no meaning outside of a capitalist 
economy that invests it with value, so if we were to isolate one instant in a person’s 
experience, interrupted from the thread of associations, hopes, expectations, 
memories, etc. that led up to it and will follow on from it then that momentary 
‘state’ would not be the same moment as it is experienced by the person himself. To 
put the same point in Husserlian terms, the world exists for me ‘only as cogitatum 
of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes’ and hence it 
follows that it would not be the same cogitatum outside of this particular stream of 
cogitationes.
63
 The phenomenon of love, as well as the word itself, as Wittgenstein 
puts it, ‘refers to a phenomenon of human life’64 and thus has sense only within that 
life. And, to again juxtapose Wittgenstein with Husserl here, the latter says 
something very similar when he says that ‘what is experienced’ in our moment to 
moment experience is ‘nothing more than a synthetic unity inseparable from this 
                                                 
62
 Philosophical Investigations, § 583, p. 153. 
63
 Cartesian Meditations, § 15, p. 37. Similarly, in the Ideas I, Husserl writes that ‘no concrete 
mental process can be accepted as a self-sufficient one in the full sense’, which means that no 
‘content’ of phenomenological experience can be taken on its own, for each moment of 
consciousness is what it is only within its contextual ‘stream’. Furthermore, ‘two streams of mental 
processes (spheres of consciousness for two pure Egos) of an identically essential content are 
inconceivable, as well as that no completely determined mental process of the one stream can belong 
to the other [...;] only mental processes of an identical inner characteristic can be common to them 
(although not common as individually identical), but not two mental processes which, in addition, 
have a “halo” absolutely alike.’ Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans., F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) 
pp. 198-9. 
64
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 583, p. 153. 
279 
 
life and its potentialities.’65 The whole series of associations that make up my 
feeling of love towards a person (or of hope, or hatred, or enjoyment) could not be 
distilled into one communicable ‘flash’, just as the whole of someone’s life could 
not be condensed into one second.
66
 
 
However, perhaps dwelling on an example as loaded and as indefinable as love has 
made our question harder than it needed to be. We could simplify matters a great 
deal by considering something less ‘ineffable’, such as taste and asking whether we 
could imagine a technological system that would be capable of isolating and 
transmitting it to another person’s brain. Suppose, then, that I find the taste of 
bananas unpleasant; could the experience of someone who does like that taste be 
transmitted to me, so that I can experience what-it-is-like to enjoy bananas? If we 
give credence to the philosophical notion of qualia then we would have to say that 
we each have a different experience of this taste of bananas, and that the distinct 
quality of experience for someone who loathes them is fundamentally different 
from that of someone who cannot get enough of them. But there is nothing in the 
taste of bananas that I am missing, nothing that my banana-loving friend is privy to 
that I am not, it is simply that we have different responses to that taste. We could 
imagine a conversation taking place along the lines of, ‘I hate that mushiness, the 
                                                 
65
 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, § 47, p. 104. 
66
 This ‘background’ of associations and memories is closely related to what in cognitive science is 
known as ‘the frame problem’, that is, the immense difficulty in replicating in a computational 
system the ease and speed with which we get our bearings in a situation and process or make sense 
of any event with which we are faced, however unexpected. For since we have gathered such an 
immense store of knowledge over the course of our lives, and everything we have learned is 
potentially relevant in any situation, this knowledge must be immediately accessible at all times so 
that it can be called upon as soon as it is required. And of course a large amount of our knowledge is 
entirely useless, but this must also be permanently ‘on hand’ in case it were needed. So in any 
attempt at constructing something resembling artificial intelligence, or of providing a computational 
model of how consciousness works, such a faculty would impose huge demands on the structuring 
and processing of information. Cf. W.F.G Haselager, Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: The 
Right Frame of Mind, (London: SAGE, 1997), pp. 54-77. 
280 
 
lingering bitter aftertaste’, to which my friend replies, ‘yes, that’s what I love about 
them!’  
 
Dennett likens our individual discriminatory dispositions to a true story about two 
Soviet spies who used an ingenious password system to identify each other. Each 
had one half of a torn cardboard Jell-O box, and since the likelihood of someone’s 
replicating the tear exactly is so small it acted as an infallible recognition device. 
Dennett’s suggestion is that just as each torn piece of cardboard acts as a unique 
detector for its counterpart, so our distinct dispositions ‘fit’ the world individually 
and perfectly. Interestingly, he asserts that this is a reciprocal development, 
meaning the natural world actually meets us in the middle, each having evolved to 
take best advantage of the other. So just as we developed colour vision as a survival 
strategy, the natural world evolved a form of colour-coding in order to attract or 
repel animals such as us. Thus the colour fruit turns when it is ripe is that fruit’s 
means of advertising itself to a potential seed-spreader, it having developed this 
quality in order to maximise its chances for reproduction and take advantage of 
those animals with colour-vision. There are plenty of entirely subsidiary by-
products that accompany this coevolution of colour and colour-vision, and not 
every brightly coloured natural object is so for a reason. However, the only reason 
we can distinguish red rubies from green emeralds, as Dennett puts it, is because we 
have evolved to distinguish red from green berries. ‘The fact that there is a 
difference in colour between rubies and emeralds can thus be considered to be a 
derived colour phenomenon.’67 The point is, to an animal with a different visual 
apparatus, this connection between berries and rubies will not exist. 
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What goes for colour goes equally for sweetness and bitterness, and pleasant and 
foul aromas, all of which being further means of attracting or repelling, which 
coevolved alongside our taste and smell receptors, letting us know what it is 
advisable to eat and what it is not. There will of course be innumerable particular 
variations, such as liking or loathing bananas for example, but these are mere 
evolutionary quirks that serve no purpose (unless, as Dennett points out, they come 
to put the bearer at an advantage in some unforeseen way. If bananas turned out to 
be deadly, for example, people who did not like the taste would be in a better 
position to survive ahead of those who did.) 
 
Because of this interlocking reciprocity that our discriminatory states establish 
towards the world, like the two pieces of torn cardboard, there is no external criteria 
– outside of the encounter – against which we can judge it. So if someone wants to 
refer to his own private qualitative experience, of red-ness for example, and say that 
this is how it is for me, ‘[all] that move accomplishes (at best)’, says Dennett, ‘is to 
point to his own idiosyncratic colour-discrimination state, a move that is parallel to 
holding up a piece of Jell-O box and saying that it detects this shape property.’68 
 
So does it really make any sense to talk about isolating and communicating qualia, 
as in transmitting the ‘likeableness’ of bananas to someone who does not like them? 
Does it in fact make any sense to talk about qualia at all? We can look to a passage 
from Wittgenstein, which anticipates some of the points we are making here: 
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Someone suddenly sees an appearance which he does not recognise (it may 
be a familiar object, but in an unusual position or lighting); the lack of 
recognition perhaps lasts only a few seconds. Is it correct to say he has a 
different visual experience from someone who knew the object at once?
69
 
 
The answer would be that it both is and is not correct. If a song starts playing and I 
do not recognise it while the person sitting next to me does, the auditory sensation 
we each experience is the same (supposing neither person’s hearing is impaired) but 
we both respond differently to it. So the song is the same but our experience of it is 
qualitatively different, just as the way we ‘hear’ a song for the hundredth time 
strikes us as different to how we ‘hear’ it the first (or the way we drive along a 
street for the nth time is different to how we negotiate it the first time.) This is 
because each individual’s ‘complex of reactive dispositions’ is peculiar to that 
person and our own such states are not fixed and immutable but adapt and change 
over time as we learn. And so all that could ever conceivably be communicated in a 
real-world equivalent of the Brainstorm technology would be the taste itself, or the 
visual stimulus itself. Since there is no transcendent what-it-is-like-ness that 
corresponds to the quality ‘liking bananas’ or ‘disliking bananas’, merely the 
individual reactions of our taste receptors to one and the same taste, I will still not 
like the taste of bananas even if I experience it by proxy, ‘through’ the experience 
of someone else who does like it. There is no information that could be made 
available to me that would transform my experience, for we each taste the same 
thing, which is to say the taste manifests itself identically to each of us and we 
simply have different responses to it. This may lead to our wanting to say 
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something like the ‘objective quality’ is the same while the ‘subjective quality’ is 
different, but, aside from the absurdity of speaking of objectivity where taste is 
concerned, this really says no more than that one of us likes it while the other does 
not; there is no need to invent an additional terminology. All of this of course goes 
equally in the case of love. Love is not predicated on a certain knowledge as if, as 
the Phil Spector song goes, ‘to know him is to love him’. I do not love somebody 
because I know something about him or her that a third person does not, or because 
I simply know them better than anyone else does. The other may know everything 
there is to know about the object of our love and yet still not be able to feel how we 
do. Thus the quote attributed to Nicomachus with which we have opened this 
section (‘Behold her with my eyes…’) is not as if to say ‘if you knew her the way I 
know her you would feel as I do’, but is rather the tautologous, ‘if you felt the way I 
do about her you would feel as I do’. There is nothing that the other person is 
missing in his experience of my beloved that could be made evident to him in a 
flash of realisation. 
 
However, perhaps an even more crucial point concerning the possibility or 
conceivability of gaining access to another’s first-person experience is that even 
supposing, ignoring all of the objections we have so far encountered, that we could 
upload an experience or feeling such as that of ‘love’ to a database as Christopher 
Walken’s scientist does, and enable the other to experience it for themselves, this 
would still not truly be my feeling of love that the other experiences but his own. 
For even if it is (originally) ‘my’ multifarious network of memories, feelings and 
associations that he is able to feel – meaning he actually feels them first hand rather 
than viewing or gaining knowledge of them – they would still be experienced as if 
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they were his own. He now perhaps knows what it would be like were he to feel the 
love that I do and to have had the memories and feelings that I have had but what 
he still does not know (first hand) is what this experience is like for me. And surely 
if the faculty of telepathy is indeed to effect such a radical penetration into the other 
as to overcome their very otherness then this is the decisive obstacle that would 
need to be negotiated. It is not an enrichment of my own experience that I would be 
looking for but an insight into the experience of another. Thus, once again, it should 
not be a matter of gaining empathetic understanding into what it would be like for 
me to experience what he is experiencing but precisely to see what it is like for 
him.
70
 
 
In Spike Jonze and Charlie Kaufman’s film Being John Malkovich (1999), there 
famously exists a magical cupboard door which leads directly into the mind of the 
actor John Malkovich, but the way this is experienced for the successive inhabitants 
of Malkovich’s mind (which is perhaps the only way it could possibly be 
experienced as such – we will come back to this) is as if the actor were a puppet or 
a machine and they were the ‘ghost in the machine’, seeing through his eyes and 
directing his movements but still as themselves, occupying his body. What we are 
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trying to conceive here is whether and how we could really be John Malkovich – 
that is, to not be ourselves experiencing a day in his life. As Derrida puts it, this is 
where original finitude... 
 
makes its appearance in an irreducibly open question which is the 
philosophical question in general: why is the essential, irreducible, 
absolutely general and unconditioned form of experience as a venturing 
forth towards the other still egoity? Why is an experience which would not 
be lived as my own (for an ego in general, in the eidetic-transcendental sense 
of these words) impossible and unthinkable? This unthinkable and 
impossible are the limits of reason in general. In other words: why finitude, 
if, as Schelling had said, ‘egoity is the general principle of finitude’?71 
 
The Experience of the Other 
 
In the Fifth of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl turns his attention to 
transcendental intersubjectivity, applying the phenomenological method to the 
experience or constitution of the ‘alter-ego’, or the other. As we have already 
alluded to, much of the problem centres on how we are to rescue objective 
knowledge of the external world once we have performed the transcendental 
reduction, which restricts us to the interiority of our phenomenological 
presentations. The answer Husserl proposes is that this knowledge is secured 
through intersubjective agreement – through my knowing that there are other 
openings onto the world exactly like my own and thus that the world as it is for me 
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is shared by others.
72
 But before we can proceed to this stage we must first have 
encountered these other egos, who are ‘surely not a mere intending and intended in 
me, merely synthetic unities of possible verification in me, but, according to their 
sense, precisely others’.73 The other qua other opening onto the world and 
guarantor of that world cannot be incorporated as merely a moment of my own 
consciousness without thereby sacrificing that very quality that constitutes him as 
another ego. Yet how am I to have an experience of something definitively outside 
of me and still preserve that very externality? Without by any means following all 
of the intricacies of Husserl’s reasoning we will draw out a few aspects that are 
particularly pertinent to our problem. 
 
What Husserl repeatedly insists upon throughout is the insuperable condition of 
‘ownness’ that characterises all experience. This means that every thought, every 
perceived object, every sensation is such only if it is experienced as ‘peculiarly my 
own’.74 This is obviously not a form of Berkleyan idealism, and nor does ‘my 
ownness’ equate to ‘my own creation’ as in a kind of intellectual intuition. Rather it 
is the basic truism that the only experience I can ever undergo is always, 
inescapably, my experience. This fact of being ‘trapped in our own perspective’ and 
unable to see outside of ourselves is of the essence of our finitude. However, just as 
earlier we could not rid ourselves of intersubjectivity and gain access to that kernel 
of selfhood which, outside of the sphere of universality, belonged to me alone, so 
now it seems that starting from the other side the problem has been reversed. For if 
we assert that everything only is so long as it is for me then the existence of other 
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minds seems at best to be mere conjecture, and we are consequently left with a 
transcendental solipsism. So from whichever side we start out – intersubjectivity on 
the one hand and monadic subjectivity on the other – it seems we are incapable of 
accounting for the other side. However, this apparent relapse into solipsism that 
seems to ensue when we follow the phenomenological method is precisely what 
Husserl means to refute here. For insisting on the insurmountability of one’s own 
experience is by no means to deny intersubjectivity but is rather to secure it; this is 
in fact its founding condition. As Husserl puts it, ‘[the] only conceivable manner in 
which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so 
determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others.’75 Any experience of 
another subject, any ‘venturing forth’ unto the other must still be my experience 
otherwise it is not an experience at all. So any and every encounter with the other 
must necessarily hold back from the other himself; my experience can never reach 
all the way out. All the knowledge I have of him remains a part of me rather than of 
him as such, and so in a certain important respect I never truly encounter the other; 
at least not directly. 
 
This is where Husserl is fundamentally at odds with Levinas, the latter accusing this 
Husserlian account of intersubjectivity of doing violence to the other, and making 
of him merely an object of my consciousness. For Levinas, the other is not in any 
respect an alter-ego (in the sense that I view him as another like myself), for it is 
not a case of starting with my own subjectivity and working outwards. To be sure, 
for Levinas also we do not ‘reach all the way out’ and gain access to the other in his 
innermost being, but in the face-to-face relation with the other he gives me ‘more 
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than I contain.’76 This is what Levinas terms ‘teaching’ as opposed to maieutics, 
which merely awakens within me what was already there lying dormant. The other 
comes to me from a veritable outside; he is presented to me as absolutely exterior, 
rather than the relative externality of objects, which, while retaining a certain 
autonomy are nevertheless presented within me as being outside of me. In the case 
of the other, however, he is never ‘within’ me in this way as a thought or 
representation of mine, for this could only ever reduce him to ‘the same’, to being 
something that I contain. So rather than being an object of cognition, the noema in 
the case of the other ‘overflows the capacity of thought’.77 The only mark or 
presence of the other within my subjective space is his very transcendence and 
infinite externality: ‘The distance that separates ideatum and idea here constitutes 
the content of the ideatum itself.’78 This means that there is not a psychic content 
corresponding to ‘the other’ and in addition the sense of a further unexplored 
horizon as in Husserl’s account of perception. Rather, the very distance or 
transcendence of the other from any concept, knowledge or experience I can have 
of him forms the content itself. The other qua other is this infinite excess or 
overflow. 
 
Now in order for there to be this excess there must be a ‘point of departure’79 from 
which it takes flight – put differently, the infinite overflowing of thought needs the 
thought that it overflows – and Levinas often asserts that alterity ‘is only possible 
starting from me’.80 It follows that the relationship to the other is such only for an I 
that remains itself and does not dissolve in the relationship. The quarrel, then, 
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between these two accounts circulates around how the other is presented to this I, 
and how to maintain the other’s externality within this presentation. This, as we 
have seen, was already Husserl’s stated problem and so by no means something he 
was blind to, but Levinas’ contention is that the attempt results in failure, for the 
other’s infinite externality is reduced to the merely qualified externality of 
objecthood. All of Levinas’ beautifully lyrical analyses of the face-to-face relation 
are oriented around articulating an alternative description that does full justice to 
the other in his alterity and does not result in objectification. 
 
This relation of the face-to-face is, says Levinas, ‘totally different from experience 
in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist’.81  The face is ‘neither seen 
nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the 
alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content.’82 This is the violence that 
Levinas ascribes to Husserl’s account: the I exerting domination over the other by 
making of him merely a modification of my own consciousness. Again, for Levinas 
the other is never given to me as the content of my thought, ‘he maintains a relation 
with me’ but ‘he remains absolute within the relation.’83 The relation is therefore 
‘maintained without violence, in peace with this absolute alterity’84 and exteriority 
is never converted into interiority. 
 
                                                 
81
 Ibid., p. 193. [My italics.] More than a decade earlier, in the essay Time and the Other, trans. 
Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1994), Levinas writes ‘experience 
always already signifies knowledge, light, and initiative, as well as the return of the object to the 
subject.’ p. 70. This is why death is likewise not an experience, of which we will have more to say 
later. 
82
 Ibid., p. 194. 
83
 Ibid., p. 195. 
84
 Ibid., p. 197. 
290 
 
We have been trying to consider how we could gain access to the other’s ownmost 
experience without thereby wresting it back into my experience, but here Levinas 
seems to suggest that we are on the wrong tack with such an approach. For since an 
experience can only ever belong to me, it is wrong to speak of an experience at all 
where the other is concerned. The other is infinitely irreducible to a subjective 
event for me. Thus not only do I never experience the other ‘himself’, but I never 
experience the other at all, since the other is never something that happens to me 
but something that remains infinitely outside of me. So we can still say that all 
experience remains my experience, but if we follow Levinas we must add that the 
other can never be a part or moment of this experience. However, if it is not my 
experience in the face-to-face encounter do we already have what we are looking 
for? Is not every encounter with the other already a surpassing or negating of my 
own experience and a presentation of the other in person, i.e., immediately? 
 
But this entails further questions, for if my encounter with the other is not an 
‘experience’, which is the essence of my ownness, how am I still to hold onto the I 
and not let it dissolve in the relationship? Where am ‘I’ in this face-to-face relation? 
How do we preserve ‘this radical heterogeneity’85 unless I hold fast to my 
experience and the other likewise? If the other is not somehow a part of my 
meaningful existence, if he remains entirely external to any cognition or perception 
I can have of him then how is he to present himself to me at all? How can I talk 
about the other as such unless he is the other for me? For unless the I collapses 
altogether into the other the only alternative through which he would remain wholly 
outside of my experience is if I have no encounter with him at all. 
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Derrida, coming to Husserl’s defence, judges that Levinas ‘deprives himself of the 
very foundation and possibility of his own language’ by ‘refusing to acknowledge 
an intentional modification of the ego – which would be a violent and totalitarian 
act for him’.86 For even though Levinas insists upon the ‘point of departure’ in the 
relationship (the I), he cannot account for how the infinitely other appears from this 
vantage point unless it is as an ‘intentional modification of the ego’ – his 
appearance in and for me, which, as Husserl shows, is appearance tout court. Thus 
a certain violence is irreducible according to Derrida, and there is no ‘peaceful’ 
encounter with the other that would not coincide with the worst violence – again, 
either the total absorption of one into the other or the negation of the face to face 
encounter altogether. He can only ever be presented to me as a moment of myself 
and never as absolutely, or infinitely, other. This violence is pre-ethical and opens 
the possibility of ethics, in that prior to it there would be no intersubjective relation 
to speak of. Furthermore, as Derrida here contends, it is only if we follow Husserl 
and view the other as precisely an alter-ego, ‘like myself’, that we do justice to him 
in his alterity. For ‘[if] the other was not recognised as an ego, its entire alterity 
would collapse.’87 
 
So it seems we have reached a certain limit, and the only way for the other to 
appear to me in any kind of relationship (‘face to face’ or ‘mind to mind’) would be 
in and through my own experience. Perhaps the telepathic relationship we have 
been seeking, which would present the other to me absolutely and without 
mediation, is the Levinasian ideal of the peaceful encounter. For if I yearn to access 
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the other from his own perspective and not from mine, it is because we surely see 
this as being the only truly non-violent relationship: rather than him appearing to 
me and for me, he would be present for himself, able to ‘speak for himself’ without 
intermediary. But, to reiterate, this could only be accomplished as the worst form of 
violence – either to myself or to the other. It is thus only by doing justice to 
Husserl’s account, against Levinas’ critique, that we guarantee respect for the other 
in his otherness. Were I to ‘depart’ from myself and enter into the other’s 
phenomenological interior absolutely this would indeed destroy intersubjectivity, 
but not by making the other into the absolutely transparent object of my cognition 
as Žižek describes, but rather by my collapsing entirely into his subjectivity and 
losing this sphere of ‘my ownness’. For how could I experience another’s 
phenomenological inner-space, as they experience it, while simultaneously 
maintaining an external perspective? This desire to see the world through another’s 
eyes, or ‘experience’ an experience that is not our own is similar to the nostalgic 
wish to go back and relive a point in our own history; in both cases we do not really 
know what it is we are wishing for. For we would ask, do you want to witness or 
observe this moment as if from the outside? To which the answer would be, ‘No, 
that is not enough. I want to experience it, to live it again!’ But then if you do 
‘experience’ it you lose the external vantage point that bestows the memory with 
the value you now attach to it and simply live it as if for the first time. Therefore 
you would not be re-living it as a past experience but simply living it. There is no 
compromise or middle point between these two ‘points of departure’, it is a simple 
case of one or the other. If we envisage a compromise to be a kind of ‘living 
through’ the experience, where you perform the actions and say the words that the 
younger version of yourself said and did in this hypothetical past event while 
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remaining the ‘present’ self observing it as you are doing it, you still are not 
reliving it in the way that you wish, there remains an irreducible distance, as with 
the various occupants of the mind of John Malkovich. So either you experience it 
and consequently do not experience it (from your present vantage point) or you 
merely witness it from outside and do not experience it. Returning to the question 
of experiencing another’s thoughts as they are experienced in the other, either I 
retain the distance of an external observer, and consequently I do not experience it 
(first hand), or I do gain first-hand access but at the cost of dissolving my own 
subjectivity into theirs and consequently I do not experience it. I am either on one 
side or the other, but the wish is to somehow straddle the divide: to experience his 
experience while simultaneously maintaining a certain distance, a certain selfhood, 
which is an impossible hybrid comparable to the Sartrean In-Itself-For-Itself, or 
God. 
 
So, for Husserl, in our knowledge of the other a ‘certain mediacy of intentionality 
must be present’, which is termed ‘appresentation’. The other is appresented but 
never given, for if he were given, ‘if what belongs to the other’s essence were 
directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and 
ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same.’88 The other can never be 
immediately presented to me without disappearing altogether, and if I were to gain 
this impossible access, the very instant it is consummated the other evaporates: 
 
Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, originally – is 
something I am; or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, 
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by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterises 
a primordially unfulfillable experience – an experience that does not give 
something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated 
– is ‘other’.89 
 
As soon as I access the subjectivity of the other immediately (as soon as he is 
presented rather than appresented), the other becomes a part of myself and 
intersubjectivity collapses. So even though telepathy would perhaps bring us to the 
closest point just short of an immediate encounter, the two communicating subjects 
would still ‘absolve themselves from the relation’90 that they enter into; otherwise 
there would be no relation as such, they would maintain absolute communion. But 
our insistence upon the inescapability and the finitude of this quality of ownness 
need not necessarily equate to solipsism. In fact, as Søren Overgaard stresses, 
would it not be the other option that amounts to the truly solipsistic position? For if 
I were not condemned to access the world only through my own individual 
perspective this would condemn me to the ‘solitude of being the owner of all 
perspectives.’91 
 
From Telepathy to Teleiopoesis 
 
This is how we should understand the following passage from Derrida’s essay 
‘Telepathy’: 
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For here is my latest paradox, which you alone will understand clearly: it is 
because there would be telepathy that a postcard can always not arrive at its 
destination. The ultimate naivety would be to allow oneself to think that 
Telepathy guarantees a destination that ‘posts and telecommunications’ fail 
to assure. On the contrary, everything I said about the postcarded structure 
of the mark (interference, parasiting, divisibility, iterability, and so on) is 
found in the network. This goes for any tele-system – whatever its content, 
form, or medium.
92
 
 
Without entering into a discussion of the strategic terms Derrida here employs – 
‘(interference, parasiting, divisibility, iterability, and so on)’ – we can begin to 
grasp the meaning more clearly if we juxtapose it with a statement from the early 
work Speech and Phenomena: 
 
Everything in my speech which is destined to manifest an experience to 
another must pass by the mediation of its physical side; this irreducible 
mediation involves every expression in an indicative function.
93
  
 
No matter how clearly a person may express themselves the mediating sign is never 
transparent and my interlocutor’s ‘lived experience’ is never present to me in itself 
but only through traversing and ‘to some degree [losing] itself in, the opaqueness of 
a body’.94 Because of this ‘irreducible mediation’ communication can never be 
ideal or perfect, there is always a certain interpretative necessity on behalf of the 
receiver and hence the ever-present possibility of failure or misunderstanding. I 
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may hear a perfectly innocent remark as a sarcastic gibe, or I might take literally a 
merely hollow offer such as a dinner invitation. At first glance, however, this 
recourse to externality would seemingly be bypassed or negated in the case of 
telepathic communication, where it is a matter of one mind communicating with 
another (apparently) without mediation. For telepathic communication, as a means 
of ‘instant’ delivery seems to establish a direct connection between subjects, and if 
the other can encounter my thought for himself then the possibility of 
misunderstanding is surely overcome. However, for all of the reasons we have 
outlined so far this is an untenable proposition, which is tantamount to saying that 
mediation remains irreducible. 
 
An interesting related question is whether one could lie in thought, or whether the 
ability to ‘read someone’s mind’ entails always knowing whether or not they are 
telling the truth. Sartre writes that, ‘[by] the lie consciousness affirms that it exists 
by nature as hidden from the Other; it utilises for its own profit the ontological 
duality of myself and myself in the eyes of the Other.’95 But again, would a 
telepathic insight not see behind the curtain and perceive the insincerity, thus 
overcoming (in part) the other’s hiddenness? Once more, the television series 
Heroes provides us with the perfect example of how not to envisage this possibility 
when in one scene a character says one thing – out loud – and thinks another, which 
the telepathic character of course is able to ‘hear’. But a lie is not like a box that 
contains something different to what it says on the label. I do not, for example, 
think ‘no’ and say ‘yes’, I simply say that which is not the case or that which I do 
not really think or believe. As Wittgenstein would say, there is nothing internal, in 
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addition to the utterance, which accompanies it – except perhaps a feeling of guilt 
or unease, but then this would be manifest (to the astute observer, or the polygraph) 
in my behaviour. No matter how far we may penetrate the other’s consciousness we 
will always remain on the outside, and always in the position of interpreting 
‘external’ behaviour. Nowhere will we reach a decisive core at which his meaning 
or his sincerity may be finally determined. 
 
So all communication, any ‘tele-system’ whatever, must ‘go via the stars’96 before 
reaching (or not) its destination. As long as the two egos are ‘separated by an abyss 
I cannot actually cross’97 as Husserl puts it, then no form of absolute communion 
could ever take place and no communication will ever be ideal; but if this abyss 
were to be crossed – or closed altogether – then it would mean the end for one or 
other of us and hence the end of communication. Thus we could say in Derridean 
language that this gap or abyss is both the opening and the limit of communication. 
Telepathy, again, perhaps brings us to the extreme edge of the abyss, the point at 
which we come closest to passing over into the other side, but this is also the point 
at which it presents itself all the more insistently as absolutely un-negotiable. So if 
anything this abyssal gap between subjects would be more pronounced in the case 
of telepathy than in sensory communication precisely because by circumventing 
what seems to constitute the obstacle – space, the sense-organs, the constraints of 
language – and bringing one mind ‘directly’ into contact with another, the very 
impossibility of realising this immediacy confronts us – ‘directly’, if it is possible 
to speak of an immediacy of mediation. For, as we have intimated above, there 
would be no way back once we had crossed the limit; or if we did come ‘back to 
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our senses’ there would be no way of integrating this out of body (or, rather, out of 
mind) experience into our own stream of consciousness without assimilating it, that 
is without making it into my own experience. It would become either a blind spot or 
just a memory of something that happened to me, and not a memory of somebody 
else’s experience. 
 
So we could say that the fact that I can be understood at all through the opaqueness 
of the mediating body, the fact that my meaning can ever traverse this abyss and 
you can ‘know what I am thinking’, this itself involves a minimum of telepathy in 
the etymological sense of to touch at a distance. Brain-to-brain communication 
would then be a special case of a general telepathy. If the ‘destination’ were 
guaranteed in advance then there would be no delivery at all, the sender and 
recipient would be one and the same. So for all communication, a certain distance, 
and hence a certain telepathy, is necessary. 
 
However, what are we to make of those scattered instances where Derrida speaks of 
a message that includes its destination within it, a letter that ‘carries its address 
along and implies in advance, in its very readability, the signature of the 
addressee’? This is a message which involves, incorporates, implies its reader or 
hearer. Yet how can this be so without already guaranteeing its arrival? And after 
what we have just seen, if the recipient were already assured and fixed in advance 
how could we even speak of a delivery? As Derrida describes it, ‘[here] is an arrow 
whose flight would consist in a return to the bow: fast enough, in sum, never to 
have left it’. So does anything even take place here if the letter is never posted, or 
the arrow never leaves the bow? Seemingly so, for ‘[it] will nevertheless have 
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reached us, struck home; it will have taken some time’. Travelling at an ‘infinite or 
nil speed’, this seemingly paradoxical ‘absolute economy’ Derrida labels 
teleiopoesis, in the sense that it ‘renders absolute, perfect, completed, 
accomplished, finished’, while remaining at a ‘distance at one remove’.98 
 
There is a certain instantaneity to this teleiopoetic effect, or even better it ‘advances 
backwards; it outruns itself by reversing itself.’99 This is a performative structure 
unlike any other (which Derrida elsewhere calls an ‘absolute performative’100), 
whereby the announcement or the prediction of the event will already have made it 
occur. What is said or thought happens by virtue of being said or thought. So it is 
not enough, Derrida writes in ‘Telepathy’, to ‘foresee or to predict what would 
happen one day’. Rather what is in question is how to think ‘what would happen by 
the very fact of being predicted or foreseen, a sort of beautiful apocalypse 
telescoped, kaleidoscoped, triggered off at that very moment by the precipitation of 
the announcement itself, consisting precisely in this announcement’.101 Thinking 
through the effective force of the prediction itself, the ‘mighty power’ of the 
‘might’ (exploiting to the full the double meaning of this word, as strength and as 
uncertainty – ‘it might happen’), would allow us to ‘see the difference between 
make come and let come vanish at an infinite speed.’102 
 
This concept of teleiopoesis is developed in The Politics of Friendship through a 
reading of Nietzsche and his call in Beyond Good and Evil for a new breed of 
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philosophers of the future.
103
 Nietzsche speaks to these future philosophers, and for 
them. He predicts their arrival, announces their presence on the horizon and calls 
out, beckons, or appeals to them. But as we have just seen, the question is not one 
of the accuracy or verifiability of this prediction but of what is produced, 
constituted, effected ‘by the very fact of being predicted or foreseen’: 
 
Nietzsche renews the call; he puts through – from a different place – this 
teleiopoetic or telephone call to philosophers of a new species. To those of 
us who already are such philosophers, for in saying that he sees them 
coming, in saying that they are coming, in feigning to record their coming 
[…], he is calling, he is asking, in sum, ‘that they come’ in the future. But to 
be able to say this, from the standpoint of the presumed signer, these new 
philosophers – from the standpoint of what is being written, from where we 
(Nietzsche and his followers) are writing to one another – must already have 
arrived.
104
 
 
This is an intricate, circuitous structure whose complexity only increases the further 
we interrogate it. On the one hand, the call announces and constitutes the called: 
Nietzsche’s prophetic address includes in advance those heirs to whom it is 
addressed, and delimits the space in which they can appear; the prediction thus 
brings about its own realisation. The moment it is read and understood it will 
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always have been addressed to that very reader who now understands it, but nothing 
guarantees that anyone will understand the call or be there to hear it, which is a first 
reason why the message can include its reader without thereby ensuring a 
determined destination. This accounts for the messianic structure that Derrida 
ascribes to the teleiopoetic effect, for when praying for the Messiah to come or 
wondering when he will arrive I am addressing myself to the Messiah, ‘here and 
now, to inquire when he will come.’105 In so doing I establish myself as his ‘herald 
and precursor’,106 so whenever the Messiah or philosopher of the future does arrive 
(and again, nothing guarantees that he will) the call will have already addressed 
him, only him, no matter how much time may have passed between call and 
response. 
 
But on the other hand this is not a simply unilateral movement, with the reader 
deciding to try and live up to Nietzsche’s demand and become the person described 
or announced. For if someone is able to hear this call then she already is the 
philosopher of the future whom Nietzsche prophesies; if she were not she would 
fail to understand it, and the appeal would fall on deaf ears. So this recipient does 
not simply and straightforwardly succeed Nietzsche as his disciple. Even as 
Nietzsche writes his appeal, his interlocutor must ‘already have arrived’, for in 
speaking to this other, the other ‘precedes’, ‘informs’107 and ‘inspires’108 the sender. 
Thus it is not a unidirectional communication, which starts with Nietzsche and ends 
with the recipient. Already the order of succession of the teleiopoetic event is 
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unstable: once Nietzsche pens this address the subsequent addressees will have 
already preceded it. 
 
And as we saw in our first chapter with the three identical statements from De 
Kooning, Cage and Borges about the reversal of influence (‘every writer creates his 
own precursors’), there is a further reciprocal exchange at work. It is not simply 
that the writer, artist or philosopher of the future will hear something – in Nietzsche 
or, say, Herman Melville for example – that nobody else has yet heard, for this 
assumes that the call resounded prior to its being heard and was merely waiting for 
a response. As such the subsequent artist would not truly have created his or her 
precursors but merely been more attentive to them than others. Rather, if we are to 
do justice to the circuitous path of teleiopoesis, we might say that in hearing the 
message she effects the sending of it, recalling that strange temporality of the 
Freudian Nachträglichkeit that we saw previously, where an event is only 
retroactively constituted as a ‘cause’ by the ‘effect’. So the receipt of the message 
by the addressee does not leave the sender (and the message itself) untouched. Not 
only is it the saying that acts as a ‘doing’, but the hearing likewise has a certain 
performativity.
109
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However, before we risk placing too much emphasis on the hearer or the recipient 
we must insist again that it is still the case that the addressee is included in the 
message, and that the one who hears it understands herself to have been predicted 
or prophesied. She is answering to a call that pre-existed her. But only in and by 
means of the arrival is it constituted as already having been sent. This complex 
backwards and forwards in time (the before that comes after) also pertains to the 
identity of the addressee. For even though there must be a certain quality of 
already-ness to the recipient, as we have said – otherwise she would not be 
equipped to receive the call – nevertheless the ‘me’ that hears is only ‘already 
there’ after I have heard the call. All of this accounts for the backwards travel of the 
arrow: the moment it arrives it will already have arrived. If the call sent out (by 
Nietzsche or whomever) were known in advance then nothing would transpire in 
this movement, nothing would truly be heard. I can only hear it, receive it, take it 
on board, if it is not already known to me. Thus, Derrida speaks in ‘Telepathy’ of a 
letter that would be... 
 
launched toward some unknown addressee at the moment of its writing, an 
addressee unknown to himself or herself, if one can say that, and who is 
determined, as you very well know how to be, on receipt of the letter; […] 
this is quite another thing than the transfer of a message. Its content and its 
end no longer precede it.
110
 
 
In reading Nietzsche’s call to future philosophers and sensing/deciding that it 
‘speaks to me’, that he is addressing me, there is of course a certain recognition, a 
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feeling that it awakens something in me that is already familiar. In other words I 
must be hospitable to it in order to receive the message in the first place. But 
although I feel this evident familiarity, the thoughts or feelings that it gives rise to 
within me did not precede the receipt of the message. Only after receiving it do I 
have the sense that I felt that way all along. If I am deeply affected by the work of a 
great writer like Proust and feel as if he speaks directly to my innermost private 
experience I can imagine that it was written for me and to me.
111
 Proust 
telepathically knew what I am thinking and how I feel. However, if this recognition 
pertained to something that I simply already knew then reading Proust would hold 
nothing for me, it would merely be a succession of trite sentiments and truisms. So 
again, only after the receipt of the message will I have already known what it has to 
tell me.
112
 However, we must reiterate the complex reciprocity and circuitousness 
of this relationship, for through my reading the sender and the message itself are 
altered. This is not only true in the case of a highly accomplished reader of Proust 
like Walter Benjamin for example, but even on a banal level, the meaning it has in 
the context of my life, the significance I bestow upon it cannot have preceded my 
reading it. Yet once I read it, it was already there waiting for me, for the words do 
not change.
113
 ‘In this encounter the destiny of a life is knotted, of several lives at 
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the same time’.114 The sender is therefore the ‘split effect’ rather than the ‘simple 
origin of teleiopoesis.’115 Prior to the teleiopoetic effect neither the sender nor the 
receiver (qua sender and receiver) are fully constituted subjects; they only become 
the selves that they maintain in the relationship through the relationship.
116
 
 
We can see now that this magical symbiotic (telepathic) relationship is not limited 
to such exceptional cases as predicting the coming of the Messiah or the 
philosopher of the future, or responding to the work of a great artist, but can have 
general applicability. In friendship, or in a love affair, both parties – the ‘me’ and 
the ‘you’ – are to a large extent constituted in and by that very relationship. This is 
evidenced in a superficial manner by the way in which friends or lovers start to pick 
up on one another’s mannerisms, develop a shared sense of humour, and how we 
often ‘behave differently’ when we are among different friends.  
 
When I address the other as a friend for the first time, if he or she answers to it in 
friendship then a certain backwards leap will have taken place: we will already 
have been friends. ‘You say “me” the unique addressee and everything begins 
between us. Starting out from nothing’.117 Whatever the common ground which 
pre-exists our becoming friends (we attended the same school, we have shared 
interests), the moment the bond of friendship is made these matters will have been 
irrelevant. They cannot be the cause, since there were others with the same 
interests, the same experiences whom I do not count as friends, and we can cease to 
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share these interests without thereby ceasing to be friends (indeed with many of the 
friends we have retained from childhood we may no longer have anything in 
common other than our friendship itself.) Thus it is founded on a void: the ‘me’ that 
addresses you as a friend and the ‘you’ that answers are constituted the moment the 
address is received, for again, within this relationship neither is who they are or 
were outside of it. Consequently the addressee remains ‘unknown’ even when I do 
know the identity of the person to whom I have spoken, for in answering it he or 
she will not be who they were prior to it. Likewise I, as sender, am transformed. 
Hence this aforementioned leap, from which ‘everything begins between us.’ This 
is again a strangely cyclical movement, where, in the case of the picking up of the 
other’s mannerisms, I imitate you imitating me imitating you, etc. 
 
We considered earlier the experience of the ‘receiver’ in telepathic communication 
and wondered how that transmitted content would be manifested to thought. We 
there suggested that telepathy would muddy the waters of the sender-receiver 
relationship and problematise the notion of there being an ‘originator’ of the 
thought. Here the situation is the same, it is an active passivity and a passive 
activity. We ‘give by receiving’,118 and ‘make come’ by ‘letting come’.119 So we 
can say that although telepathy/teleiopoesis would not and could not enable me to 
hurdle the abyss separating me from another, what it does enable is for me to enter 
into a relationship with the other where we, to some extent, become one. We each 
give birth to something that belongs to both of us, is shared between us, and that 
neither of us possesses outside of that relationship. Freud insists on the distinction 
between ‘telepathy’ and ‘thought transference’, conceding the latter while rejecting 
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the former, and the conception of thought transference that Freud develops retains 
and requires a direction of travel – the repressed wish of one is transported to the 
other. The concept of telepathy developed by Derrida on the other hand denies such 
an agency between stable identities. It is no longer even a matter of 
intersubjectivity, which implies a certain occasionalism, and would be a merely 
external relationship between isolated, fully constituted subjects. However, this 
cyclical symbiosis remains a closeness in distance, attested to once again by the 
tele- in telepathy/teleiopoesis. I cannot take the other’s place, nor he mine, and 
responding to this address or answering the call, ‘which you are invited to do to the 
best of your ability […] remains your absolutely and irreplaceably singular 
responsibility.’120 Whether and how we respond can only be assumed by the 
respondent themselves, there is no programme or guarantee.
121
 
 
Responsibility, Freedom, Death: The Aporia of Ownness 
 
This question of responsibility brings us back to the earlier quotation from Kant’s 
second Critique. There we suggested that freedom, which is tied to the moral law, 
is that which makes my life truly my own; that singular individuality that 
Kierkegaard suggests is concealed by the generality of language is my very 
spontaneity. This freedom, as freedom from natural determinants, means that 
nothing can abrogate me from my responsibility: if I commit a wrongdoing I can 
have no recourse to a because (it is because I was born this way, or because I was 
neglected as a child, etc.) The fact that I am ultimately responsible for my actions 
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and am not a mere causal mechanism is the condition of freedom. Furthermore, 
only I can take responsibility for myself, which is of course the condition and 
definition of responsibility. So freedom, responsibility and selfhood are all here 
inextricably intertwined. Indeed, as Derrida puts it in The Gift of Death, through 
readings of Jan Patočka, Levinas and Heidegger, responsibility is nothing else than 
the ‘experience of one’s absolute singularity.’122 Being responsible means 
experiencing oneself as an irreplaceable individual, in that I cannot pass this 
responsibility onto anybody else. Derrida grounds the consciousness of 
responsibility in an experience of death, drawing on Heidegger’s (and Patočka’s) 
analysis of death as that which no one can do for me or in my place.
123
 It is not as 
an already established I that I take up an attitude or stance towards death, rather the 
identity of the I is bestowed by death: ‘My irreplaceability is therefore conferred, 
delivered, “given,” one can say, by death.’124 Only through this experience of death 
as my death, as uniquely mine, am I constituted as a self that is responsible, and 
hence free. As we saw in our second chapter, being-possible is the being proper to 
Dasein (I do not have possibilities, rather I am my possibilities), and death is said 
by Heidegger to be the pre-eminent possibility, or my ‘ownmost nonrelational 
possibility not to be bypassed’.125 Death, then, as Heidegger formulates it, is that 
which is most my own and that which opens the very possibility of ownness, 
experienced as responsibility. It is death that individuates me as uniquely 
responsible and as an absolutely distinct, separate subject. Everything throughout 
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my life that I can do, think or say could conceivably be done, thought or said by 
another. Death, as my own death, is the one ‘experience’ that can be undergone by 
each of us alone. So nowhere do I experience my uniqueness and unsubstitutability 
except in death, in which ‘all relations to other Dasein are dissolved’.126 Since 
nobody can die in my place nobody can ever take over my experience, or know 
first-hand ‘what-it-is-like’ to be me. If we were not finite beings, burdened with the 
knowledge that one day we will die, this limitation to one’s own experience and 
perspective would not bear upon us, but this is because there would be no I as such. 
 
This then, at base, would constitute the abyss or gap between one subject and 
another. The impossibility of ‘really knowing’ the other’s mind is the impossibility 
of giving, taking or assuming the other’s death. No unus mundus, no telepathy 
could ever overcome this gap without destroying us along with it. For what each of 
these concepts affirm is the possibility of a shared knowledge or experience, and 
this indeed puts into question the privacy of any specific experience and the extent 
to which any of my thoughts, ideas, opinions and affective sentiments could be said 
to be decidedly my own: in all of these aspects my place can be taken by another. 
However, death, responsibility, freedom, are the point at which my experience 
becomes my own, that is, uniquely singular and distinct from that of the other. 
 
Insofar as nobody can take responsibility for me (as in take over my responsibility) 
or die for me (in the sense of dying in my place, taking my death away from me) 
then each person’s experience is indeed, as Nietzsche holds, ‘incomparably 
personal, unique, and infinitely individual’. Firstly, since responsibility (qua 
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experience of selfhood) is always mine alone it cannot be compared with anyone 
else’s. We may speak of collective or shared responsibility, but in the final instance 
it remains only mine. As Kierkegaard insists, I cannot appeal to general or 
universally applicable laws to guide or justify my behaviour, for this would be an 
abrogation of my own singular responsibility. Levinas, paraphrasing a character 
from Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, often writes ‘All men are 
responsible for one another and I more than anyone else’.127 Thus my responsibility 
is incomparable because I am more responsible than the other: my responsibility is 
all that I can speak about and so it cannot be compared or weighed up against 
another’s. As soon as I factor in the other’s responsibility (towards me for 
example), I disavow my own responsibility towards him, introducing calculation 
and scheming into my behaviour. Furthermore, ‘[how] can I admit his 
responsibility for me without immediately finding myself […] responsible for his 
responsibility itself. To be me is always to have one more responsibility.’128 It 
follows that this excess of my responsibility over the other’s is an exponential 
escalation, ‘increasing in the measure that it is assumed’,129 which accounts for the 
‘infinity’ of responsibility. For since responsibility is the experience of selfhood 
itself, there is no point at which I will have had done with it, or discharged myself 
of it. The moment I am no longer responsible, I am no longer a subject. 
 
However, it will not have escaped notice that there has been a slight but 
fundamental shift in our account of the uniqueness of responsibility. From resting 
on an essential solitude (the solitude of death), it has now have taken on an evident 
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sociality. Responsibility for oneself, for one’s own actions and behaviour, has 
passed into responsibility for, and towards, the other. For Levinas never ceases to 
reproach Heidegger for privileging one’s own mortality ahead of all others and 
insisting upon our necessary separation-in-death. Levinas even suggests that 
selfhood, or ipseity, derives not from my own death at all but rather from the 
other’s death. The upsurge of responsibility that ensues precedes consciousness or 
free commitment. This is a responsibility even before there is any I able to take up 
or assume that responsibility. It is a responsibility, finally, which did not arise in or 
from a decision taken by a free subject, but which originates outside of me and 
assigns me to be a subject. For Levinas, one’s singularity as I arises through one’s 
being ‘chosen without choosing’,130 which is a passivity infinitely more passive 
than receptivity, since receptivity presupposes a capacity or ability to receive that 
precedes that which it receives. Consciousness, as Levinas often writes, is 
inseparable from activity: anything that affects consciousness from the outside can 
always, by its assenting to it, be assumed by consciousness as if it were its own 
invention. Responsibility to the other, however, cannot be something freely decided 
upon or assumed by a fully constituted subject, nor can it be something empirically 
learned through the experience of sharing the world with others. I cannot decide to 
be or not to be responsible for the other, it is something that falls upon me prior to 
all decision: ‘In the face of the other man I am inescapably responsible and 
consequently the unique and chosen one.’131 As such, rather than coinciding with 
freedom, as we suggested above, responsibility for Levinas precedes my freedom, 
                                                 
130
 Otherwise than Being, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981) p. 57. 
131
 ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’, in The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell , 1989) p. 
84. 
312 
 
and even precedes the I, in an ‘immemorial past’132 that cannot be recovered or 
brought under my spontaneity. It would take us too far from our main problem were 
we to provide more than this brief sketch of that which is developed over 200 pages 
in Otherwise than Being, but if this hyperbolical responsibility to the other precedes 
the I and calls upon me to be an I then we can perhaps understand how ‘the death of 
the other preoccupies the human being-there [Dasein] before his own death’.133 
Thus, before taking up a position toward my own death I am concerned about, and 
implicated in, the other’s death. Henceforth, death can no longer be thought of as 
that which annuls or unties all relations to the other and brings me before myself in 
my ‘ownmost nonrelational possibility’, but as primarily that which divests me of 
concern for myself and my own being. 
 
For Levinas, then, it is the other’s death that is pre-eminent, and it is concern over 
the death of the other, over his mortality and vulnerability, that calls upon me to be 
a subject: 
 
This would be the I of the one who is chosen to answer for his fellowman 
and is thus identical to itself, and thus the self. A uniqueness of chosenness! 
[…] The priority of the other over the I, by which the human being-there is 
chosen and unique, is precisely the latter’s response to the nakedness of the 
face and its mortality. It is there that the concern for the other’s death is 
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realised, and that ‘dying for him’ ‘dying his death’ takes priority over 
‘authentic’ death.134  
 
Thus it is still in responsibility, as that which concerns only me, that I experience 
my irreplaceability and uniqueness, but this irreplaceability is awakened in 
answering to the call of responsibility to the other rather than in facing up to my 
own mortality. Only I can answer to it; he addresses me, and I cannot defer or avoid 
this responsibility – even fleeing from it or disavowing it is still responding to it. So 
it is an I that is elected or chosen, born outside of itself, in sociality, rather than an I 
that arises in selfhood from its ownmost possibility, and thus bracketing off social 
relations. The important point is that, contra Heidegger, for Levinas the ‘my 
ownness’ of selfhood is derived and secondary, and the other precedes the I. 
 
It obviously cannot be a matter of our deciding between one or the other of these 
two positions, or proving or disproving one or the other. But whichever death 
precedes the other in terms of priority – whether this is an ethical, ontological or 
temporal priority, – nothing Levinas can pose in objection to Heidegger can deny 
the latter’s key insight that my concern for the other’s death, even if this takes 
primacy over concern for my own death, cannot lead to my dying that death for 
him, and as such taking it away from him. Likewise, this priority of the other’s 
death over my own cannot alter the existential fact that it is in every case my death 
that I will die, and never the other’s. Even if I were to take a bullet for another, 
though I may have saved him from dying at this particular moment and thus 
prolonged his life, I have in no way taken his death away from him or died in his 
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place. Nor have I died or experienced his death (meaning that the death that I 
undergo is not mine but the other’s) even if this death (the bullet that kills me) were 
meant for someone else. And as Derrida puts it,  
 
Once it is established that I cannot die for another (in his place) although I 
can die for him (by sacrificing myself for him or dying before his eyes), my 
own death becomes this irreplaceability that I must assume if I wish to have 
access to what is absolutely mine.
135
 
 
Interestingly, the previously discussed film Brainstorm attempts to approach this 
problem of whether one’s own death could be taken over or undergone by the other. 
In the film, one of the researchers has a cardiac arrest in the laboratory while 
wearing the headset device and thus ‘uploads’ her death for Christopher Walken’s 
character to experience. Unfortunately at this point the film lapses into ponderous 
metaphysical fantasy involving some kind of celestial afterlife, and by thus 
conceiving of death as a passage into another place, and hence as an experience – 
the ultimate experience, in every sense of the word – the real problem is avoided, 
and the true ‘experience’ of death as one’s ‘ownmost nonrelational possibility not 
to be bypassed’, that is already presupposed and ‘understood’ in any such 
metaphysico-theologico-fictional speculation is missed. Admittedly however, it is 
difficult to conceive of a different route for the film to have taken at this point, 
since ‘death’ cannot be represented without dissimulating it as a phenomenon of 
life. But then, if death cannot be presented, made known, or ‘experienced’ at all, 
how am I to have this immediate encounter with my death – as my most proper 
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possibility – that individuates me as an irreplaceable subject? This is the problem 
Derrida raises in Aporias: if death is, as Heidegger often phrases it, the possibility 
of the impossibility of Dasein – the possibility of Dasein’s ‘no-longer-being-able-
to-be-there’136 – would this be possibility as impossibility, or impossibility as 
possibility? The two alternatives are not interchangeable, for while the former 
cancels or annuls itself as possibility (possibility would be precisely that which is 
no longer possible), the latter still appears within the space of the possible: 
impossibility would still be able to appear as such, as something Dasein is capable 
of. 
 
As Derrida suggests, Heidegger’s whole existential analytic rests on the latter 
interpretation, on death being a possibility-of-being that presents itself and ‘to 
which Dasein relates.’137 Death, as the very impossibility of all presentation, all 
appearing – ‘the disappearance, the end, the annihilation of the as such’138 – must, 
for Heidegger’s analysis to hold, nevertheless present itself, show itself, or appear 
to Dasein – ‘as such.’ Even though it is impossibility itself, it must be awaited or 
anticipated as possibility – indeed as our ‘ownmost possibility’. It is this experience 
of death – the paradoxical appearance or presentation of the impossibility of all 
appearance or presentation – that distinguishes Dasein from all other forms of life. 
But if we can no longer appeal to such an experience how is this distinction to be 
upheld? For if ‘the impossibility of the “as such” is indeed the impossibility of the 
“as such,” it is also what cannot appear as such.’139 And if animals do not have an 
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experience of, or relation to death as such, ‘neither does man, that is precisely the 
point!’140 
 
So perhaps the somewhat clumsy, naïve and unsophisticated representation of the 
experience of death given in the film Brainstorm (as well as any other similar 
account we would care to mention) cannot necessarily be so clearly distinguished 
from the authentic, primordial understanding described by Heidegger. While the 
former resorts to a metaphysics of death, speculating upon what lies beyond, and 
thus betraying the prior, existential experience of death, the latter likewise relies on 
death being something that can be presented ‘as such’ – again, on impossibility 
appearing as possibility. The demarcation between the metaphysical understanding 
of death and the more originary or fundamental experience is thus ‘untenable’, in 
that ‘it cannot even claim to have any coherence or rigorous specificity.’141 For 
what could this experience of death be that Heidegger opposes to the inauthentic 
one? How could we ‘relate’ to that to which by definition we cannot relate? 
 
So death, as our most proper possibility, which must be assumed or taken up as 
such, is also, at the same time ‘the least proper’,142 and that to which I must relate 
as what is most my own is also that which is least my own, to which I cannot relate. 
This knot cannot be untied by taking Derrida to mean that Heidegger is wrong in 
his insistence on the ‘mineness’ of death, for it remains the case that each dies his 
own death, and that as such it is surely my death that is most properly mine and no-
one else’s. However, since I cannot relate to my death, it is simultaneously that 
which is least my own and which in fact has nothing to do with me. The most and 
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the least, the proper and the improper coincide and cannot be resolved into one or 
the other. There is an original contamination in the space of ‘my ownness’. This 
relation without relation accounts for how we can have such an irresolvable conflict 
regarding death such as that between Heidegger and Levinas, for both rely on an 
experience of death as such – whether my own or that of the other – that is prior to 
any empirical knowledge or experience of somebody actually dying. This 
regression to the most authentic, the most primary or the most original assumes an 
a priori, grounding encounter with death as such. However, if there is no such 
encounter, if man can have no relation with death, then the question as to whose 
death is primary must remain undecidable. Not only can I never experience the 
other’s death immediately, so I can never experience my own death either. Whether 
it is the other’s death or my own death that individuates me as an irreplaceable 
subject, it is in either case inaccessible so the question remains unanswerable. Just 
as Heidegger unravels Kant’s attempt to establish the stable foundations of finitude 
(in grounding sensibility and understanding in the imagination), so here Derrida 
does the same thing to Heidegger. The foundational experience of death that 
grounds mineness – and the whole existential analysis of Dasein – is swept away; 
again, not by passing to an even more ‘radical, originary or fundamental 
thought’,143 but by denying the possibility of any such foundationalism or 
fundamentalism. 
 
So there can be no grounding experience of ownness that is not originally impure. 
The implications for our discussion surrounding telepathy and the other are clear: at 
precisely that point at which we are most separated from the other, and closest to 
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ourselves, we are furthest away from ourselves. From the beginning, in addition to 
attempting to discover whether the I can ever experience the other’s experience, we 
have also been trying to trace a clear line of separation between that which is my 
own and that which also belongs to the other. While the original communicability, 
and hence universality, of every thought and experience was conceded, we seemed 
to have reached the ultimate point of absolute uniqueness and singularity in death. 
Here, at least, was an ‘experience’ that was truly mine and which could not be 
expropriated, but on further investigation this turns out to have been the very 
essence of expropriation. So if mineness cannot be rigorously grounded or 
delineated, neither, it seems, can my singularity as distinct from universality. This 
is of course not to say that I would ever confuse myself with anyone else, or 
dissolve altogether into generality, but whenever I try to establish what it is that 
distinguishes me from anyone else we reach the aporia that Derrida describes. Just 
as it cannot be stated whether it is my own death or that of the other which takes 
precedence, so it cannot be decided whether intersubjectivity or individual, 
monadic subjectivity comes ‘first’. We noted above that from whichever side we 
decided to start we ran up against a problem when trying to account for the other. 
When setting out from the presupposition of intersubjectivity, there seemed to be 
nothing but intersubjectivity and when positing individual subjectivity as our point 
of departure, we inevitably had to negotiate the problem of solipsism. If this is a 
necessary undecidability then it cannot simply be the case that there is nothing that 
is truly my own, which would mean there is nothing outside the universal. 
However, nor could it be the case that there is something that is truly my own: some 
isolable, founding property. 
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Could it be that it is this irresolvable hovering between the two sides that has lain at 
the root of our whole problem in this chapter? Because the universal is not all, this 
allows us to suppose that there is some nucleus of otherness or uniqueness, outside 
of generality, that perhaps an absolute telepathic insight (or intellectual intuition) 
would enable us to access. We saw this repeatedly: language seems necessarily to 
conceal some secret kernel of selfhood that we each possess individually. However, 
such a supposition led to the impasse that we reached in our reading of Nietzsche, 
where the two sides could not be reconciled. There we suggested that either there is 
an inherent communicability and hence universality already belonging to this true, 
unique self, which undoes it from within, or there is a total absence of 
communication between the inner self and the ‘herd’ self, which leaves us once 
again with a core of selfhood that is both most our own and least our own, which 
has everything and nothing to do with us. This would be a ‘self’ hidden even from 
him or her to whom it supposedly ‘belongs’. 
 
For Derrida, such an irreducible, absolutely private self is an inescapably 
theological assumption, necessarily presupposing the infinite insight of God to 
whom it would show itself. In fact Derrida goes further than this and even suggests 
that ‘God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible 
from the interior but not from the exterior.’144 So in order to assume this 
inaccessible interiority we must co-posit a place or point of view from which it 
would be visible, as well as a witness to occupy that position. This witness that is 
so constituted is ‘at the same time other than me and more intimate with me than 
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myself’.145 So in wishing to gain access to this singular otherness of the other, we 
are once again striving after the absolute perspective of God, but this is a point of 
view that is coextensive with the object viewed. In other words, it is a God 
constituted in order to secure the possibility of this interiority, with each necessarily 
implying the other. Rather than a transcendent being able to see and know all, God 
is this radical interiority that would allow each of us to withdraw from the 
universal. This perhaps points towards a different interpretation of intellectual 
intuition, for if the latter is a cognition whose object, rather than pre-existing it, is 
originally created in and through that cognition, then here also we have an ‘object’ 
(this secret interior self) that only is through divine observation, and which can be 
only so long as it is being observed. However, here the relationship is reversed, for 
it is effectively the object that creates its observer. Only so long as we assume the 
object itself can there (and must there) be this witness to it. If, as we suggested 
above, there is no property of ownness, then the absolute point of view vanishes 
with it. 
 
So if there is no unique, singular kernel of selfhood, this desire to see into the other 
in his or her core of otherness – to gain access to the vantage point of God – will 
always be frustrated; we will always be on the outside, in the universal, but at the 
same time knowing that the universal does not account for everything. This, 
however, is not due to our being unequal to the divine gaze of the Creator, or being 
incapable of penetrating deeply enough; rather, the very thing that would ensure the 
unknowability of the other would be that there is nothing (or no thing) there to 
know.
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Conclusion 
 
The initial project I had decided to undertake in this work could be summarised as 
follows: something truly extraordinary appears to be on the horizon: a technology 
capable of giving positive existence to the contents of the mind and thus 
overcoming the finite gap between thought and external reality; however, is this 
really the case? Clearly, then, a certain level of scepticism was predominant from 
the beginning. As already acknowledged (on p. 9n), the seed from which the 
present work grew was the extract from Žižek’s The Parallax View which drove the 
second chapter. (To repeat: ‘In the terms of German Idealism, this means that what 
Kant called “intellectual intuition” – the closing of the gap between mind and 
reality, a mind-process which, in a causal way, directly influences reality, this 
capacity that Kant attributed only to the infinite mind of God – is now potentially 
available to all of us, that is to say, we are potentially deprived of one of the basic 
features of our finitude.’)1 A bold, provocative statement, casually made, was to be 
investigated and subjected to scrutiny. And since the depiction at the beginning of 
the first chapter of an artist’s frustration was borne out of experience, there was an 
autobiographical stake in these questions from the beginning. Many times while 
studying as a practicing artist I had fantasied a thaumaturgical power that would 
allow one’s ideas to emerge unspoiled and fully-formed directly from thought, so 
these technologies seemed suspiciously providential – too good to be true as it 
were. 
 
                                                 
1
 In the interests of full disclosure I should perhaps say that I first came across this identical passage 
in another of Žižek’s works, the ‘Author’s Afterword’ to the book of essays entitled The Universal 
Exception (London & New York: Continuum, 2006.) 
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However, it soon became clear that if the outcome was not to be predetermined in 
advance it was necessary to move away from the safety of scepticism and rethink 
the terms of the question, for, as is often the case, the presuppositions in place at the 
point of departure will to a large extent dictate the destination. It could be said then 
that by following Žižek and asking whether the finite gap between internal and 
external could be transcended by means of technology we were always going to be 
thwarted in this effort due to its underlying assumptions. As stated in the discussion 
at the end of Chapter Three surrounding Jung and the unus mundus, by approaching 
the problem as an incommensurable gap we foreclose any possibility of the two 
sides being reconciled. Thus after having reached a certain impassable limit we 
were compelled to attempt to think the relationship otherwise and so to transcend it 
by alternative means. This was done, as already noted, because it seemed that 
unless there is a faculty of the mind that transcends the receptivity constitutive of 
finitude then no technological appendage can truly have such radical consequences 
as it may seem at first sight to present. 
 
The rub of course is that once we have traversed this abyssal space by an alternative 
route in order to secure the technology’s radical potential we then find that we no 
longer need the instrument at all, for that which we had hoped to achieve was, by 
approaching it from a different vantage point, already achieved. So it seems that 
either way the prosthesis fails to bridge the gap: if there is this insurmountable gulf 
then no instrument, however advanced, could fully overcome it; but if we can 
conceive the relationship rather along the lines of a continuum or neutral space then 
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in effect we already have what we are looking for and the tool is no longer needed.
2
 
(Furthermore, as has often been insisted, no medium or apparatus can be simply 
and conveniently effaced or erased from the operation that it performs, so it would 
be a mistake to leave the interface itself out of consideration when speculating upon 
the possibility of an immediate coincidence of internal and external. That which 
facilitates this immediacy – if immediacy it is – will always intervene in the 
procedure and the art created or the desires fulfilled are not merely passively 
enabled but are actively shaped and affected by this technological intermediary.) 
 
However, it may perhaps have seemed as if our musings on telepathy have marked 
something of a retreat from the precipice initially approached in the previous 
chapter. There, in the final subdivision of Chapter Three entitled ‘Synchronicity 
and the Unus Mundus’, we appeared to abandon caution in favour of a more 
adventurous speculative approach, breaking with the theme of a melancholy 
finitude forever at one remove from reality and embracing a form of metaphysical 
monism. So where does our fourth and final chapter sit in relation to what has been 
accomplished in the pages immediately preceding it? Essentially this is a question 
as to the relationship between intersubjectivity and ontology, or, the respective 
approaches to the two ‘gaps’. 
 
What Jung posits under the name of synchronicity is that there exists a form of 
intuited content (or ‘“immediacy” of psychic images’) that is neither ‘received’ nor 
‘produced’ by the subject. The event of synchronicity is the acausal co-occurrence 
                                                 
2
 It should perhaps be reiterated that none of this is put forward as a critique of the technologies 
themselves, as if one were imprudent enough to suggest that all of the work being done in this field 
is in vain. The immensely beneficial consequences such capabilities will have on a practical level 
cannot be underestimated, in particular for people with physical disabilities. It will be clear, 
however, that our enquiries here have been centred on a more essential, ontological level. 
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of separate manifestations – psychical and physical – of the ‘same living reality.’ 
Could a similar statement, with certain precautions, not be made about the form of 
telepathy that we have arrived at? For we have suggested, via Derrida, that 
telepathy is not that which will enable me to break out of my own cloistered interior 
and gain absolute access to the private inner space of another, but is rather that 
which renders such interiority suspect, necessitating that we reconceive the 
relationship altogether. This was what lay behind the move from telepathy as it is 
commonly envisaged to teleiopoesis, which can no longer be considered along the 
lines of the simple transmission of a message between two or more self-identical 
subjects; rather, each is changed in and by the liaison. Like synchronicity, this is no 
longer a question of activity and passivity but of a quasi-mysterious sharing or 
sympathy. So when we described the relationship as a form of symbiosis in which 
each subject gives birth to something that none possess individually we could 
perhaps consider this too as being the respective manifestations – in me and in the 
other(s) – of the ‘same living reality’. There is thus no stable dividing line between 
me and the other, for telepathy (or teleiopoesis) undermines the very notion of a 
fully constituted, separate, self-contained subject. As we saw, even death, that 
ultimate punctuation point, cannot be the locus at which this relationship is 
stabilised and the identity of the subjects firmly fixed and isolated. 
 
Admittedly, the space for convergence between Derrida and Jung here is small and 
contestable, and has involved a certain bending of terminology, as well as a degree 
of revisionism in our reading of Jung. For this ‘same’ (living reality) is no doubt 
not ‘the same’ in each case. While synchronicity involves a bifurcation of what is 
essentially one, there is no ‘essence’ or ‘identity’ of what takes place in 
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telepathy/teleiopoesis that is (subsequently or simultaneously) instantiated in 
separate subjects, as if it were a self-identical, transpersonal ‘content’. We have 
already shown that the unus mundus hypothesis, while offering a way out of the 
impasse between thought and object, has little to say regarding the intersubjective 
‘gap’ or relation. Thus the final question in our third chapter, which led into our 
discussions around telepathy, asked: if the gap between thought and that which is 
given to thought no longer holds sway, what about the multiple ‘sites’ or ‘instances’ 
of thought? Does it follow that we are all in some sense ‘the same’ on this 
antecedent substratum that is prior to the differentiation of thought and being? Yet 
if this is so how do we account for the splitting into multiplicity and the emergence 
of individuation? Here we meet once again with the question of universality and 
singularity that has been our guiding question for much of the final chapter. As we 
have already noted, while unus mundus posits a certain shared, universal structure 
of experience, there must nevertheless remain the contrary aspect of singularity and 
difference, unless we all are to dissolve into oneness. This is why the outcome of 
our discussion on telepathy has been rather more ambiguous than that reached in 
the third chapter, for this lack of a stable point of separation between subjects and 
the reduction of distance does not amount to a neutral unity. As already stated, the 
gap here is simultaneously reaffirmed as it is undermined. Applying a familiar 
locution of Derrida’s we might say that ‘there is’3 mineness, interiority, separation, 
but that this is not a limit that can be touched or delineated: that which individuates 
me and keeps me at an infinite distance from the other is not a thing, a quality, a 
property, or an ‘experience’. In fact we can take the next step and say that it is the 
                                                 
3
 Cf., for example Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), where we read that ‘there is gift’ (p. 10) – i.e. outside of the 
circle of economic exchange – but ‘the gift does not exist and does not present itself.’ (p. 15.) 
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fact that there is no such thing, quality, property or experience that ensures the 
finite gap of unknowability between subjects. 
 
Finitude thus returns, but it is no longer a negatively defined finitude of lack or 
diminution, positing a reality that we are forever separated from. Nor is it 
characterised in opposition to a limit concept, say of intellectual intuition, in which 
(or in whom) this lack is overcome. For the very idea that there is something more, 
something private, that telepathy would enable us to gain access to, is precisely 
what must be abandoned. 
 
So each time there was something that appeared to be definitively out of reach, a 
‘great outdoors’ separated from a closed interior, and each time, albeit in different 
ways, we have shown that this is not necessarily the case. In the first instance we 
did this by annulling the separation itself and in the second by refusing the very 
idea that there is ‘something’ that we are separated from or that we could reach: 
something positive and self-identical. So again, only so long as we dream of 
overcoming finitude via technology does it present itself to us as something in need 
of being overcome. We have already seen that the idea that the other hides an 
irreducibly secret self from me necessarily assumes the existence of a divine 
observer who can see what I cannot. Likewise, the idea that we are permanently 
distanced from reality, as Meillassoux has shown, not only provides a space for but 
seems actively to encourage the thought of a deity to fill that gap. So by thus 
denying the gap, in its different ways, we are not attaining to the position of the 
divine observer and by doing so attaining the faculty of intellectual intuition, but 
actually denying the possibility of any such infinite vantage point or faculty. 
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